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SUMMARY 
The development and implementation of community-based forest management systems is 
considered a promising approach to increase forest sustainability. Furthermore, offering 
economic incentives is essential to halt CO2 emissions due to land-use changes and deforestation 
in developing countries. A number of mechanisms have recently emerged which support policies 
to reduce emissions from forest-use changes. These include Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES) and REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and the 
enhancement of carbon stocks). REDD+ is a voluntary instrument proposed as the least expensive 
way to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions in the forestry sector. Nevertheless, there is 
increasing uncertainty as to whether sufficient institutional capacity exists to implement these 
mechanisms, as well as a lack of clarity concerning the optimal implementation mechanism for 
REDD+. This uncertainty suggests the need to come up with appropriate implementation models 
to ensure the site-level effectiveness of REDD+ in developing countries. Without action, the 
expected outcomes from this voluntary instrument could be undermined by inappropriate 
institutional arrangements and the challenges of poverty in tropical countries. It is also feared that 
local populations may lose out in these promising incentive schemes for forest protection. This is 
because the value of the natural resources and their commoditization will likely increase 
following the implementation of such mechanisms, while the interests of more powerful 
stakeholders may predominate if social safeguards are not clearly defined. Nevertheless, 
successful REDD+ could also become an important instrument for policy makers in defining 
strategies for poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation.  
Several countries in Africa have developed their REDD+ readiness portfolios in order to fulfil at 
least one of the conditions necessary to benefit from international funding. This is the case for 
Ghana, Tanzania, D.R.Congo, Madagascar, Ethiopia and many others. Cameroon had initially 
lagged behind, but the government and a number of involved stakeholders have been working 
hard since then to meet the requirements. However, the approach used in international 
negotiations to develop mechanisms such as CDM, REDD and REDD+ was top-down with little 
or no contribution from stakeholders, especially those at the local level where deforestation 
drivers are actually rooted. This clearly questions the sustainability of the ongoing REDD+ 
schemes in the tropics. It may also create doubts about the overall level of engagement, in terms 
xxi 
 
of transparency and effective participation, along the whole REDD+ value chain. In the absence 
of the latter, the overall emissions reductions achieved, as well as the effectiveness of the policy 
reforms yet to be enacted by African countries to support REDD+ and other incentives, will be 
negatively affected.  
Thus, the present research argues that REDD+ may suffer from a lack of local acceptance, if the 
already agreed interventions do not build on the lessons learnt from previous management 
experiences and local community perceptions. Furthermore, the exact nature of the socio-
economic factors that determine farmers’ decisions to choose a certain type of land use over 
another in Cameroon are yet to be determined. An integrated understanding of the above is most 
likely to deliver a positive interplay between REDD+ stakeholders and the health of forested 
landscapes, at the same time generating policy instruments consistent with good governance 
principles across scales.  
As it is, this doctoral work contributes to the ongoing climate change debates for better policy 
actions and clearer implementation options of the REDD+ mechanism in Cameroon. The thesis 
presents the factors and social safeguards which could be used to restructure the current incentive 
and forest governance schemes, with the overall aim of effectively reducing carbon emissions, 
while at the same time improving community livelihoods in the tropical forests of Cameroon and 
beyond. 
The study addresses these issues firstly by exploring current knowledge of REDD+ and REDD+-
related regulations at country level. The latter may underpin local-level actions and govern 
effectiveness in emissions reduction and the functioning of carbon-stock schemes. Secondly, 
field data was collected through structured and semi-structured questionnaires, using qualitative 
approaches such as the Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) methodology. Data was then 
modeled using a binomial logistic regression. The third step was to map the institutional 
landscape for REDD+ using a qualitative approach called “the grounded theory”. The perceived 
capacity potentials and gaps with regard to identified functions across the national REDD+ 
implementation process were rated through a pre-designed institutional learning process. Finally, 
an assessment was conducted on community perceptions of REDD+ incentive options using a 
payment card. We then gathered perceptions on social and environmental safeguards emerging 
xxii 
 
from previous UNFCCC decisions and IPCC guidelines. This aimed to ensure equity and 
mitigate conflict following the lessons learnt from current forest policy instruments in the 
country.   
Our results evidence four important findings which show the need for a cross-sectoral 
transformational change. The findings also indicate the need for proper guidelines on how to 
tackle uncertainties and risks that may undermine stakeholders’ involvement in REDD+ at both 
local and national levels.  
First, the binary logit regression model (chapter four) helped us to understand to what extent 
socio-economic factors impact on changes in forest cover at a local level. The model outcomes 
showed three specific factors guiding farmers’ decisions to keep land either as farmland or 
fallow: a) the proportion of non-farm income to total income; b) the economically active age of 
the farmer; and c) field ownership alongside compensation options. From our findings, we 
concluded that REDD+ design and implementation should be based on high community 
willingness to get involved. Further, forest policies would gain by factoring in REDD+ as an 
instrument for poverty reduction within a broader sustainable development approach. 
Second, a schematic model for the governance of carbon emission reductions was developed, 
comprising five functions. Model robustness analysis indicated that if implemented, it could be a 
game changer by introducing new management bodies and new ideas into the REDD+ process. 
Being a recent policy instrument, REDD+ is nested within global forest governance and 
institutional frameworks. In terms of forest management, solutions should be identified to 
overcome past failures associated with continuous forest-cover destruction alongside local 
population disinterest in conservation. For the model to deliver on its expected performance, a 
cross-sectoral, practical implementation framework is suggested. This involves redesigning 
incentives, actors, information and power relations. This would allow the incorporation of all 
stakeholders’ viewpoints, but would remain flexible to the experimental nature of the REDD+ 
road ahead. Our findings in chapters five and six arguably raise the issue of how an effective 
governance structure could become an enabling mechanism for a performance-based REDD+ 
implementation process in the ongoing multi-actor and multi-scale arena. As there is no clear 
policy framework for REDD+ initiatives across scales in Cameroon, the latter implies that their 
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implementation may not meet international requirements. This, in turn, could lead to failures to 
meet standards set by certified donors who have, so far, pledged no less than USD 4.5 billion 
dollars to REDD+ in around 50 developing countries. In line with current recommendations, our 
findings suggest that cross-sectoral REDD+ policy measures need to be enacted. These could be 
developed without the need to change existing laws and codes.  
Third, another part of the research dealt with disparities detected with regard to the governance 
structure prevailing in Cameroon’s forest sector. These are exacerbated by confusion about the 
roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholders involved, as well as the pseudo-devolution noted 
in forest resource management. Current stakeholder involvement does not meet the requirements 
of the numerous legal instruments that have been enacted in the country. Therefore, all 
stakeholders need to learn from both past and present initiatives to develop workable action plans 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from different types of land use. In the meantime, these 
initiatives could enhance carbon stocks in target landscapes. For instance, law enforcement based 
greenhouse gas emission initiatives seem to have been a failure, because most of the regulatory 
texts and laws promulgated in the Cameroonian forest sector were developed using a purely top-
down approach, and were consequently implemented in a dictatorial style. As detailed in chapter 
five, this resulted in community rights’ distortion in and around forest massifs, thus increasing 
forest destruction because, through destructive land-use practices, local people claimed to 
struggle for their survival based on the traditional beliefs about “unlimited forests” and the 
discourse of “ancestors’ lands”.  
Finally, uncertainties about institutional arrangements, participation level, forest tenure and 
carbon rights issues were found to be detrimental to the successful implementation of REDD+ 
schemes. As such, local communities may not benefit from REDD+ funds, as they are often 
misdirected by those with political and economic powers who have interests beyond 
environmental objectives. In this way, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation will be 
stimulated, escalating tree felling and thereby jeopardizing carbon sequestration and climate-
change mitigation efforts. Undertaking forest tenure reforms prior to REDD+ is important to 
ensure that forest benefits under REDD+ schemes will not only go to facilitators or 
intermediaries, but also to members of legal entities, including local communities. This requires 
greater support from international governance and control bodies, who should pay more attention 
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to the adequate application of agreed principles. This may, therefore, imply moving to a more 
comprehensive approach to REDD+ implementation that would broaden the benefits to all 
relevant actors. This entails the exploration of ways to reduce emissions across all land uses with 
an emphasis on tenure and other best practices. 
In conclusion, the above findings represent empirical evidence on how to incorporate social 
dimensions into the current climate-change debate. Our investigation was part of a series of 
REDD+ feasibility assessments conducted in the country since 2011. We believe our inquisitive 
approach during data collection and workshops, held with most REDD+ partners, has positively 
influenced and started to inform the process nationwide. In 2013, Cameroon had an ambitious 
plan to develop its national REDD+ strategy in the subsequent 3 years. Models developed and 
lessons learnt based on tenure-right analysis in southern Cameroon may serve to restructure the 
ongoing REDD+ process and frame the upcoming policy instruments. The findings also 
contribute to a better governance flow towards effective and equitable emissions reductions, both 
locally and globally.  
Furthermore, the REDD+ initiative, with its increasing complexity and growing uncertainties, 
needs to build on lessons learnt from the successes and pitfalls documented by existing forest 
management systems. More importantly, cross-landscape variations might occur in local 
perceptions, and also over time, as the REDD+ debates evolve, adding greater complexity to the 
framework. In order to capture these risks, more accurate assessments encompassing all agro-
ecological zones of Cameroon are therefore recommended. This might be important to gain a 
broader understanding not only of local perceptions but also to obtain more evidence on the 
opportunity costs of forest conservation, agricultural and afforestation activities to avoid further 
deforestation and forest degradation.  
 
Key words: humid forest, policy instruments, governance, land use, REDD+ effectiveness, 
poverty reduction, regression model, agroforestry, incentive options, community participation, 
carbon rights, forest tenure, power relations, social safeguards, sustainable development, 
Cameroon. 
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RESUME 
Le développement et l’adoption des systèmes de gestion communautaire a été considérée comme 
une approche prometteuse pour améliorer la pérennité des forêts. Les incitations économiques 
sont essentielles pour maitriser les émissions de Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) dans les pays en voie 
de développement. Des mécanismes d’application des politiques visant la réduction des 
émissions émanant des divers changements d’utilisations des forêts tels que les PSE (Payements 
des Services Ecosystémiques) et la REDD+ (Réduction des Emissions liées à la déforestation et  à 
la dégradation et l’augmentation des stocks de carbone forestier) ont émergé depuis quelques 
années. Certains acteurs pensent que ces mécanismes constitueraient une opportunité globale 
pour résorber une grande partie des GES. Cependant, il existe une incertitude quant à la capacité 
des institutions étatiques pour rendre opérationnel le mécanisme REDD+; ce qui suggère le besoin 
de développer des modèles pour éclairer sa mise en œuvre en milieu réel dans les pays moins 
avancées. Ceci signifie donc que les attentes liées à cet instrument volontaire pourraient être 
contrariées par des arrangements institutionnels inappropriés ainsi que par les défis de pauvreté 
existants dans les pays tropicaux. En plus, il y a aussi une certaine crainte que les populations 
locales et autochtones pourraient être les premiers perdants au sein des mécanismes émergents de 
protection des forêts. Cet état pourrait être expliqué partiellement par le fait que la valeur des 
ressources naturelles va probablement s’accroître et l’intérêt grandissant des autres acteurs 
tendancieux pouvant surplomber les droits des communautés si des garde-fous sociaux ne sont 
pas clairement définis. REDD+ pourrait aussi devenir un instrument politique important pour les 
décideurs dans leurs stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté et la conservation de la biodiversité. 
Plusieurs pays d’Afrique ont déjà développé leurs documents-cadres d’état de préparation à la 
REDD+ afin de remplir les conditions d’accès aux fonds internationaux du changement 
climatique. C’est le cas du Ghana, Tanzanie, RD-Congo, Madagascar, Ethiopie et plusieurs 
autres. Le Cameroun, après avoir trainé le pas derrière les autres dans le processus REDD+, a 
initié des consultations des parties prenantes depuis 2009 pour remplir les prérequis. Toutefois, 
lors des négociations internationales sur les changements climatiques (pour des 
mécanismes MDP, REDD, REDD+), l’approche utilisée n’a pas été assez participative pour tenir 
en compte les préoccupations et les droits des parties prenantes au niveau des communautés qui 
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est la base même des facteurs de déforestations. Ceci pose la question non moins fondamentale 
de la pérennité des interventions en vue si le mécanisme REDD+ venait à être mis en œuvre. Si 
l’on y ajoute l’incertitude de transparence, d’engagement authentique et de participation effective 
des acteurs, alors la REDD+ et sa chaine de valeur pourraient être négativement affectées. Ainsi, 
notre recherche postule que la REDD+ pourrait courir le risque de non acceptation au niveau local 
si elle ne tire pas des leçons des expériences et perceptions des populations locales. En somme, 
une compréhension intégrale des facteurs déterminant les choix des communautés pourrait jouer 
en faveur de la réussite de la REDD+ pendant que cette dernière génèrerait des instruments 
politiques consistants vers une bonne gouvernance locale pour une mise en œuvre peu onéreuse.  
L’objectif global de cette étude est de contribuer à la compréhension des facteurs socio-
économiques et politiques ainsi que les sauvegardes sociales qui pourraient être utilisés dans la 
restructuration des systèmes de gouvernance forestière et incitative. A la longue, il s’agira de 
parvenir à réduire effectivement les émissions issues de la déforestation et en même temps 
améliorer les conditions de vie des communautés dans les forêts tropicales du Cameroun et au-
delà. 
Cette recherche passe par une approche multidisciplinaire et multi-acteurs pour explorer l’état des 
connaissances existantes et analyser les instruments politiques en vigueur pour en cerner les 
lacunes et défis en rapport avec la concrétisation de la REDD+. Les données de terrain ont été 
collectées à travers une méthodologie qualitative utilisant des questionnaires structurés et semi-
structurés. Une partie des données a été ensuite modelée par régression logistique binomiale 
tandis que l’autre partie a fait l’objet d’analyse par l’approche « grounded theory » pour faire 
sortir la dimension institutionnelle de la RED+ au niveau national. Finalement, un examen des 
perceptions des communautés a été fait sur les options REDD+ de motivation et les sauvegardes 
socio-environnementales selon les décisions de la convention cadre des Nations Unies pour les 
Changements climatiques (CCNUCC) et le guide de du comité Intergouvernemental sur les 
changements climatiques (IPCC). Ceci visait à tirer des leçons des instruments politiques existant 
dans le secteur forestier pour assurer l’équité et l’atténuation des conflits éventuels.  
Les analyses indiquent quatre importants résultats qui connotent le besoin d’un changement 
transformationnel à travers divers secteurs. Les résultats montrent aussi que nous avons besoin 
des guides adéquats sur comment cerner les incertitudes et risques qui pourraient entraver 
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l’engagement effectif des parties prenantes dans le processus REDD+ aux niveaux tant national 
que local. 
Primo, le modèle de régression logistique binaire a été établi et nous laisse comprendre à quel 
point la pauvreté influe sur le changement du couvert forestier au niveau local. Ce modèle a 
permis d’identifier trois facteurs spécifiquement en relation avec le système de décision paysanne 
pour garder les terres soit en jachères ou en cultures. Il s’agit: a) la part des revenus non-agricoles 
dans  le revenu total du ménage; b) l’âge économiquement actif du paysan; et c) le droit de 
propriété des terres appliqué aux options de compensation. Ce qui implique que le 
développement en cours du mécanisme REDD+ devrait prendre en compte la volonté et le 
consentement des communautés d’être engagé dans le processus. De plus, les politiques 
forestières gagneraient de prendre en compte REDD+ comme un instrument de lutte contre la 
pauvreté dans un cadre plus étendu de développement durable. 
Secundo, un modèle schématique de gouvernance à cinq fonctions pour la réduction des 
émissions a été développé. L’analyse de sa robustesse montre que, si mise en œuvre, il pourrait 
être un catalyseur de changement en intégrant de nouvelles institutions et de nouvelles idées dans 
le processus REDD+. Par effet induit, un cadre institutionnel de gouvernance des forêts est 
suggéré pour assurer l’atteinte des performances attendues. Il consiste en des apports de 
nouveaux jeux de pouvoirs, d’information, d’acteurs et d’incitations. Ceci permettra 
l’incorporation des points de vue de toutes les parties prenantes tout en restant toujours flexible 
eu égard à la nature encore expérimentale de la REDD+.  Nos résultats soulève l’inquiétude quant 
à comment une structure de gouvernance effective pourrait être un mécanisme  adéquat de mise 
en œuvre du processus REDD+ basé sur les performances certifiées dans un contexte multi-
acteurs et multi-échelles. Comme au Cameroun il n’existe pas encore de cadre politique de 
gestion des initiatives REDD+, ceci implique que l’exécution de ce genre de processus pourrait ne 
pas satisfaire les exigences internationales. En retour, ce fait ferait perdre au pays plus de 4,5 
milliards de dollars promis par les bailleurs à quelques 50 pays en voie de développement pour 
faire décoller le processus REDD+. 
Tercio, un autre point important concerne les disparités détectées dans la structure de 
gouvernance du secteur forestier au Cameroun. Ces disparités sont exacerbées par une confusion 
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dans les rôles et responsabilités des parties prenantes impliquées ainsi que la pseudo-dévolution 
dans la gestion des ressources forestières. Cette situation est en contradiction réelle avec les 
nombreux  instruments légaux promulgués dans le pays. Les parties prenantes ont donc besoin de 
tirer les leçons des initiatives passées et présentes afin de développer des plans d’action 
plausibles pour réduire les émissions de GES liés aux différents types d’utilisation des terres. 
Finalement, les incertitudes quant à l’arrangement institutionnel, le niveau de participation, la 
tenure forestière et le droit au carbone forestier sont autant d’aspects trouvés très critiques pour 
réussir la mise en œuvre du mécanisme REDD+ au Cameroun. Conséquemment, les 
communautés locales pourraient ne pas bénéficier des fonds REDD+ du fait qu’elles sont souvent 
malmenées par les acteurs qui disposent des pouvoirs politiques et économiques pour des intérêts 
quelquefois au-delà des standards environnementaux. Se faisant, les facteurs de déforestation et 
de dégradation des forêts vont être stimulés de plus bel pour finalement hypothéquer le plan de 
séquestration de carbone et les efforts d’atténuation des effets dûs aux changements climatiques.   
Par ailleurs, entreprendre les réformes en matière de tenure forestière en prélude à la REDD+ 
serait important pour garantir que les retombées des forêts provenant des fonds REDD+ ne soient 
partagées seulement entre les facilitateurs et intermédiaires véreux mais doivent arriver au niveau 
de toutes les parties légales y compris les communautés locales. Ceci requiert une injonction du 
système international et un control éclairé qui ferait attention à l’application des principes clés de 
bonne gouvernance surtout l’équité, la participation et la transparence. Ceci impliquerait donc un 
changement de paradigme vers une approche REDD+ compréhensible qui, ensuite aiderait à 
étendre les divers bénéfices aux ayant-droits. Compréhensible signifierait l’exploration des voies 
de réduction des émissions avec une emphase sur la tenure afin de Réduire les Emission liés à 
Tous les Types d’Utilisation des Terres (En Anglais: REALU “Reducing Emissions from All 
Land Uses“). 
En conclusion, notre recherche présente une évidence empirique robuste sur la manière 
d’incorporer la dimension sociale et institutionnelle dans les débats actuels sur les changements 
climatiques. Cette investigation faisait partie d’une série d’études de faisabilité sur la REDD+ 
conduites au Cameroun depuis 2010. Nous croyons que notre approche inquisitive pendant la 
collecte des données et les ateliers organisés avec multiples partenaires impliqués dans la REDD+ 
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ont servi de tremplin pour la matérialisation du processus dans le pays. Le Cameroun a un plan 
ambitieux de développer sa stratégie nationale REDD+ à commencer par Janvier 2014. Les 
modèles développés et les leçons documentées à base des analyses sur les droits forestiers dans le 
Cameroun septentrional pourrait guider la restructuration de la conception du processus REDD+ 
et le développement des cadres et instruments politiques à venir. Nos résultats contribuent aussi à 
assoir un bon courant de gouvernance des ressources vers  un mécanisme plus équitable et 
effectif de réduction des émissions au niveau tant local que global. 
 
Mots clés: Forets humides, instruments politiques, REDD+, gouvernance, utilisation des terres, 
pauvreté, modèles de régression, options de motivation, communautés locales, participation, 
sauvegarde sociale, tenure forestière, droits au carbone, développement durable, Cameroun.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
De toepassing van een bottom-up bosbeheerssysteem is veelbelovend om de duurzaamheid van een bos te 
verhogen. Economische benaderingen behoren tot de belangrijkste initiatieven om broeikasgasemissies ten 
gevolge van veranderingen in landgebruik in ontwikkelingslanden terug te dringen. Mechanismen die het 
beleid steunen om emissies te verminderen bij verandering van bosgebruik, zoals betaling voor 
ecosysteemdiensten (ESD) en REDD+ (reductie van broeikasgasemissies ten gevolge van ontbossing en 
bosdegradatie in ontwikkelingslanden) zijn onder andere recent toegenomen. REDD+ wordt voorgesteld 
als een vrij in te stappen instrument om globaal zo goedkoop mogelijk de broeikasgasemissies te 
verminderen in de bossector. Niettegenstaande is er een groeiende onzekerheid of er voldoende 
institutionele capaciteit aanwezig is om deze mechanismen te implementeren, alsook onduidelijkheden 
over de optimale implementatie van deze mechanismen voor REDD+. Deze onzekerheid geeft aan dat 
modellen nodig zijn om de doeltreffendheid van REDD+ in ontwikkelingslanden te garanderen. Zonder 
enige actie kunnen de verwachtingen van dit instrument ondermijnd worden door ongeschikte 
institutionele maatregelen en door de uitdagingen in de armoedebestrijding in vele tropische landen. 
Bovendien vreest men dat de lokale bevolking aan het kortste eind zal trekken in deze veelbelovende 
bosbeschermings-initiatieven. Dit kan gedeeltelijk verklaard worden door het feit dat de waarde van 
natuurlijke bronnen en hun vermarkting waarschijnlijk zal toenemen door het invoeren van deze 
mechanismen, waarbij andermans belangen zullen overheersen als de sociale waarborgen niet duidelijk 
worden gedefinieerd. Hoe dan ook kan een succesvol REDD+ een belangrijk instrument worden voor 
beleidsmakers in hun strategieën om armoede te verminderen en in het behoud van de biodiversiteit.  
Verscheidene landen in Afrika hebben REDD+ portfolio’s ontwikkeld om ten minste aan één van de 
voorwaarden te voldoen om te kunnen genieten van internationale financiering. Dit is het geval voor 
Ghana, Tanzania, de Democratische Republiek Kongo, Madagaskar, Ethiopië en vele anderen. Kameroen 
lag oorspronkelijk achterop, maar de overheid en een aantal betrokken belanghebbenden hebben hard 
gewerkt om aan de voorwaarden te voldoen. Hoewel de aanpak in internationale onderhandelingen om 
mechanismen zoals CDM, REDD en REDD+ tot stand te brengen top-down was, was er weinig tot geen 
bijdrage van de verschillende belanghebbende actoren, vooral op lokaal niveau waar de oorzaken van 
ontbossing eigenlijk geworteld zitten. Dit alles stelt de duurzaamheid van de aanwezige REDD+ schema’s 
in de tropen in vraag. Hierdoor worden er twijfels gecreëerd aan het algehele niveau van de betrokkenheid 
die juist transparantie en effectieve participatie moet beogen over de gehele REDD+ waardeketen. In 
afwezigheid van dat laatste, zal zowel de algemene emissievermindering als de doeltreffendheid van de 
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beleidshervormingen die nog dienen uitgevoerd te worden door Afrikaanse landen om REDD+ te steunen, 
negatief beïnvloed worden. Dit onderzoek oordeelt dat REDD+ zal komen te lijden aan een gebrek aan 
lokale aanvaarding, als de reeds aanvaarde interventies geen rekening houden met hun belangen en 
ervaringen. Verder moeten de socio-economische factoren op gemeenschapsniveau bepaald worden, die 
het gedachteproces van de boeren bepalen om te kiezen voor een zeker landgebruik in plaats van een 
ander. Kennis van bovenstaande zal waarschijnlijk een positieve wisselwerking tussen de REDD+ 
belanghebbenden en de toestand van de boslandschappen opleveren en tegelijkertijd beleidsinstrumenten 
genereren die consistent zijn met de beginselen van goed bestuur op alle niveaus.  
Deze thesis is een studie van de factoren en sociale hefbomen die kunnen gebruikt worden voor de 
herstructurering van de huidige benaderingen in bosbeheer met de algemene doelstelling om de CO2-
emissies te reduceren en tegelijkertijd de levenswijze van de gemeenschappen in de tropische bossen van 
Kameroen en verder te verbeteren.  
Deze studie heeft als eerste doel de REDD+ en REDD+-gerelateerde regulaties op landsniveau te 
doorlichten. Deze laatste kunnen acties op lokaal niveau ondersteunen en kunnen effectief de 
emissiereductie en koolstofopslag-scenarios regelen. Velddata werd verzameld door gebruik te maken van 
kwalitatieve benaderingen zoals de Lokale Ecologische Kennis (LEK) methodologie, daarbij gebruik 
makende van gestructureerde en semi-gestructureerde interviews. Data werd dan gemodelleerd via een 
binominaal logistische regressie. De laatste stap was om het institutionele landschap van REDD+ in kaart 
te brengen door de kwalitatieve ‘grounded theory’ te gebruiken. De waargenomen capaciteitspotentiëlen 
en lacunes met betrekking tot de geïdentificeerde functies doorheen het nationaal REDD+-
implementatieproces werden beoordeeld door een vooraf ontworpen institutioneel leerproces. Uiteindelijk 
werd een beoordeelt hoe de lokale gemeenschappen de verschillende REDD+ initiatieven benaderen. 
Daarna probeerden we om sociale en economische waarborgen te verkrijgen zoals die bekomen werden 
uit vroegere UNFCCC-maatregelen en IPCC-richtlijnen. Dit had tot doelstelling gelijkheid en conflict-
ontwijkend gedrag te garanderen. 
De resultaten omvatten vier belangrijke ontdekkingen die de noodzaak tot een transformatie aantonen. 
Onze bevindingen wijzen ook naar de nood aan degelijke richtlijnen ivm. hoe onzekerheden en risico's aan 
te pakken die belanghebbenden hun aandeel in REDD+ kunnen ondermijnen.  
Ten eerste bevorderde het 'binary logic regression model' ons begrip omtrent de manier waarop armoede 
lokaal het bosbestand veranderd. Het model vond drie specifieke factoren gelinkt aan het 
beslissingsproces van boeren om land in productie te houden of niet (braakland): a) het inkomensaandeel 
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van niet-landbouwgerelateerde activiteiten; b) de economisch actieve leeftijd; en c) eigendomsrecht 
tezamen met compensatie alternatieven. We besloten dat REDD+ ontwerp en implementatie - althans 
vanuit een lokaal perspectief - gebaseerd moet zijn op de toenemende bereidheid van de gemeenschappen 
om betrokken te zijn. Het bosbeleid zou er wel bij varen mocht REDD+ als een instrument om armoede te 
bestrijden gezien worden, als deel van een breder duurzaam ontwikkelingskader.  
Ten tweede werd een koolstofemissie-reductie-model ontwikkeld bestaande uit 5 functies en 3 lineaire 
fasen. Indien dit model wordt geïmplementeerd zou dat wel eens een doorbraak kunnen betekenen in het 
REDD+proces doordat nieuwe ideeën en spelers geïntroduceerd worden. Een nieuw beleidsinstrument 
zijnde, zit REDD+ geweven in het globaal bosbeleid en typische institutionele werkingskaders. 
Oplossingen zouden moeten worden gevonden om mislukkingen omtrent het bosbeheer te vermijden, 
zoals eerder wel het geval is geweest. Opdat het model de verwachtingen zou inlossen, werd een praktisch 
implementatiekader voorgesteld dat verschillende sectoren overschrijdt, waarbij verschuivingen nodig zijn 
op het niveau van actoren, informatie, stimulansen en machtsrelaties. Hierdoor kan rekening gehouden 
worden met de verzuchtingen van alle actoren zonder het experimentele karakter van het REDD+ proces te 
ondermijnen. Uit hoofdstukken 5 en 6 blijkt dat de verwezenlijking van een resultaatgericht REDD+-
proces afhangt van de effectiviteit van beheersstructuren in een setting die momenteel vele actoren en 
schaalniveau's omvat. Daar er geen duidelijk kader bestaat voor REDD+ initiatieven in Kameroen is het 
mogelijk dat de implementatie ervan niet aan internationale standaarden voldoet. Dit zou dan een weerslag 
kunnen hebben op het voorziene budget van niet minder dan 4.5 biljoen dollar in 50 ontwikkelingslanden. 
Dringende maatregelen zijn nodig die naast de bestaande regels en codes kunnen ontwikkeld worden. 
Een volgend item zijn de onregelmatigheden waargenomen in het bosbeheer in Kameroen. dit komt 
ondermeer tot uiting in de verwarring rond de rol en verantwoordelijkheid van alle belanghebbenden 
alsook in de vermeende pseudo-devolutie opgemerkt in het beheer van de natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
geassocieerd met bossen. De situatie is niet consistent met de nochtans vele instrumenten die ter 
beschikking staan in het land. Iedereen dient lessen te trekken uit verleden en huidige initiatieven om 
zodoende een werkbaar strijdplan te ontwikkelen tegen broeikasgas-emissies ten gevolge van 
verschillende vormen van landgebruik. Ondertussen kunnen bestaande koolstof-stocks aangevuld worden. 
De wetten bekrachtigen lijkt te mislukken daar de meeste teksten en wetten in de Kameroense bossector 
via een eenzijdig 'top-down' - denken zijn ontstaan. Door geen rekening te houden met traditionele, vaak 
eeuwenoude vormen van landbezit en overerving aanwezig binnen de lokale gemeenschappen werd vaak 
het omgekeerde effect bekomen, zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5.  
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De succesvolle implementatie van REDD+ is in zekere mate afhankelijk van het wegwerken van 
onzekerheden rond institutionele bepalingen, niveau in participatie, bosbeheersplannen, koolstofrechten, 
etc. De lokale gemeenschappen dreigen naast de boot te vallen door toedoen van politieke en economische 
actoren die niet verder kijken dan hun eigen egoïstische belangen. Verdere ontbossing en bosdegradatie 
kan hiervan een gevolg zijn. het is dus noodzakelijk om eerst de wetgeving rond landgebruik en die 
omtrent bossen in het bijzonder te hervormen/moderniseren alvorens met REDD+ initiatieven van start te 
gaan, zodoende de voordelen eerlijk te verdelen onder alle belanghebbenden. Hiertoe is meer steun van de 
internationale gemeenschap nodig. Niet in het minst die van bepaalde controle-uitoefenende organen die 
er op kunnen toezien dat de principes correct worden nageleefd. de algehele REDD+ aanpak moet 
eventueel uitgebreid worden naar een REALU-aanpak: 'Reduced Emission from All Land Uses’. 
Ter afsluiting presenteert deze studie robuuste aanwijzingen hoe sociale parameters in het huidige 
klimaatdebat in te brengen. Ons onderzoek maakte deel uit van een serie haalbaarheidsstudies volbracht in 
Kameroen sinds 2011. Wij geloven dat onze werkwijze tijdens de dataverzameling en tijdens de 
workshops met alle REDD+ partners inspirationeel is geweest voor het gehele REDD+ proces in 
Kameroen, dat zich voorgenomen had een duidelijke strategie uit te werken binnen de drie jaar. Onze 
ontwikkelde modellen en onze algemene bevindingen kunnen een belangrijke bijdrage leveren. De 
algehele complexiteit neemt nog eens toe, daar er verschillen kunnen zijn afhankelijk van de regio of het 
tijdsbestek waarin het REDD+ debat zich voordoet. We pleiten er dan ook voor om alle agro-ecologische 
zones in Kameroen grondig te bestuderen in het kader van REDD+, hierbij rekening houdend met de 
opportuniteitskosten van de verschillende vormen van inwisselbaar landgebruik. 
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Part I: GENERAL RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND REVIEW 
OF EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Trust in the Lord with all your heart. Never rely on what you think you know. Remember the Lord in 
everything you do, and he will show you the right way” (King Solomon in Proverbs 3: 5-6, GNB). 
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CHAPTER  
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter lays the foundation for the thesis research, encompassing the general background, 
the context and the research problem.  Research questions and objectives are identified. It also 
discusses the challenges to achieving effective emissions reduction from global to local levels 
and concludes with the general thesis outline.
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1.1.  Background and definition of concepts 
Implementation of community-based forest management is considered a promising approach 
towards increasing forest sustainability. Simultaneously, since the 1980s, deforestation has been 
recognized as a serious problem threatening life resilience. At the same time, several authors 
have stated that economic incentives are essential to halt emissions of greenhouse gases caused 
by deforestation in developing countries (van der Werf et al., 2009; Palmer and Engel, 2009; 
Corbera and Schroeder, 2011; Cerbu et al., 2011; Negra and Wollenberg, 2012). As a 
consequence, smallholder-based innovative mechanisms to guarantee environmental protection 
have recently emerged, such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES) and Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) schemes.  
“REDD” is an international financial mechanism established under the United Nations 
Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2010). This idea was first proposed by a group of 
developing countries led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (Bali Decision 2/CP13; 
Brockhaus et al., 2014). REDD’s primary aim is to enhance national and international action on 
climate-change mitigation, because climate change is considered a global problem requiring 
common international efforts to address the causes and to build resilience (Van Noordwijk et al., 
2012). Following Angelsen et al. (2008) and Lyster (2013), REDD is commonly defined as an 
incentive-based scheme. It builds on the same principles as the PES initiatives. REDD evolved 
from the discussions held during the 11th Conference of Parties (COP) in Montreal, Canada, in 
2005. Through this instrument, countries that choose to reduce their national levels of 
deforestation and loss of carbon stock below an agreed baseline would receive performance-
based payments (Minang and Van Noordwijk, 2012; Brown, 2013). It is from here that forests 
were included in the UNFCCC itself. Subsequently, the scheme went through a series of 
developments at the Conferences of Parties in Bali in (2007), Cancun (2010), Warsaw (2013) and 
most recently Lima in 2014 and Paris in 2015.  
Conclusively negotiations from Cancun to Paris have achieved two main milestones: 1) in 
Warsaw a clearer framework which particularly provided an explicit roadmap for REDD+ 
implementation bringing together technical and institutional implementation guidelines (Atela et 
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al., 2016); 2) in 2015, COPs have agreed on a common basket fund called “Green Climate 
Fund”within the UNFCCC framework. This was established under Decision 1/16 as part of the 
Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). The agreement aims to help the world to move towards a low-
carbon-climate resilient future. About 10 billion USD have been committed to the Green Climate 
Fund with nearly half coming from the EU member states. Prior to Paris, more than 170 countries 
submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) covering more than 95% 
of global emissions. Some countries still need to take position on the binding nature of reducing 
emissions quickly enough to keep the global average temperature rise below 2o (Hamrick and 
Goldstein 2016). So far, full common stand is not yet reached at and REDD+ is part of this 
evolving process. 
As negotiations progressed on the financing mechanisms to compensate developing countries for 
the recovery or maintenance of forest carbon stocks, three interrelated concepts emerged, 
although they are still under negotiation between COP parties, namely REDD, REDD+ and 
REDD++. The difference between these mechanisms is mainly based on what each should cover 
(Larson et al., 2009; Angelsen et al., 2009; Tacconi et al., 2010; Skutsch and McCall, 2012; 
Minang and van Noordwijk 2012). The acronym REDD is used when consideration is only given 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. When 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and carbon-stock enhancement are added to this, 
the term REDD+ is used. More recently, in scientific debates there has been a call to expand the 
scope of REDD+ to integrate all land-use-related carbon emissions, and the idea is gaining 
momentum. This would add both agricultural and agroforestry sectors to the scheme. This 
approach is called REDD++ or Reducing Emission from All Land Uses (REALU) (Bernard et al., 
2013).  
In this thesis, we will focus on REDD+. The justification for choosing REDD+ is that this is the 
only truly operational policy mechanism that exists in the field. Unlike REALU, which is still 
under scientific development by the ASB partnership (Bernard et al., 2013), discussions on 
REDD+ have been underway by UNFCCC parties since 2009. Since then, it has become clear that 
a REDD+ mechanism can deliver multiple benefits. In addition to mitigating climate change, 
REDD+ can support the livelihoods of local communities, maintain vital ecosystem services and 
preserve globally significant biodiversity (Brown, 2013; Brockhaus et al., 2014).  
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However, the development of REDD+, as a proposed solution to mitigate climate change by 
halting forest cover decrease, faces several uncertainties, particularly with regard to social 
safeguards and forest governance principles (Brown, 2013, Lyster et al., 2013). The REDD+ 
mechanism supports the voluntary efforts of developing countries, which are Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol, to mitigate climate change effects (UNFCCC, 2008). To qualify for financial 
compensation under the UNFCCC, countries have to formulate (and implement) national REDD+ 
strategies. These strategies should include information on technical aspects, such as national-
forest reference emissions levels, and should describe a robust MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification) approach along with desired implementation arrangements and funding prospects. 
At COP 16 and 17, REDD+ countries were also requested to address drivers of deforestation and 
forest degradation, land tenure, social safeguards and participation by relevant stakeholders 
(Lyster, 2013; Brockhaus et al., 2014). 
The concept of deforestation refers to the complete removal of forest cover for whatever reason, 
such as conversion to smallholder agriculture or oil extraction (Sierra, 2000). Meanwhile, van der 
Werf et al. (2009) defined this process as the long-term reduction in tree-canopy cover to below 
10-30%. In practice, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 2006) defines deforestation as 
the process of conversion of forest to non-forest land use such as cropland, pasture or human 
settlements. Forest degradation typically relates to partial deforestation, with more than 10-30% 
of forest cover remaining (for example through selective logging). Deforestation has received a 
lot of attention in scientific publications since the Rio summit and this has increased in the 
context of the REDD initiative. In this regard, the works of Sunderlin (1996), Geist and Lambin 
(2001), de Wasseige et al. (2009), Angelsen et al. 2009, Palmer and Engel (2009), Angelsen et al. 
(2012), Ernst et al.( 2012), Malhi and Marthews (2013), and Lyster et al. (2013) are important in 
identifying substantive trends for the phenomenon in the tropics. 
One of the reasons why many scholars are interested in studying deforestation is the importance 
of forest resources to national economies. Forested areas represent about 33% of the earth’s land 
surface and constitute an important asset for climate regulation. This has favoured substantial 
investments in forestry management and conservation (Brown, 2013). The second reason is that 
deforestation and forest degradation account for about 12% of global greenhouse gas emissions 
(van de Werf et al., 2009) and constitute the bulk of emissions from developing countries (Ernst 
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et al., 2012). Globally, deforestation is the second largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere, after fossil-fuel combustion (Le Quéré et al., 2009; van de Werf et al., 2009). 
Sohngen (2009) indicates that, basically, increasing forest stocks constitutes a safer reduction 
mechanism for carbon in the atmosphere. It is also widely accepted that avoiding deforestation 
can contribute significantly to reducing CO2 emissions (Tomich et al., 2005; IPCC, 2008; van de 
Werf et al., 2009). The newly developed REDD+ instrument provides incentives for avoiding 
deforestation, but, how REDD+ will be operationalised at the local level remains unclear and 
details as to how it will successfully work in practice are yet to be agreed by all stakeholders.  
Much of the literature views REDD+ as an instrument directed towards communities and other 
small-scale forest owners and managers, much like the concept of Payments for Environmental 
Services (Larson et al., 2009; Skutsch and McCall, 2012; Awono et al., 2014). A PES system is 
designed to provide payments to those who contribute to the provision of environmental services. 
Some researchers believe that PES experiences have the potential to influence the design of 
REDD+ activities (Engel et al., 2009; Tacconi et al., 2010; Soriaga and Annawi, 2010). The idea 
is to translate the natural values of a given environment that is under threat from deforestation 
into real financial incentives at the local level (Engel et al., 2009). These authors find that it is 
possible to link PES to policies geared at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, because the main ES to consider in both cases would be carbon storage. 
The extent to which the above assumption is reasonable and compelling depends on a number of 
factors, such as stakeholder participation, rights to ressources, institutional arrangements and 
incentive levels (Brown, 2013). Reeds (2008) defined participation as a process in which 
individuals, groups and organizations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect 
them. Some proponents agree that stakeholder participation increases the likelihood that 
environmental decisions are perceived to be fair and promote social learning (Palmer and Engel, 
2010; Brown, 2013; Awono et al., 2014). However, little is known about the effect of stakeholder 
participation on the eventual effectiveness of REDD+ when participation starts right from the 
design stage. Emphasis needs to be placed on involving local stakeholders in communities where 
deforestation takes place, because it is these smallholder farmers who will eventually implement 
the designed REDD+ process on the ground.  
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Furthermore, there is increasing uncertainty concerning the implementation process starting from 
demonstration/piloting to performance based actions (Minang et al., 2014). This uncertainty 
relates to the institutional capacity of governments in developing countries to implement the 
REDD+ mechanism, as well as doubts about the institutional arrangement itself, since many 
drivers of deforestation are cross-sectoral and are rooted in a wider socio-economic and political 
context (Robiglio et al., 2010; Skutsch and McCall, 2012). These doubts suggest the need to 
come up with arrangements that will facilitate on-site implementation in developing countries. If 
action is not undertaken, expectations regarding this voluntary instrument could be undermined 
by inappropriate institutional arrangements, challenges resulting from poverty and increasing 
social conflicts (Clements, 2010). Transformational change is therefore needed during the full 
implementation phase, whereas REDD+ effectiveness would require substantial on-the-ground 
policy actions, as well as governance reforms at national level.   
From the above, it can be understood that this study focuses on REDD+ implementation 
challenges, as well as on the validity of forestry policy, with an emphasis on social and 
institutional dimensions at the community level where deforestation is to be mitigated. Since 
forest degradation is part of deforestation, and as REDD+ is a mechanism in progress that has yet 
to be formalized, the chapters developed here will mostly talk about REDD+ policy with an 
emphasis on avoiding deforestation as a pathway to reduce CO2 emissions.  
Some literature may use REDD and REDD+ interchangeably, but throughout this thesis, we focus 
on REDD+, as the latter allows consideration of the additional implications for agroforestry, 
carbon stocks and other co-benefits that this new version of the original REDD instrument 
showcases. Environmental services (ES) and ecosystem services are practically the same within 
the literature. Where found, the two will have the same meaning and implications in this piece of 
work. The REALU mechanism is not included in our study.  
 
1.2. Problem statement	
Rural poverty and climate change have an increasing influence on the livelihoods of forest-edge 
communities. In the current environmental degradation context, smallholder farmers’ livelihood 
challenges have led to more anthropogenic activities, such as land-use change, agriculture, 
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biomass burning and livestock pasturing. These activities imply increased carbon emissions 
resulting from the associated deforestation (Tomich et al., 2005; WB, 2008; Springate-Baginski 
and Wollenberg, 2010; Bernard et al., 2013).  
Many scholars have shown that the increase in atmospheric CO2 is the likely cause of climate 
change even though several other GHGs such as methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) or 
tropospheric ozone (O3) are concurrent factors (IPCC, 2007; van der Werf et al., 2009; Le Quéré 
et al., 2009). To counter climate change by harnessing C-stocks gained over time is the purpose 
for which REDD+ was developed. Based on REDD+, the international community wants to see 
forests preserved and would like to pay for the carbon they store, for the wealth of biological 
diversity they harbour, and for the many other environmental services they provide globally 
(Tomich et al., 2005; UNFCCC, 2007).  
Against the long-established fact that forests act both as sinks and sources of emissions 
(Sunderlin et al., 2009; Angelsen et al., 2009), developing countries are expected to implement 
REDD+ as an instrument to mitigate climate change. A substantive body of research on 
mitigation agrees that REDD+ could be a vehicle for reducing pressure on forests in the tropics, 
which in turn could lead to CO2 emission reduction (Palmer and Engel, 2009; Rametsteiner et al., 
2009; Hajek et al., 2011; Kanowski et al., 2011; Minang and Van Noordwijk, 2012; Angelsen et 
al., 2012; Malhi and Marthews, 2013).  
However, since 2011, criticism and controversies have challenged the innovativeness and 
sustainable viability of REDD+ as a policy instrument. This seems to be mainly because the 
social and institutional dimensions continue to be overlooked (Brown, 2013; Lyster et al., 2013). 
Brown (2013), in his thinking, contends that some issues, if not adequately addressed during the 
framing phase, could break REDD+ to the disappointment of several proponents, including 
national policy makers, international bodies and other REDD-impacting agencies. These critical 
issues mostly relate to social feasibility and they include the interests of local stakeholders, who 
are participating and what forms of object are to be governed as well as social safeguards. Atela 
et al. (2016) report on REDD+ implementation in Kenya but still, concrete cases on the ground 
are scace in Africa. The Kenyan case study has evidenced that REDD+ draws useful insights from 
the forestry sector but needs institutional reforms to guide further stakeholders’s engagement. 
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The case also indicates that the institutional failures exacerbate underlaying drivers of 
deforestation that conflit with REDD+ rules. Worldwide, undocumented cases may be found in 
Brazil, Tanzania, Peru, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Howerver, several projects under 
REDD+ piloting phase exist in about 17 countries (UN-REDD 2015) but only the above case in 
Kenya is reported. Redisign could be envisaged after learning from the on-the-ground cases by 
scientists.  
Angelsen et al. (2012) and Brown (2013) recognised that current REDD+ efforts have been 
geared towards more technical aspects, such as how to assess and monitor land-use change, and 
have consequently neglected the socio-economic dimensions. Some other proponents recently 
claimed that very little effort has been made to integrate social and institutional challenges, such 
as lack of stakeholder participation, limited consideration of socio-economic household 
characteristics, top-down approach and no proper mainstreaming of communities rights within 
the instrument design process (Taconni et al., 2010; Brown, 2013; Bernard et al., 2013; Sunderlin 
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these aspects are considered pivotal to guarantee the on-the-ground 
effectiveness of REDD+ (Tacconi et al., 2010; Bernard et al., 2013; Lyster 2013; Brown, 2013; 
Awono et al., 2014). The risk is that local communities may not agree to take part in the 
implementation as they have not been fully involved in the initial discussions during the design 
phase. At the end of the day, these social and institutional flaws can constitute a disincentive for 
communities to engage in activities to help avoid or reduce deforestation.  
Many studies have warned that in the course of REDD+ implementation at local and sub-national 
levels, there is a danger that new social conflicts may arise (Colfer et al., 2005; Angelsen et al., 
2009; Cotula and Meyers, 2009; Lawlor et al. 2010; Hajek et al., 2011; Brown, 2013; Awono et 
al., 2014, Sunderlin et al., 2014, Atela et al., 2016). Under the emerging international climate 
debates, these conflicts could even increase further. For instance, with current ownership tenure 
under the Forestry Act of Cameroon, there is a danger of increased conflict and dilemmas 
between efforts to develop tree plantations and keep natural forests intact. The irony is that, 
according to the law enforcement in Cameroon, all trees belong to the state, not to those planting 
or conserving them. This legal disposition creates insecure forest tenure by transferring de jure 
use rights from smallholders to the state. This might act as a negative incentive for communities 
to engage in REDD+. 
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Following Brockhaus et al. (2012), REDD+ governance is understood as a system in which 
involved actors try to influence policy actions and outcomes through the instrument’s regulatory 
processes, mechanisms and organizations. Applying institutional arrangements is part of 
governance and refers to the operational rules governing the ways in which actors (individuals or 
organizations) interact within a given arena. In the light of this definition, existing governance 
principles in Cameroon may constitute a challenge for the implementation of carbon emission 
reduction schemes (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008). The reason is that, although there is room for 
policy reforms, actors’ involvement in shaping forestry regulations is very limited and many 
established implementation norms including local community and civil society participation 
remain superficial across public administrations in Cameroon. This calls for additional 
investigation into the kind of governance that addresses stakeholders’ views across institutions 
within the forestry sector (Saunders and Reeve, 2010; De Pinto et al., 2012) in the transition from 
the REDD+ pilot phase to the quick-start phase of real project interventions in Cameroon.  
Thus, this research argues that REDD+ may suffer from local communities’ disapproval of the 
already-agreed interventions, which are unlikely to draw from either local or other experiences. 
In the same vein, the socio-economic factors which determine farmers’ preferences for a certain 
type of land use over another, at community level, are yet to be clarified. Furthermore, an 
integrated understanding of these socio-economic dimensions is required to create a positive 
interplay between REDD+ stakeholders and the health of forested landscapes.  
With regard to emissions reduction, Rametsteiner et al. (2009) established that the international 
development agencies currently involved in REDD+ could fund bundles of national measures to 
address the local and regional drivers of deforestation. In this way, some financial investment 
could save millions of hectares from deforestation.    
Whereas some uncertainties remain as to the most appropriate operational mechanism at global 
governance level (Lawlor et al., 2010; Hajek et al., 2011; Kanowski et al., 2011; Minang and Van 
Noordwijk, 2012; Bernard et al., 2013), the strategic positioning of various REDD+ actors will 
need to be guided by local evidence and models nested in relevant policy frameworks and 
institutional arrangements (Somorin et al., 2014). It is also highlighted that practical REDD+ 
design needs to be guided by specific evidence from the viewpoints of multi-level actors in order 
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to incorporate their ideas and gain their consent (Brown, 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014). With 
reference to the existing land-use policy in Cameroon, stakeholder involvement and other policy 
issues need to be well-documented in order to guide future pathways for REDD+.   
Despite the few pilot initiatives that are underway in some countries (Bernard et al., 2013; 
Sunderlin et al., 2014) uncertainty remains as to which operational mechanism should be used for 
the actual implementation of REDD+ (Pesket et al., 2008; Lawlar et al., 2010; Angelsen et al., 
2012). For example, agreements reached on REDD+ so far have not spelled out details as to 
whether the mechanism will take the form of total access restrictions for target forests, as in the 
establishment of protected areas, or whether it will result in a form of regulated access based on 
agreements with local people, as in sustainable forest management and co-management schemes. 
Failing to generate data and knowledge to remedy the highlighted uncertainties may imply 
planning before hand the failure of the most expected REDD+ implementation. Such knowledge 
is crucial for policy makers and shapers to design strategies that reduce carbon emissions, as well 
as to sustain other co-benefits, such as biodiversity conservation or watershed services derived 
from forests. 
1.3. Scope of the study and hypotheses 
The study builds on outcomes from experiences of the Alternative for Slash-and-Burn platform 
(ASB) in the tropics (http://www.asb.cgiar.org ) particularly in Cameroon and Indonesia. It 
capitalises on the lessons learnt from a number of past and ongoing projects, such as the 
“Reducing Emissions from All Land uses” (REALU) funded by NORAD, and “Forest Tenure 
rights in central Africa” a Cameroon collaborative work between the Rights and Resources 
Initiative” (RRI) and ICRAF. The lessons learnt from project initiatives to safeguard biodiversity 
in diverse target landscapes are incorporated, with reference to experience drawn from Payment 
for Environmental Services in Africa (PRESA) and RUPES (Rewarding Upland Poor for 
Environmental Services) in South Asia (http://rupes.worldagroforestry.org ; 
http://presa.worldagroforestry.org ).  
Since 2011, six countries in the Congo basin have launched the implementation of a global 
REDD+ project funded by the World Bank. In the light of this, local-level determinants of 
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deforestation and forest degradation, and community priorities should be identified for the pilot 
sites in Cameroon and across the participating central African countries. The developing REDD+ 
scheme underlines the need for each country to build its own knowledge base to understand local 
drivers across actors and scales. Such knowledge will be used to strengthen national institutions 
involved in forestry and other land uses in addressing emission reduction issues. It confirms that 
research initiatives, such as this PhD, are relevant in the context of early institutional learning 
about the REDD+ implementation process in the sub-region.  
Within a climate-change policy perspective, the research attempts to capture farmers’ perceptions 
on deforestation and actors’participation in REDD+, institutional arrangements and forest tenure 
rights in a participatory manner. This thesis adds an institutional dimension and a social 
momentum across the current climate-change policy debates. The evidence provided can guide 
decision makers to improve the likelihood of REDD+ success within a new, sustainable 
development agenda.  
Therefore, the following major research hypothesis is developed: Incentive-based forestry policy 
instruments such as REDD+ can be designed to become socially attractive and institutionally 
feasible through locally defined governance principles and policy reforms.  
Additionally, the following secondary hypotheses were developed, based on local ecological 
knowledge and tested in the Southern region of Cameroon:  
H1. Current forestry policies and regulatory frameworks in Cameroon are not clear enough to 
govern REDD+ and science-informed reforms and incentives need to be developed, learning from 
socio-economic challenges such as national and local factors that change the behaviour of local 
communities towards deforestation.  
H2. The long-term success or failure of the REDD+ mechanism is conditional on the specific 
design of the institutional framework and the mainstreaming of key social safeguards, such as 
tenure rights, compensation options and the level of stakeholder involvement during the planning 
and implementation phases. 
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1.4. Aim of the thesis and research questions  
Within the framework of the above described context and hypotheses, the main objective of this 
doctoral work was to contribute to the ongoing climate change debates for better policy actions 
and clearer implementation options of the REDD+ mechanism in Cameroon. The PhD seeks 
therefore to analyse forestry policy instruments and arrangements to understand social and 
institutional issues which can affect REDD+ processes. Targeting the forested landscape of 
Efoulan in South Cameroon as a case study area, the emphasis is placed on the potential of the 
suggested structures (economic and other interest-based incentives) to bridge community 
perceptions and REDD+ implementation in the context of local and national forest management 
policies. The thesis poses four main research questions:  
1. What are the current policy conditions in the forestry sector and how can existing gaps 
and constraints be addressed to ensure the effectiveness of REDD+ at local level?  
2. What micro-level factors drive land-use changes initiated by local stakeholders and in 
what way should these factors influence REDD+ design?  
3. What institutional structure and policy solutions could act as a governance framework for 
local communities and other stakeholders to effectively implement REDD+ as a climate-
change mitigation intervention? 
4. How are forest rights and other safeguard claims by local communities viewed by 
villagers in the current climate-change context with regard to the design and 
implementation of REDD+?  
 
Research question 1 is addressed in chapter 2 through a thorough desktop review of scientific 
publications and key policy documents relating to forest management in Cameroon. The second 
research question is covered in the fourth chapter and is answered on the basis of field data 
collected using structured and semi-structured questionnaires complemented by data from focus 
group discussions and transect walk observations. Question 3 is addressed in chapter 5 using an 
institutional mapping perspective with the objective of understanding local and sub-national 
implications of some forest governance principles on emissions reduction. Finally, research 
question 4 resulted in chapter 6, using insights from three secondary site datasets assessing 
intercultural rights and claims emerging from forest management systems with implications for 
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REDD+ schemes potentially being established in Cameroon. The logical flow and the 
interconnections between the various empirical chapters are illustrated in the next sections (for 
more details see also figure 3.7 and table 3.4. in chapter 3).  
 
1.5. 	PhD	thesis	outline	
This thesis is divided into two major parts: Part I: General research background and review of 
existing knowledge, and Part II: Findings, applications and implications. Figure 1.1 shows the 
full interconnections existing between the empirical chapters of the thesis. During the 
investigation process, emphasis was placed on the following research actions: 
 analysing the uptake framework for policies and institutional structures, including the 
social and structural arrangements in the context of local communities, to gain insight into 
the challenges and opportunities for implementing the REDD+ mechanism at grassroots 
level; 
 mapping and modelling individual deforestation decisions which affect the proposed 
REDD+ frame. The focus was on socio-economic variables influencing dialogue and 
discourse to bridge interests and perceptions between key participants in forest 
management; 
 cross-checking external and internal policy-related aspects of forest management, 
including tenure regime and community rights issues as vectors affecting conservation 
processes in NRM. Taking the deforestation context of Cameroon, the insight is to be 
used to address challenges for the proposed REDD+ mechanism and to propose policy 
solutions for its effectiveness across the country.   
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Figure 1.1 Outline of the thesis showing REDD+-influencing factors, stakeholders studied and outputs 
The seven chapters of the thesis address the central aspects of humid forest governance in 
Cameroon and their links to REDD+ through institutional and social learning processes. 
Chapter one (Introduction) establishes the background to the study and the context behind the 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the tropics. It highlights knowledge gaps in relation 
to REDD+ and explains the need for the current research. It also discusses where challenges 
remain for the success of effective emission reductions across scales. Chapter two then reviews 
documents that concentrate on the state-of-the-art in terms of existing knowledge, policy gaps 
and challenges. The analysis is based on historical forest-management trends and current debates 
on climate-change mitigation under REDD and REDD+. The aim is to contribute to the debate 
about whether existing frameworks would be sufficient to govern REDD+ implementation in 
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Cameroon. The chapter shows policy gaps and limitations while describing a set of parallel 
concepts, such as PES, to support ongoing thinking.  
Chapter three describes the general methodology used in the study, although a more detailed 
presentation follows in each empirical chapter. The entire section is therefore organized as 
follows: a brief description is provided of the country and the study areas, in order to present the 
socio-economic and bio-physical conditions of the target areas. Thereafter, sampling design, data 
collection strategy, the regression model applied and other data analysis techniques are described. 
For forest communities, if the UNFCCC-negotiated emissions reduction scheme does not 
properly secure people’s rights and the natural resources on which they depend, local 
stakeholders will not be willing to adopt and implement it. This will increase the risks of forest 
conversion into farmlands. However, if fair payments are offered, REDD+ could be seen by locals 
as an opportunity to generate income and to enforce their current informal customary rights to 
forest resources. Therefore, there is a need to understand the link between socio-economic factors 
and deforestation. This will influence the potential of existing policies to govern REDD+ across 
scales. These issues are examined in chapter four. The latter is the starting point for the second 
part, which is purely empirical. Specifically, the chapter explores the role of farm and socio-
economic factors as determinants of deforestation and forest degradation at local level. A 
regression model was used to establish relations between the variables studied. We end up by 
identifying significant factors which could be taken into account when using REDD+ as an 
incentive mechanism to reduce carbon emission levels by local stakeholders in Efoulan and thus 
Cameroon.  
Chapter five revisits the institutions with stakes in climate change, environmental policy and 
conservation. It looks at their roles and responsibilities in line with REDD+-segregated functions, 
combined with a framework developed for this analysis. It draws lessons on key governance 
principles (i.e. participation, power relations, information flows) to be enforced for REDD+ to 
work efficiently and fairly at local level. This insight assisted in the development of an 
institutional structure from which the REDD+ processes could be designed, assuming that 
existing incentives and policies are inadequate as they present the potential for new social 
conflicts. Chapter six attempts to shed light on land and forest tenure systems as one of the key 
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REDD+ social safeguard issues in southern Cameroon. Smallholders’ perceptions on rights and 
claims in the current forestry policy arena are assessed and linked with the climate-change debate 
in Cameroon.  
The last chapter (chapter seven) provides a general discussion on policy implications before 
providing conclusions and key recommendations. It synthesizes our main findings while briefly 
discussing policy implications for REDD+ to be successful in Cameroon and even beyond. In this 
way, we want to inform policy makers, policy shapers and local communities interested in 
climate change mitigation strategies about the potential of REDD+ for sustainable development 
and how to tackle challenges that may undermine this incentive mechanism at local and national 
levels.  
The outcome will hopefully provide information to avoid planning the failure of the yet-to-
materialise REDD+. The chapter ends with practical implications and emerging research 
perspectives which would be needed for additional knowledge generation. It should be noted that 
the three empirical chapters are closely interlinked in the following maner: on-the-ground 
REDD+ effectiveness factors (including institutional arrangements) bridge chapter four to chapter 
five while the social dimension especially forest tenure and rights creates the link between the 
latter to the 6th chapter. Both chapters have the ultimate aim to address deforestion and enhace 
carbon stocks in southern Cameroon and beyond. 
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CHAPTER  
2.  EVALUATION OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND LOCAL 
LIVELIHOODS IN THE LIGHT OF REDD+ IN CAMEROON 
 
Abstract  
This chapter explores issues on REDD+-related regulations at country level to underpin local-
level actions and to govern the effectiveness of REDD+ implementation. The desktop 
investigation considers Cameroon as a case study and reviews about 85 publications and a 
portfolio of more than 10 national regulatory instruments to identify policy gaps and limitations. 
It also discusses a set of parallel tools, such as PES, to inform the existing REDD+ debate. Two 
specific shortcomings are identified: (1) locally over-constraining and complex approaches used 
in forest management which could provide cautions for the implementation of REDD+; and (2) 
limited understanding of local linkages between communities’ poverty status and trends in forest-
cover loss. These shortcomings, if not considered, may result in the failure of emission reduction 
programs and the designed REDD+ schemes in Cameroon being socially disconnected. This calls 
for the design of a fair REDD+ mechanism to motivate the local end users and forest stewards, 
namely rural communities. 
Key Words: Forest conservation, PES schemes, policy gaps, community livelihoods 
 
This chapter is drawn from the following manuscript: Ngendakumana S., Minang AP, Speelman S, 
Namirembe S and Van Damme P. (2016). Implementing REDD+ afterwards: learning from forest 
conservation policy and social frameworks in Cameroon (Paper revised and resubmitted to the 
International Forestry Review Journal) 
 
 
“No matter how you divide up the developing world, one thing is not debatable: most people are poor, on 
the outside of the system looking in and getting angrier every day. If you rebuild the system from the 
bottom-up, the poor will come, with their enterprise, creativity, and piles of potential capital” (Hernando 
de Soto, President, Institute of Liberty and Democracy, Peru). 
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2.1.  Introduction  
Since the 1980s, a wide spectrum of conservation strategies has been used to improve the 
sustainable management of tropical forests. The lessons learned from these conservation 
programmes could help to improve REDD+. Initial efforts took the form of governmental and 
international conservation agencies’ forest projects known as ICDPs (Integrated conservation and 
Development Programs) to support the management of protected areas (Hasket and Gutman, 
2010). By the time of the climate-change debates after Rio, the concept of the ICDP initiatives 
had changed to reward forgone efforts on avoided deforestation and increased reforestation. This 
change in scope reflected the outcome of UNFCC agreements to value the goods and services 
that forests provide; particularly atmospheric carbon sequestration.  
Past strategies, however, either favoured the economic dimension of natural-resource 
management, or else the ecological dimension, and very little attention was paid to social issues 
for local communities (Colfer, 2005; Oyono et al., 2006; Enchaw, 2009; Minang and Van 
Noordwijk, 2012). Until very recently, these classic approaches had undermined the social 
framework and promoted conservation policies that failed to take into account community needs 
and perceptions with regard to livelihoods and cultural values. This led to a decrease in forest 
cover and biodiversity status, even in protected areas (Brown, 2013). The existing situation gave 
local communities the opportunity to blame governments for applying top-down strategies that 
depleted their indigenous forests. Alternatively, governments could also blame local communities 
for much of the damage being done to forests. These accusations and counter-accusations have 
induced the recent quest for adoption of conservation strategies and policies that will (a) enhance 
local participation, (b) create a sense of tenure security for smallholders and (c) introduce benefit 
sharing among stakeholders (Tumnde, 2001; Enchaw, 2009; Hoang et al., 2012).  
Key laws and regulatory instruments that shape forestry actions in Cameroon include, but are not 
limited to, (1) The 1994 Forestry and Wildlife law, (2) National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan, (3) the law no 2011/008 on Management and sustainable territorial development of 
Cameroon, and (4) The 1996 Environmental law no 96/12. It is nevertheless hypothesized that 
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beyond the current situation, gaps and inconsistencies will persist and this may negatively affect 
yet-to-be-implemented market-based innovative mechanisms such as REDD+.  
The Government of Cameroon promulgated a Forestry Law in 1994 which makes provisions for 
local people to acquire and manage community forests. An increase in participation by local 
populations in forest management through the community forest mechanism is often 
compromised by the cost, administrative red tape and the politically sensitive nature of the 
process. Tumnde (2001) and Asanga (2001) noted that the cost of preparing applications for the 
establishment of a community forest requires the mobilisation of a great deal of resources and the 
process is rather lengthy. Foundjem-Tita et al. (2013), when analysing forest law compliance in 
Cameroon, found that the process for obtaining permits could take about 4 years and could 
require more than 26,000 USD. Some years earlier, Tumnde (2001) observed that “the cost of 
preliminary work (which includes a quantitative and qualitative inventory of the resources of the 
forest with a view to drawing up a simple management plan), is beyond the reach of local 
communities, as the services of experts that cost between 1,800 USD and 29,000 USD are 
required”. Based on the above, it can be deduced that community forest instruments used in 
Cameroon are highly normative, whereas it is extremely difficult for them to gain recognition by 
local communities. Therefore, using the existing instruments without any reform may act more as 
a policy disincentive when addressing climate change. 
In this chapter, the focus is on conservation frameworks and tenure security in Cameroon, with 
emphasis on the policy constraints, to find out how REDD+ could be better implemented to turn 
around forest loss and, at the same time, serve as a tool for promoting sustainable development. 
REDD+ is presented as a new individual country-driven policy instrument which is consistent 
with the mainstreaming of forest management to promote environmental integrity (Lyster, 2013). 
The focus on conservation finds its justification in the discussion by Engel et al. (2009) that 
REDD+ has a particular potential to act as an umbrella service in forest conservation. 
Nevertheless, it can be claimed that before introducing such a new mechanism for conservation, 
it is important to learn from the failures and successes of the existing alternative tools.   
It is assumed by several scholars that the development of appropriate REDD+ policies and 
programmes will serve as an incentive to motivate local communities to participate in forest 
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conservation for climate-change adaptation and mitigation (Torres, 2014; Awono et al., 2014; 
Dlamini et al., 2015). Therefore, it seems very important to capture insights from the literature 
and policy documents on what is known about forest regulations at country level. This could then 
inform and underpin local-level actions which could govern effective emissions reduction and 
carbon-stock schemes. The desktop study uses Cameroon as a case study to demonstrate the gaps 
in the current forest governance instruments, while presenting a set of parallel tools, such as PES, 
that could fill these gaps.  
2.2.  Unveiling deforestation drivers and the impact of climate change  
Deforestation in tropical areas is the second largest source of global carbon dioxide emissions, 
after emissions from fossil-fuel use (Le Quéré et al. 2009, van de Werf et al., 2009). Increased 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere lead to global warming (Lambin and Geist, 
2001; IPCC, 2007; MEA, 2005; Nepstad et al., 2007; Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak, 
2009). CO2 emissions are considered to be responsible for about 56% of climate change (Le 
Quéré et al. 2009). Moreover, deforestation deserves special attention. As Ernst et al. (2012) 
indicated, despite policy efforts to halt the deforestation process, net deforestation in, for 
example, the Congo basin has almost doubled from 167,000 ha/year between 1990 and 2000 to 
317,000 ha/year between 2000 and 2005.  
The link between economic development and deforestation has been extensively investigated. For 
instance, it was found that countries such as Cameroon and the Central African Republic, which 
have reached a population density threshold of 20-30 inhabitants/km², could see their 
deforestation rates double due to increased demands for agricultural land, fuel wood and cash 
crops such as cocoa and palm trees (Ernst et al., 2012; Megevand et al., 2012 ).  
Several studies have reported on the drivers of deforestation in the tropics. Two categories can be 
differentiated; namely macro- and micro-economic factors (Lambin et al., 2001; Bhattarai and 
Hammig, 2001; Scrieciu, 2006; Robiglio et al., 2010; Megevand et al., 2012; Kissinger et al., 
2012). Most studies rely on empirical analyses using cross-country (or country-specific) case 
studies, but to our knowledge none has used site-specific data. Another way of classifying drivers 
of deforestation under direct and indirect typology is described in the introduction to this thesis.  
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The most-quoted macro-scale unsustainable factors explaining deforestation are logging, 
population growth, urbanisation and government policies (Scrieciu, 2006; Megevand et al., 
2012). Initial findings seem to confirm that there is a significant causal relationship between these 
selected macro-economic factors and tropical forest cover decrease. All scholars agree on the 
complexity of these links. For instance, in an exploratory work written by Scrieciu (2006), it was 
found that population density was the most important driver of deforestation. Other important 
socio-economic drivers were access to drinking water, individual wealth and primary education. 
In 2010, Robiglio et al. (2010) noted that there is rarely a single driver in a deforestation process. 
Most often, multiple drivers work simultaneously or sequentially in causing forest depletion.  
Micro- or socio-economic factors are also worth considering. As global attention increases on 
addressing poverty, deforestation and CO2 emissions (Andersen, 1997; MEA, 2005; Neufeldt et 
al., 2012), it will be necessary to develop technical options backed up by appropriate incentives 
to achieve proper mitigation and improvements to livelihoods (Wollenberg et al., 2012). It has 
been established that in West and Central Africa at the local scale, land-use conversion 
agriculture is a survival strategy for many smallholder farmers (Ngendakumana, 2011; 
Ngendakumana et al., 2012; Megevand et al., 2012; Awono et al., 2014). This conversion 
represents a major source of carbon emissions in Africa and tropical countries in general 
(Wollenberg et al., 2012; Neely and Leeuw, 2012). Additionally, Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) 
provide strong evidence of a relationship between income and deforestation across the Latin 
American, African and Asian continents. These authors also argue that, with an increase in 
income, the structure of the economy and energy demand patterns might shift towards coal- and 
petroleum-based fuels, thus reducing forest conversion pressures. Yet, such processes are, in turn, 
hypothesized to depend particularly on country-specific institutional structures. In other words, a 
reduction in the rate of tropical forest depletion would depend more on strengthening grassroots 
governing institutions and other underlying institutional factors, and less on the frequently cited 
factors elaborated above.  
In terms of strategies at local level, many scholars found that avoiding deforestation (and thus 
further increases in CO2 emissions) and increasing forest biomass (carbon sequestration) have a 
major climate-change mitigation potential (Kanninen et al., 2007; Nepstad et al., 2007; Palmer 
and Engel, 2009). However, the success of new mechanisms will also depend on their social 
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feasibility and on the adaptive capacity of the associated institutional pathways. For example, 
when developing a forestry policy instrument, local communities always need to be consulted on 
possible management options to enable them to give their consent through a participatory 
process. This is because climate change, in itself, is also a key driver of changes in tree-based 
ecosystems, which may increase risks and vulnerability, and potentially lead to exacerbated 
poverty in rural areas (Rametsteiner et al., 2009; van Noordwijk et al., 2011; Bernard et al., 
2013). In the same vein, it is worth noting that agriculture will be more affected by climate 
change than any other sector, as a result of changes in humidity and temperature leading to 
changes (both positive and negative) in agro-ecological zones (FAO, 2014). This vulnerability 
comes from the fact that agricultural production systems would be hit by land degradation caused 
by desertification, which would be exacerbated by the tremendous pressures created by ever-
increasing population growth and increased demand for food products. These anthropogenic 
challenges will result in forest-cover decrease. Consequently, carbon emissions relating to land-
use changes may be higher than they are today. Fischlin et al. (2010) argued that, together with 
the existing processes (e.g. deforestation, forest fragmentation, other forms of habitat loss, 
population growth, income growth, urbanisation), the changes described above may also result in 
changes in the type and intensity of ecosystem services provided by forests. 
At the individual level, forest conversion is the outcome of an economic decision made by a 
rational agent (the frontier smallholder farmer, the logging industry, or the state agency, as such). 
The potential effect of economic incentives offered to farmers (or the state) can usually be 
explained, to a large extent, through simple economic analysis. Therefore, linking mitigation to 
rural development in a national net emission reduction policy framework will be necessary to 
coordinate interventions that aim to sustain life and achieve the large-scale ecosystem 
conservation required to harness climate-change effects (Leimona et al., 2011; van Noordwijk et 
al., 2011; Wollenberg et al., 2012).  
Recent developments in defining strategies to reduce emissions from deforestation and other land 
uses highlighted their potential to mitigate the emerging negative effects of climate variability, 
especially if they are community-based and applied after stakeholder capacity building (Hoang et 
al., 2012; Awono et al., 2014). These strategies may also provide livelihood benefits for local 
communities living in forest ecosystems (Mustalahti et al., 2012; Hoang et al., 2012). However, 
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the existing simplistic approaches to tackle climate change, together with the limited local 
understanding of the links between the socio-economic status of communities and trends in 
forest-cover loss, might result in the failure of emission reduction options, as well as the social 
disconnection of the REDD+ schemes in the tropics, as they are designed in the north.  
2.3.  Evolution of the international debates 
In a note released in December 2011, the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) indicated that since the 13th Conference of Parties (COP13), the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) undertook a program of work on methodological 
issues relating to a range of policy approaches and positive incentives generally aimed at REDD+. 
The UNFCCC workshop on methodological issues relating to REDD and held in Tokyo, Japan, 
in June 2008, came up with a general agreement stating that discussions on policy approaches 
and incentives could be initiated based on current knowledge. This created the need to refine 
ongoing instruments in the domain of climate change. 
A look at the current literature confirms that payments for environmental services (PES) 
initiatives and REDD+ have become increasingly popular in forest conservation (Engel et al., 
2009; Alix-Garcia et al., 2009; Van Noordwijk and Leimona, 2010; Blom et al., 2011; Leimona 
et al., 2011; Minang and Van Noordwijk, 2012; Hoang et al., 2012). The 15th Climate Change 
Conference (UNFCC COP-15) in December 2009 upheld REDD+ as an effective scheme for 
developing countries to initiate action regarding climate-change mitigation (UNFCC, 2010). 
Compared to REDD, REDD+ expands the scope of eligible actions. Apart from targeting 
emission reductions from deforestation and degradation, it includes conservation measures and 
enhancement of carbon stocks, as well as sustainable management of forests. There was a 
consensus at COP 16 for REDD+ to be undertaken in three phases: development of national 
strategies or action plans; implementation of policies and measures; and payment for 
performance on the basis of quantified forest emissions and carbon removals. Discussion on the 
different financing options for implementing REDD+ were deferred to COP 17, which took place 
in Durban, South Africa, in December 2011. Recently, during the Paris COP 19 in 2015, a global 
25 
 
fund known as the climate green fund was identified and agreed upon, although disbursement 
mechanisms for individual countries, as yet, remain unclear. 
Larson et al. (2010) have argued earlier that, under the current understanding, REDD stood as a 
climate-change strategy but not as a poverty-alleviation strategy. REDD+ is presented as an 
innovative land-use change strategy which could positively impact on livelihoods. Details of the 
general REDD+ principles have been documented by several authors (Minang and van Noordwijk 
in 2012; Brown, 2013; Lyster et al., 2013). During the 2nd World Congress of Agroforestry held 
in Nairobi, 2009, Achim Steiner, the then UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director 
for the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) declared: “the future of the global land use 
is no longer just about land, it is about the future of the atmosphere, of biodiversity and water, 
fuel and food”.  
Based on the fact that deforestation is an important source of global carbon emissions, the need 
arises to combine the REDD+ concept with other land-use strategies, such as NAMA (Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions) and NAP (National Adaptation Plans) (Bernard et al., 2013). 
The challenge here is to incorporate the potential of trees for climate-change mitigation and 
climate-related risk reduction strategies within more appropriate practices to sustain the 
remaining forests, agricultural lands and other environmental services they provide within the 
tropical forest margins (Mustalahti et al., 2012; Minang and Van Noordwijk, 2012).  
2.4.  Past and ongoing forest conservation strategies: lessons for the design of 
REDD+?  
If the impact of local populations on protected areas must be reduced, then zoning of protected 
areas for conservation should be done using incentive-based approaches in a broad, participatory 
manner with significant contributions by the local population who depend on these natural 
resources for their livelihoods. The view of the Executive Director of the International Tropical 
Timber Organization (ITTO), Emmanuel Ze Meka is in line with this assertion. During a 
workshop in Yaoundé in 2007 aiming to tackle the root causes of deforestation, he stated that 
“you cannot combat the rate of deforestation without tackling the root causes, such as poverty”. 
The same idea is at the basis of the integrated conservation-development project approach 
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(ICDPs). ICDPs represent an innovative management approach that seeks to reduce human 
impact on protected areas by providing local populations with sustainable, income-generating 
activities (Minang et al., 2012). Already in 1994, UNEP and UNDP declared that ICDPs can 
range from community development initiatives in areas bordering parks, to regional land-use 
initiatives, particularly in areas with shared resources.  
2.4.1. Insights from Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs)  
The impact of local populations on protected areas can be curbed when there are provisions for 
offering alternative livelihood options and when land surrounding protected areas is well-
managed. Asanga (1995) shared this view when elaborating on the changing role of an ICDP in 
Cameroon. He declared that in order for community forests to benefit future generations, the land 
surrounding a forest should be sustainably managed for farming and grazing to guarantee local 
populations’ livelihoods. This type of management would address concerns about rural income, 
well-being, vulnerability, social organization, food security and use of natural resources. 
Hakizumwami (2000) shared this opinion. He stated that the negative impact of creating 
protected areas on people’s livelihoods can be compensated when people are provided with 
ICDPs. However, when ICDPs only target some of the affected communities, the rest of the 
population whose plight has not been addressed will find it difficult to sustain a living on the 
limited resources remaining. These people will then violate conservation norms, as observed in 
the Cameroon community forestry sector by Enchaw (2009) during his investigations.     
In this regard, the lessons learnt from the success and failure of past ICDP initiatives, along with 
those from the early REDD pilot projects across Cameroon and the tropics, may be crucial for 
guiding the ongoing REDD+ implementation processes. Cameroon has experienced several 
ICDPs in recent years. However, results within target rural communities seem to be mixed. 
Besong et al. (1995), in a review of Mounts Kilum, Ijim and Kupe Mountain Projects, were 
categorical and stated that community management of forests in general, and of conservation in 
particular, is new to Cameroon and should not be a short-term operation. These authors held that 
the artificial short time horizon imposed by the duration of these projects, in combination with 
the limited commitment of donors to longer-term funding, had the perverse effect of putting 
project teams in the position of ‘dominant leader’ rather than ‘process facilitator’. The authors 
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further raised the fear that the short time horizon was likely to compromise the projects’ own 
understanding of local political, social and resource-use systems. Some years later, this 
precarious situation was investigated by Enchaw (2009) who found that, in Cameroon, the haste 
used in predefined, top-down projects led to non-attainment of project goals in terms of 
‘handover of forest’ to community management. Furthermore, the stakeholders involved could 
not explore different options in the search for sustainable natural-resource management (NRM). 
Of course, the underlying search for best practice in NRM would be time-consuming, but would 
also eventually yield a sound impact on the level of both forest health and community livelihoods 
(Enchaw, 2011).  
According to Minang and van Noordwijk (2012), strong conceptual links can be found between 
ICDP and REDD+. They highlighted four main dimensions of the potential linkages between the 
two mechanisms, namely: (1) the use of vast protected domains and ICDPs as part of REDD+ 
strategies; (2) use of REDD+ as source of finance for forest conservation and thus incorporation 
of carbon emission reductions into current ICDPs; (3) operational modalities, as current REDD+ 
projects are burdened with key ICDP features; and (4) use of local knowledge and capacity 
building developed through ICDP initiatives for S&MRV (Surveillance and Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification).  
 
2.4.2. Payment and rewards for environmental services for REDD+  
The importance of Environmental Services (ES) has been clearly highlighted in the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment carried out between 2003 and 2005 (MEA, 2005). Thereafter, they gained 
interest around the world through several recent studies (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola et al., 2007; 
Swallow et al., 2009; Leimona et al., 2009 and 2010; Haskett and Gutman, 2010; Tacconi et al., 
2010) as well as in Africa with case studies from Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi (German et 
al., 2010; Jindal, 2010; Ajayi et al., 2011). The MEA report (2005) mapped out the services that 
sustain specific functions and regulate life on earth. The same report goes on to define 
environmental services as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, among which it is possible 
to distinguish supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural services. In order to give more 
details, Haskett and Gutman (2010) highlighted some key services, such as carbon stocks, 
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biodiversity, scenic beauty and water supplies for domestic, industrial and agricultural use. As for 
ES sustainability, anthropogenic activities have been identified as shapers of ecosystem status 
across landscapes (FAO, 2011; Masinga, 2011; Ngendakumana and Namirembe, 2012). 
Ecosystem status modification is mostly due to agricultural intensification, which often leads to 
biodiversity loss and erosion of ecological functions (Ajonina, 2011; van de Sand 2012).  
Around the year 2000, it was stated that an incentive mechanism to maintain ecosystem services 
could be an interesting approach. This idea led to the development of PES schemes. Wunder 
(2005) defined Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as (a) a voluntary transaction where; (b) 
a well-defined ecosystem service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service; (c) is ‘bought’ 
by a (minimum of one) service buyer; (d) from a (minimum of one) service provider; (e) if, and 
only if, the service provider secures service provision (conditionality).  
A payment-based approach seeks to reach a negotiated agreement by stipulating some form of 
reward to incentivize ‘downstream’ beneficiaries in recognition of the extra responsibility 
(burden) borne by ‘upstream’ communities in restoring or maintaining a healthy ecosystem. 
Many scholars have recently assessed the role of PES in forest management in tropical countries 
(Masinga, 2011; Leimona et al., 2011; Ajayi et al., 2011). All agreed that supporting PES in 
Africa may reverse forest-loss trends and enhance ecosystem functions in cultivated landscapes. 
In practice, PES deals are emerging through negotiation wherever businesses, public-sector 
agencies and non-profit organizations have taken an active interest in addressing particular 
environmental issues. These schemes provide an alternative source of income for landholders, 
whereby benefits can be extended to communities as a whole (Ajayi et al., 2011; Leimona et al., 
2011). 
In Africa, experience with PES is very recent. Pioneer initiatives were piloted by the Pro-poor 
Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa project (PRESA Project). This project has the 
potential for expansion to other countries. The project is a multi-donor partnership (EU, IFAD, 
UNDP, ICRAF, some Governments) and covers several sites in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania (East 
Africa) and Guinea in West Africa. Preliminary observations and lessons learnt show that classic 
policy regulations tend to limit the flexibility of options that can be exercised by the 
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groups/companies with the potential to create negative ES impacts, especially to ‘upstream’ 
communities (Ngendakumana and Namirembe, 2012).  
Many investigations have contributed to a typology of environmental services (Van Noordwijk et 
al., 2004; Tomich et al., 2004; MEA, 2005; Leimona, 2009; Tacconi et al., 2010; Haskett and 
Gutman, 2010; Ajonina, 2011). Hence, there is now a detailed picture of ES across the world. A 
review of current literature indicates five broad types of services which could be addressed by 
PES schemes.  
 Watershed protection. This includes water purification, enhancing/ensuring water quantity, 
flood and erosion control, amongst others. In general, downstream beneficiaries pay upstream 
land owners either for adopting particular land uses or for maintaining current land uses. 
Payments for water services have the advantage that both the providers and the users of these 
services are relatively easy to identify. Users are generally discrete private operations, such as 
hydro-electric facilities and industrial users, or institutions that represent groups of users, 
such as municipal water authorities, water-bottling companies, or irrigation farmers (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002).  
 Carbon sequestration. This service involves large emitters of carbon dioxide (i.e. agro-
industries, airline companies) in a country that regulates greenhouse gas emissions paying 
land owners to plant additional trees. In exchange for the additional carbon now sequestered, 
emitters obtain credits that are used to offset their own greenhouse gas emissions. At the 
company/emitter’s level, the incentive to adhere to the scheme may be reduced taxation and 
other policy advantages such as further investment opportunities under government 
regulations. Through coordinated payment bonds, the system can operate at the regional, 
national or global scale.  
 Biodiversity conservation. While there are isolated examples of species habitat banks, 
biodiversity payments can take a wide range of forms, including purchase of conservation 
credits, payment for bio-prospecting rights or research permits, hunting and fishing licenses, 
and management contracts to conserve and restore habitats. Developers, such as mining or 
road construction companies, may offset unavoidable biodiversity damage caused by their 
actions by developing such agreements with entities to contribute to the cost of wildlife 
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management. Most of these payments operate at the local or perhaps regional level via a 
recognized body to guarantee access and transparency of the established scheme.  
 Landscape beauty. The most obvious example of this ES is eco-tourism, where tourism 
operators pay a local land owner or community not to hunt in certain areas, or to engage in 
particular land-management activities. This approach has run into criticism, because few 
meaningful payments from eco-tourism actually end up in the hands of the locals who 
actually perform the landscape preservation function. 
 Soil resource conservation: this ES involves nutrient cycling, decomposition and 
mineralization, erosion control and sediment retention during natural or induced processes of 
soil transfer and land movement.  
Lessons from Asia and Africa show that, in the specific case of forests, external pressures and 
high threats to environmental services can create conditions whereby the local community cannot 
provide for both external and internal benefits without any positive incentives (Jindal, 2010; 
German et al., 2010; Leimona et al., 2011). In order to expand such systems, governments and 
national institutions have to guarantee the basic rules of the game to maintain the services under 
the form of a contract. REDD+, in this sense, is viewed as a form of global PES mechanism to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. However, the challenge here is to 
design schemes that can meet people’s needs and expectations (Leimona, 2011; Hoang et al., 
2012; Minang and van Noordwijk, 2012). In relation to lessons from PES which may inform 
REDD+ design, three significant issues should be kept in mind. These are: 
1) stakeholder-negotiated contracts indicating terms and conditions and clarifying payment 
forms;  
2) involvement of all actors with stakes in deforestation, such as those intervening in agricultural 
sector development and timber exploitation; and  
3) opportunity portrayed by current policies and laws to integrate reforms (Leimona et al., 2011).  
Many mechanisms of Compensation and Rewards for Environmental services (CRES), are being 
developed worldwide (WWF, 2006; Van Noordwijk et al., 2007; Swallow et al., 2007; Swallow 
et al.,2009). Tomich and Van Noordwijk (2004) have highlighted that environmental rewards 
could take various forms, such as direct payments, policy incentives, or in-kind compensation. 
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On this basis, emerging mechanisms could take any of these forms depending on the specific 
contexts and actors involved. 
Considering the growing global interest in CRES in Asia and Africa, particularly through 
conditional contracts that reward provision of conservation services, different non-cash incentive 
models have been developed and could be applied parallel to, or in combination with, REDD+ 
initiatives.  
It has been documented that most PES schemes are built on a voluntary basis through dialogue 
and negotiation between stakeholders (Swallow et al., 2007). The stakeholders’ experience could 
then be instrumental in developing further policy tools. Concrete case studies of CRES payments 
are found since 2008 in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Kenya. Famers are paid through 
voluntary market-based contract either for long-term tree planting and conservation, tonnage 
estimates of carbon stocks, watershed protection or avoided deforestation in protected areas 
(Namirembe et al., 2014; Atela et al., 2016). Currently, in Cameroon, there is no clear framework 
for organizing compensation in the forest conservation arena, despite its potential role in 
managing carbon stocks to mitigate climate variability at national, sub-regional and global levels 
(Ajonina, 2011; Dkamela, 2011; Ngendakumana et al., 2012). However, land tenure, forestry and 
other environmental laws contain provisions that relate to PES. They therefore offer an 
opportunity, albeit not in an extensive way, to roll out PES schemes, such as REDD+, that may 
tackle conservation, preservation and the sustainable use of natural resources.  
In addition, there is a high commitment by stakeholders to influence policies towards payments 
by forest-dependent users. These might include large forestry and/or water companies, and 
biodiversity conservation institutions, which obviously have a stake in environmental protection. 
From current literature (Pagiola et al., 2007; Swallow et al., 2009; Leimona et al., 2009; 
Ngendakumana, 2012), one can argue that investments in institutionalizing payments for ES are 
likely to reduce the vulnerability of rural livelihoods. Nevertheless, this will depend on the way 
agriculture and food systems are considered in the ongoing climate-change mitigation debates. 
There is an even more limited understanding of linkages between community poverty 
determinants and trends in forest-cover loss at local level. These shortcomings may continue to 
affect the expected results from emission reduction policy initiatives as well as contributing to the 
social disconnection of REDD+ schemes in developing countries. This implies the need for a 
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rethink to develop a fair financial mechanism to attract local end users and forest stewards, 
mainly rural communities. 
2.5.  Management policy arena and conflicts in the Cameroon forestry sector 
The forestry management sector and policies in Cameroon are still bogged down by historical 
inadequacies that originated in the colonial era. Abuses, gaps and conflicting legal provisions in 
the 1994 Forestry Law and its Decree of Application have created avenues for several conflicts in 
the forestry sector (Enchaw, 2011; Ngendakumana et al., 2013). Several scholars have argued 
that legal provisions, as prescribed by the 1994 Forestry Law and its associated policy 
instruments, are also a source of conflict in the community forestry domain (Bigome and Bikie, 
1998; Oyono et al., 2008; Nguiffo and Djeukam, 2008; Enchaw, 2009). For example, Article 28 
stipulates that the head of a legal institution at site level is the forest management officer (FMO) 
and that he or she is the custodian of the simplified management plan (SMP). He or she enters 
into a contract with the Forestry Administration on behalf of the authorized institution. Following 
the Articles of Association, the head of an association is the delegate. In sites studied by Enchaw 
(2009), each forest management institution has a simplified management plan and its articles of 
association.  
Applying the two legal instruments within the same FMI created conflicts of authority and 
interest at the helm of the institution, since each FMI has two legitimate managers who have 
different interests and responsibilities (the forester and the community delegate). Such conflicts 
were investigated and confirmed by fieldwork carried out in Cameroon. Analysing the outcome 
of a project called the Killum Ijim Forest Project (KIFP), the same author worked on an 
assessment of the conservation strategies in the project area. Based on the Cameroonian 
experience, Birdlife International and MINEF (2002) stated that conflicts between the legal 
community body and the forestry administration, the judiciary and municipal authority, are rife in 
the domain of community forestry.  
Following Article 27(4) of the 1994 Forestry Law, “a community forest is a delimited part of 
non-permanent forest that should not exceed 5,000 hectares” (MINEF 1998:10). When the 
boundary of a community forest is instituted, irrespective of the stakeholder, some individuals in 
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the community are likely to lose access to their land and resources in the interests of establishing 
a community forest. In a situation where land and resources belong to the local people and are 
perceived to be more valuable than forest conservation, it stands to reason that if one wants to 
keep the specific area for other uses, the population would interpret this action in terms of land 
rent leading to greater benefits from the existing resource. If they are therefore not compensated 
first and/or other land is not allocated to them before collectively sharing the benefits accruing 
from the community forest, such an action will likely encounter resistance (Enchaw, 2009). 
Resistance may not necessarily come from all local people, but at least from those individuals 
directly affected.  
Following the provisions of Article 28(3) of the decree of implementation of the forestry 
regulations, the Government of Cameroon requires legally established forest management 
institutions (such as an association, co-operative, common initiative group and/or economic 
interest group) to manage community forests. Some proponents in the domain of social forestry 
noted that in Cameroon, the creation of these legal institutions for forest management is usually 
based on stakeholders’ powers or influence rather than on tenure rights (Besong et al., 1995; 
Oyono et al., 2008; Nguiffo and Djeukam, 2008; Awono et al., 2014). Solving such influence-
based conflicts requires signficant mobilisation of financial and human resources and these are 
often limited.  
FAO (1999) elucidated that while specific disputes can be resolved, many natural-resource 
management and rural development situations are characterised by a complex interaction between 
social, political, cultural, economic and scientific aspects that defy either quick or enduring 
resolutions. The complexity in this arena is such that the conflict may never be resolved. It is 
recommended that the more appropriate task from a governance perspective is to manage conflict 
situations, rather than to attempt to resolve them. It is not surprising therefore, that conflicts, such 
as those observed within Forest Management Institutions on the one hand, and traditional 
landlords, cattle owners and farmers, on the other, have proven very difficult to resolve (Enchaw, 
2009). 
Chambers (1983) stressed that when local communities that dwell in and around forest locations 
are alienated from the management regime, such forest lands fall into an ‘open access’ regime 
34 
 
and, consequently, suffer the fate of the ‘tragedy of the commons’; meaning the depletion of 
common forests which may happen as a result of individual users’own self-interests. Cernea 
(1994) argued that although this situation has been referred to as the tragedy of the commons, it is 
actually the tragedy of open access, which originates from the dissolution of local-level 
institutional arrangements. The dissolution led to the disintegration of traditional tenure rights 
systems and the rise of modern tenure rights. Many scholars (Oyono et al., 2008; Nguiffo and 
Djeukam, 2008; RRI, 2009; Enchaw, 2011; Foundjem-Tita, 2013; Awono et al., 2014) observed 
that these two legal systems prevail in co-existence across Cameroon and other countries in 
Africa. However, existing literature does not dwell much on how the precedence of modern 
tenure rights over traditional rights affects the definition and implementation of conservation 
strategies in forest areas. Moreover, it is increasingly acknowledged by the international 
community and governments that the degradation of forests is partly caused by a lack of 
involvement of the rightful institutions and stakeholders in the conservation process (McNeely et 
al., 1990; Fobissie et al., 2012; Awono et al., 2014; Atela et al., 2016). 
2.6.  Tension between resource conservation and rights of local communities 
The use of modern legal frameworks for the conservation of biodiversity often imposes social 
change on local communities. They are often deterred from participating in the management of 
these protected areas. However, as noted earlier by Ngbo-Ngbangbo et al. (2010) based on a 
global literature review, the notion of protected areas has deep historical roots. They have existed 
in varying forms in diverse ancient cultures, dating back to early pre-agrarian societies in Asia 
and the Near East (Allin (1990) and Runte (1997) cited by Ngbo-Ngbangbo et al., 2010). In the 
same vein, it was found that Chinese and South American civilisations initiated several decrees 
setting aside lands for plant and animal protection more than 3,000 years before the present era. 
Sacred forest groves, in which all forms of extractive use were prohibited, represent an early 
manifestation of the notion of protected areas (Chandrashekara et al., 1998 cited by Pandey, 
2002).  
Conflicts between local communities and management authorities have been reported by many 
studies across tropical ecosystems (India, Cameroon and Brazil). They often surface when 
preparing large-scale conservation projects (Pandey, 2002; Oyono et al., 2008; Cotula and 
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Mayers, 2009). Emerging international governance approaches therefore opened the eyes of 
social scientists to consider additional safeguards to reduce the risks of conflict over forest 
resources as negotiated mechanisms were put in place in the context of climate-change mitigation 
(Oyono et al., 2008; Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008; Larson et al., 2010; Galudra et al., 
2011). This poses the challenge of mainstreaming various forms of key social safeguards, such as 
community rights and equity in benefit sharing to enhance other forest-related co-benefits 
(watersheds, health, local climate regulation, biodiversity).  
The business dictionary defines ownership as “the ultimate and exclusive right conferred by a 
lawful claim or title and subject to certain restrictions to enjoy, occupy, possess, rent or sell, use, 
give away or even destroy an item of property” (http://www.businessdictionary.com ). In the light 
of this definition, there is definitely room for real concern about how the interests of forest people 
can be protected under REDD+. Forest tenure and resource ownership tend to be insecure for 
communities living in forested areas in many countries where REDD+ is being implemented. This 
can be explained by the fact that the communities adhere to customary rights, which are often not 
formalized under statutory rights (Brown, 2013). In the largest forested countries of the world, 
such as Indonesia, Congo DR, Venezuela and even Cameroon, the state owns most forestland. 
Forests where local communities have statutory access or ownership rights tend to be small or 
non-existent (Tacconi et al., 2010; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Awono et al., 2014). This observation 
highlights the risk of social conflict under the upcoming REDD+ schemes and stresses the need to 
partly shift forest resource ownership towards local people for them to positively contribute to 
reducing emissions from deforestation. REDD+ is an opportunity to engage reforms in a way that 
would be equitable for local stakeholders.  
Although, at the moment, some steps have been made to move from the REDD+ pilot phase to a 
fast-track implementation in the Congo basin countries, some questions still need to be clarified: 
(1) to what extent does REDD+ have to mainstream governance principles such as participation, 
responsibilities and rules if it is to deal effectively with the drivers of deforestation? and (2) what 
lessons learnt from the current forestry policy framework could help to make REDD+ successful 
in Cameroon?  
 
36 
 
2.7.  Policy perspective for community involvement in REDD+ 
It is recognised by many contemporary researchers that REDD+ policies and programs will not 
succeed if adequate tenure incentives for indigenous people, local communities and women are 
not included. Enchaw (2011) has worked on how tenure security for indigenous people, in his 
case the Baka, provides an incentive for their participation in forest conservation within the 
framework of REDD+ policies and programs. He indicated that one of the greatest bottlenecks 
undermining the participation of indigenous people in sustainable forest management in 
Cameroon is the uncertainty of the tenure systems in practice. The latter author claimed that 
despite the existence of several forest-management laws in the country, quantitative and 
qualitative depletion of forests is being aggravated by mistaken or unclear policies. The modern 
tenure system (de jure tenure system), with public utility status upheld by the State and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country, has not only eschewed the traditional tenure 
system, but has also failed to recognise the land and forest resource rights of indigenous people, 
local communities and women. Moreover, Enchaw (2011) noted that positive aspects of the 
traditional tenure system and traditional conservation strategies were not integrated in any of the 
previous conservation frames. A sense of belonging is a normal human phenomenon. Therefore, 
no one will be indifferent to the fact that the non-integration of indigenous people, local 
communities and women in the process of conservation has dissuaded them from participating. 
The State, NGOs, funding bodies and multilateral organizations still perceive climate change and 
forest conservation as issues requiring only technical and regulatory solutions that are beyond 
indigenous peoples, yet the latter are the ones who pay the price for conservation (Sunderlin et 
al., 2014). Very often, the solutions and opportunities offered to indigenous peoples through 
REDD+ policies and programs do not take their priorities and preferences into consideration. 
Even worse, such solutions require radical and fundamental changes in socio-political structures, 
technological and economic systems, organizational forms, and modes of regulation that do not 
match the social life and organization of indigenous peoples (Brown, 2013). They could be in 
terms of imposed new leadership set up, newly introduced planting materials, exposure to modern 
exchanges and exotic feeding habits, top down policy measures and rules, etc. These changes are 
prone to distort those cultural, socio-economic and spiritual values that have effectively 
established a harmonious relationship between indigenous peoples and their forest lands and 
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territories for generations. As it is, this relationship has enabled them to conserve the remaining 
forest massifs and often to maintain carbon stocks at sustainable levels long before REDD+ 
policies and programs were proposed (Brown, 2013).  
The 1994 Forestry Law in Cameroon was developed under the auspices of the World Bank. It 
allowed local people to acquire some community forests in non-permanent forest areas (MINEF, 
1995). A multiplicity of factors, however, that, in practice, render ineffective the community 
forest concept have been identified by a number of scholars (Oyono et al., 2006; Enchaw, 2009). 
The factors are: (1) limited political will of the State towards management devolution; (2) vertical 
policy instrument development without the prior consent of the local communities; (3) efforts by 
conservationists to take advantage of legal flaws to victimise indigenous people in order to justify 
demands for conservation funds and alleviate the poverty situation for forestry staff; (4) 
orientation of most forestry processes towards experts to the detriment of local knowledge, 
whereby the required time and implementation costs constitute a major constraint.  
The legal classification of land and forest, coupled with the statutory exigency for obtaining land 
titles and registering private lands, has rather restricted access rights to these domains for 
indigenous people and local communities, although they depend directly on the land and forest 
for their livelihoods (RRI, 2009; Sunderlin et al., 2014). One fundamental policy issue is the non-
application of some of the legal provisions that were clearly promulgated and which should 
devolve access and ownership rights to local communities (Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg 
2010). The complex nature of the 1994 Forestry Law of Cameroon has rendered its 
implementation difficult. A 2009 report by REPAR (Parliamentary Network) pointed out that 
despite the gaps, omissions and contradictions in the law, there are many provisions that are 
basically good, but which are inadequately enforced. Sunderlin et al. (2014) found that in many 
developing countries, including Cameroon, issues of compensation and benefit sharing are 
inadequately managed. Even though the government may have the political will to act, external 
influence would probably frustrate its ambitions.  
Crucially, there is a lot of incoherence between the 1994 Forestry Law and other Forestry policy 
instruments in Cameroon that have been promulgated since 1995, after the law had been 
formulated (Enchaw, 2009; Foundjem-Tita, 2013). For instance, efforts by the government to 
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mitigate the situation by adopting the Environment Code in 1996 could not be brought to fruition 
as the conditions imposed by the World Bank put the country under pressure to understate 
community priority needs and rights. Under such conditions, the government was forced to adopt 
a legal instrument which contains some gaps, confusing clauses and contradictions vis-à-vis local 
interests and aspirations.  
The REDD+ process in Cameroon started in 2008 with the validation of the Readiness 
Preparation Idea Note. This was followed by two years of awereness-creation meetings at all 
levels. In 2010, preliminary assessments on existing REDD+ initiatives were carried out. This 
process led to the creation of the REDD+ steering committee. The latter was responsible for 
spearheading the development of the REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP), as well as 
the future implementation plan for the mechanism in the field. The Cameroon RPP was a three-
year project with ambitious and challenging perspectives on how to integrate REDD+ into the 
national forestry policies, and on how to improve governance principles as requirements for a 
successful implementation phase. Learning from the current legal context, REDD+ may need to 
pay attention to social fairness, while anticipating a conflict-solving arrangement throughout the 
implementation cycle.  
2.8.  Conclusions and research perspectives 
This desktop analysis sought to deepen existing knowledge in the area of forest governance to 
underpin the REDD+ implementation process after the fast-track and pilot phase in Cameroon. 
Instruments and approaches such as ICDPs and PES were found to have strong linkages with 
REDD+. A more thorough understanding of the initiatives that have previously been implemented 
in Cameroon and elsewhere is believed to improve REDD+ effectiveness and reduce 
implementation costs in the current context of limited funding flows from donors. Lessons learnt 
from the current regulatory frameworks and past and ongoing conservation initiatives are mostly 
modalities to consider in implementing REDD+. These comprise the need for better targeting, 
participation or stakeholder involvement, integrating positive aspects of traditional land tenure 
and opportunity within current policies and laws to integrate reforms. Forest tenure conflicts need 
to be resolved through adequate policy reforms and related instruments clarified and agreed upon 
before REDD+ is implemented. 
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Furthermore, from a reduced deforestation perspective, several specific gaps or deficiencies in 
the conservation approaches and policy formulations were discovered: (1) incoherence between 
existing forestry policy instruments with regard to community forest concept, (2) overnormative 
and complex approaches used in forest management which would constrain the flow of REDD+ 
implementation, (3) the reliance on top-down, instead of bottom-up, approaches which 
intentionally cast aside community rights and small farmers’ interests; and (4) limited 
understanding of linkages between local communities’ poverty determinants and trends in forest-
cover loss. Undoubtedly, this inadequate knowledge on local drivers of deforestation, the link 
with the socio-economic situation and conflicts over forest resources need to be addressed as they 
constitute stumbling blocks to REDD+ activities. These suggest that the process would need to 
take into consideration both sustainable natural-resource management (NRM) and improved 
livelihoods for the rural poor living in and around permanent forest domains, so that the predicted 
benefits can match community needs and expectations.  
The whole set of paradigms implies rethinking a fair and socially sound REDD+ mechanism in 
order to attract local end users and forest stewards, mainly rural communities. Research 
perspectives should therefore tackle the identified gaps and further explore links between 
household characteristics and deforestation, hence REDD+, to assess key factors of success. From 
the findings, adequate incentive structures could be developed based on the community-forest 
concept, in the light of local smallholder farmers’ priorities and interests. Ideally, this would then 
inform the development of an appropriate regulatory framework to halt deforestation in 
Cameroon through foregone efforts-based reward instruments such as REDD+ and/or any other 
carbon market scheme.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“You can improve on something, but you can’t improve on nothing” 
(Dr Haggai J. Edmund)
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3. STUDY AREA PROFILE AND GENERAL RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter 3 describes the country under study and the specificities of the study sites across scales, 
as well as the methodology used. A detailed presentation of the specific methods used is provided 
in each empirical chapter. During this research, a multi-layer dataset approach was adopted in 
order to obtain a broader view and to capture and record the relevant data at different scales. The 
first dataset considers the local level and contains farm and socio-economic information collected 
through a household survey, transect walks and focus group discussions. The second dataset 
covers multiple sites to assess the implications of social safeguards. Finally, the third layer 
consists of information at the national level to map the institutions with stakes in REDD+. 
3.1. Description of the study area  
3.1.1. Geographic and socio-economic context of Cameroon  
Cameroon is one of 10 countries which form the Congo basin in the central part of the African 
continent. The Republic of Cameroon borders Nigeria to the west, Chad to the northeast, the 
Central Africa Republic to the east, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo to 
the south (Fig3.1). The country extends to the west-central coast of Africa and occupies an area 
of 466,326 km2 (de Wasseige, 2009) between latitudes 2° and 13°N (about 1200 km), and 
longitudes 8° 30´ and 16°10´ E (CIA, 2013). Most of the land territory is situated between 200 
and 800 m above sea level. Cameroon has been described as “all of Africa in one triangle” 
because the country hosts such a wide range of climates and ecosystems. 
The North of the country, extending up to Lake Chad, is covered by Sahel savannah. The central 
part contains moist savannah, whereas the South is covered by dense tropical rainforests 
(MINEPDED, 2012). The climate of Cameroon varies with the terrain, from tropical along the 
coast to semi-arid and hot in the north. The coastal belt is extremely hot and humid and includes 
some of the wettest places on earth (Letouzey, 1985). 
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Figure 3.1. Political map of Cameroon showing waterways and road networks.   
(source: Adapted from the Atlas of Cameroon by Precilia Ngaunkam Shokoleu, 2012)  
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Compared to other African countries, Cameroon has generally enjoyed stability, which has 
permitted the development of agriculture, road infrastructure and timber industries (CIA, 2013). 
Nevertheless, large numbers of Cameroonians live in poverty as subsistence, smallholder 
farmers. According to a recent UNDP report, Cameroon ranks 152 out of 187 on the 2014 Human 
Development Index, with 48.2% of the country’s 20 million people identifed as 
multidimensionnally poor (UNDP, 2014).  
With an annual growth rate of 2.08% in the rural areas, alongside an urbanisation rate of 3.5%, it 
is estimated that the population will increase to around 25 million in 2020 (USAID, 2011). In 
Cameroon, the urban population was estimated to be 54% of the total in 2007 (INS, 2007). 
Population densities vary according to zones. For example, the humid forest in the Eastern Forest 
region has a population density of just 7.5 per km2; the South has 12.5 per km2, whereas the 
savannah zone has 12.6 per km2. These are less-populated areas compared to the western 
highlands (151.7 per km2), the lowland coast (105 per km2) and the North with 85.5 per km2.  
Cameroon has a vast forest cover, with around 42% of the total land area covered with forests 
(equivalent to 20 million ha), 75% of which is dense forest (FAO, 2010; UNREDD, 2011). 
According to Rainforest Alliance data (2012), the country ranks among the top six African 
countries for its varied species of mammals, birds and flora. Cameroon is estimated to host over 
half of the continent’s bird and mammal species and at least 8,000 plant species.  
The forests of Cameroon constitute a significant portion of the Congo Basin. It accounts for about 
80% of the remaining moist forests in Africa but estimates of its annual deforestation rates are 
respectively 0.05% (GAF-AG et al., 2011) and 0.06% (Ernst et al., 2012). While smallholder 
slash-and-burn agriculture and fuelwood collection are widely believed to be responsible for 
about 90% of deforestation, these drivers are often the secondary effects of tropical timber 
harvesting, which degrades forest cover and contributes to associated declines in biodiversity 
(Dkamela, 2010, Minang et al., 2012). A distinction can be made between direct and indirect 
drivers of deforestation (Ernst et al., 2012; Megevand et al., 2012; Kissinger et al., 2012). In the 
case of Cameroon, the most important direct drivers cited are agricultural expansion, 
infrastructure development, timber extraction and fuelwood harvesting. Indirect drivers 
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commonly mentioned are demographic pressure, the economic context and governance practices 
(Robiglio et al., 2010; Ernst et al., 2012). 
Recently, deforestation in Cameroon became a major source of debate (UNREDD, 2011). For 
instance, it was estimated that the country loses about 200,000 ha of its forest cover each year, 
representing an annual deforestation rate of 0.90% (FAO, 2008; MINEPDED, 2012). This loss 
rate has become alarming, especially when compared to the 4.0 million hectares cleared annually 
in Africa (Butler, 2005 cited by Asaah, 2012; see also details in section 4.1). Drivers of 
deforestation differ across the various zones, in relation to population density and distribution, 
infrastructure development and market integration. The different agro-ecolgical zones are 
presented in table 3.1 hereafter.  
Table 3.1. Agro-ecological zones and suitability for cropping  
Agro-ecological zone type Crops suitability 
Sudano-sahel Cotton, millet, sorghum, cowpea, onion and sesame 
Savanna zone Maize, millet, sorghum, yam, potato 
Western highlands Cocoa, coffee, maize, potato, poultry, vegetables 
Mono-modal humid forest zone Cocoa, banana, plantain, cassava, coffee, palm oil, 
poultry, rubber, ginger, pepper 
Bimodal humid forest zone Cocoa, plantain, cassava, coffee, palm oil, 
pineapple 
(Source, World Bank 2008) 
It can be observed that the cropping potential differs between the zones. The characteristics of 
each zone have also shaped the forest changes observed over the past few decades (WB, 2008; 
Robiglio et al., 2010).  
In the present study, particular focus is given to the rainforest zone because, as part of the Congo 
Basin forest, it is the main target area for the REDD+ projects under the COMIFAC partnership. 
The rainforest zone includes the South and Coastal zones, roughly between 2°and 6° N and for 
the most part below an altitude of 800 m (PNDP, 2011). In the coastal zone, there is a single dry 
season and rainfall decreases from 4,000 mm/year at the coast to 2,500 mm/year inland (Tchouto, 
2004). In the South, there is a four-season climate and annual rainfall is over 1,500 mm with a 
maximum of two dry months. This is a region of dense forests, where evergreen or semi-
deciduous rainforest forms an unbroken tract in the south and splits into islands north of 5°N 
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(PNDP, 2011). It corresponds to the "humid" and "low-and medium-altitude sub-humid and very 
humid” eco-floristic zones, while the coastal and southern zones make up the Atlantic coastal 
forest (see map on Fig. 3.2). 
According to Robiglio et al. (2010), the sectors that are most directly responsible for forest loss 
and degradation in Cameroon are the timber industry (timber exploitation is the prominent land-
use system in the forest zone), agribusiness and to an extend smallholder farmers.  
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Figure 3.2. Land cover map of Cameroon (source: drawn by Precilia Ngaunkam Shokoleu, 2013) 
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3.1.2. Cameroon timber industry trends  
Cameroon’s forest management system has been developed with the support of the World Bank 
in 1994 following the national zoning plan concepts, which allocate logging areas according to 
the forest policy (de Wasseige, 2009). The legal framework distinguishes permanent forest 
domains, classified as such for strict conservation, and the non-permanent forest domains 
comprising other areas covered with tree canopies. Forest-related income in Cameroon is of 
considerable economic importance, as the timber industry is the second largest source of export 
revenues for the country after the oil industry (CIA, 2013). It represents 6% of the country’s 
Gross National Product. For example, the formal timber sector generated a fiscal income of 
around 62,000,000 Euros in 2005 and employed about 163,000 people in 2006, 13,000 of whom 
were employed in the industrial sector (Cerutti and Taconni, 2008). In 2006, formal national 
timber production was estimated at 2,296,254 m3 (de Wasseige, 2009). Income from the annual 
forestry fees was estimated at 30 million US dollars in 2008, which represents 11.5% of the total 
export earnings, coming second only to the oil industry (Kengoum and Tiani, 2013).  
Logging in Cameroon, as practiced in forest management units (FMU) is highly selective, 
focusing on a few species of interest. These species include Ayous (Triplochiton scleroxylon), 
Sapelli (Entandrophragma cylindricum), Azobe (Lophira alata), Iroko (Milicia excelsa), Sipo 
(Entandrophragma utile), Fraké (Terminalia superba) and Tali (Erythrophleum ivorensis) 
(Eba’a-Atyi, 2009). Clearcutting is not practiced unless authorised for wood recovery, where 
timber logging is associated with the development of agricultural projects or infrastructure 
development (Dkamela, 2010). 
A study on the domestic timber sector has quantified the scale of the informal timber market in 
Cameroon, with harvested volumes estimated at about 2 million m3 of timber per year. This is 
almost equivalent to the quantities found in the formal timber export industry (Cerutti and 
Taconni, 2008). The domestic sector, however, has grown up in contravention of the legal 
enforcement system. Thus, it is evolving without either logging entitlements or taxation. This 
illegal deforestation is likely to negatively affect the implementation outcomes of REDD+ 
because the sector is characterised by inefficiency, corruption and a lack of transparency 
(Lescuyer et al.2009).  
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3.1.3. Agricultural sector 
In Cameroon, agriculture contributes about 20.8% to GDP (CIA, 2013). It is a sector 
experiencing continuous growth, although with fluctuating prices. The products with a relevant 
positive volume growth for export are: cocoa (4.7 %), coffee (1%), rubber (6.9%), and palm oil 
(8.3%). Furthermore, agriculture is the predominant activity for about 70% of rural households 
(CIA, 2013). The evolution of the rural sector is critical for the national economy in terms of job 
creation, income diversification, poverty reduction and overall growth and exports. After the 
hardship registered in early 2008 in the country, due to the increase in international cereal grain 
prices, Cameroon has established a strategy to enhance long-term food supply (Cerutti and 
Taconni, 2008). The strategy is based on facilitating access to and use of inputs and high-yielding 
plant material with a view to reducing production costs for small-scale farmers (WB, 2008). 
Because of its competitiveness in cassava, maize and plantain production, and thanks to 
improvements in the transport infrastructure, Cameroon is also becoming a major food supplier 
within Central Africa (Tabuna et al., 2009). This has yielded a relevant impact on the 
opportunities created for smallholder farmers in the humid forest zone, in particular in the 
Southern Region. In this area, the majority of people living near the forests rely on small-scale, 
traditional, agriculture-based, shifting cultivation practices to produce food crops, as well as 
cocoa and oil palm. According to Yemefack et al. (2013), the most important farming systems in 
Efoulan are subsistence food crop production and cocoa agroforestry plantations.  
3.1.4 Profile of the local scale study site (main site) 
The main study site for this work is the Efoulan. Efoulan is a landscape that belongs to a 
municipality with the same name (Fig. 3.3). It is located in the southern Region of Cameroon, in 
Mvila Division. Efoulan is one of the sites previously selected as part of the intervention area for 
the ASB-REALU project. The latter project is an initiative implemented by the World 
Agroforestry Center and has partners in 4 countries in the tropics. Under NORAD funding, 
REALU aimed to provide quick-start data and policy evidence to inform REDD+ processes 
globally.  
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Figure 3.3. Map of Efoulan landscape showing the study villages (Source: Ngaunkam P. and author)  
 
Efoulan was selected for this research because it met the following criteria: 1) availability of 
satellite images; 2) presence of humid forest cover; 3) presence of natural-resource management 
bodies; 4) presence of agri-business and logging companies; 5) all-weather road infrastructure; 6) 
local authorities open to, or having a clear vision on, natural-resource management; and 7) local 
administrations already in the process of building a local development plan. The logic of using a 
municipality focus is inspired by the future implications of decentralisation laws on natural 
resources (PNDP, 2011) at landscape level. It is assumed that, after the completion of the 
ongoing decentralisation process, local administrative authorities would be key facilitators in the 
CO2 emission reduction schemes. Moreover, Cameroon’s southern region is part of the potential 
areas for REDD+ within the Congo basin initiatives.  
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The population of Efoulan is estimated at 28,000 inhabitants, distributed over 37 villages (PNDP, 
2011). The livelihood of these communities depends on smallholder agriculture, based on shifting 
cultivation and cocoa plantations and oil palm (Table 3.2) as well as the collection of NTFPs.  
Table 3.2. Overview of main crops cultivated in Efoulan  
Crop typology  Common name  Local Name Scientific Name* IPNI Family names 
Perennial 
/cash 
Cocoa keka Theobroma cacao L. Malvaceae 
Palm oil   Alene Elaeis guineensis Jacq. Arecaceae 
Pineapple Zeuk Ananas comosus (L) Merr. Bromeliaceae 
Sugar cane  Nkok Saccharum officinarum L.        Poaceae 
Annual 
crops 
Groundnut  Owondo Arachis hypogaea L.  Fabaceae 
Cucumber (Egousi) Ngon Cucumis sativus L.  Cucurbitaceae 
Cocoyam  Ekabé Xanthosoma sagittifolium (L.) Schott  Araceae  
Maize Fon Zea mays L. Poaceae  
Cassava Mbong Manihot esculenta Crantz Euphorbiaceae 
Banana  Adjoué Musa sapientum L.  Musaceae  
Plantains  Ekon Musa paradisiaca L. Musaceae  
Agroforestry 
trees 
Mango Ando’o nta’an 
Mangifera indica Wall. Anacardiaceae 
Paw paw   Fofo Carica papaya L. Caricaceae 
African mango Ndo’o Irvingia gabonensis Baill. Ex Lanen. Irvingiaceae 
Source: Ngendakumana et al., 2011.  
*Scientific names checked using IPNI, 2005 (International Plant Name Index) and NRCS (USDA Natural 
Resource Conservation Service) and MOBOT Plant List (www.theplantlist.org)  
 
According to the Köppen climate classification system (Pidwirny, 2011), the climate regime in 
Efoulan is tropical monsoonal with a long wet season and a short dry season. Mean annual 
rainfall in the study area has been estimated at 1532.2 mm. The average annual temperature is 
around 24.6°C, while the average annual humidity rate is 80% (Mbosso, 2011). The period from 
December to February is the driest of the year. However, irregularities are observed in local 
climate conditions in Efoulan and its surroundings (Ebolowa, Lolodolf and Campo).  
In terms of geomorphology and geology, Efoulan belongs to the continental plateau of southern 
Cameroon, a tertiary eroded surface with undulating to rolling hills. Soils are generally fertile 
enough for agriculture, but lose their fertility rapidly under severe and cumulative intensification. 
This fact seems to push farmers to practice shifting cultivation and slash-and-burn, a practice 
which increases the conversion of forests into agricultural lands (Robiglio et al., 2010; 
Ngendakumana et al., 2011).  
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With regard to forest resources, Efoulan has four small forest units. The first is a council forest 
covering about 5,600 ha over a total surface area of 1,500 km2. The other three forests found in 
the municipality are community forests currently managed by Common Initiative Groups. Van 
Gemerden and Hazeu (1999) conducted a detailed vegetation study in the Efoulan landscape and 
reported some 490 tree species belonging to 76 families. The most prominent families include the 
Euphorbiaceae (47 species), Caesalpiniaceae (43 species), Rubiaceae (29 species) and 
Annonaceae (18 species). The forest in Efoulan is part of the Campo-Ma’an rainforest which has 
around 114 endemic plant species, 29 of which are restricted to the study area, with species such 
as Afrotrewia kamerinica, Bulbophyllum alinae, Ledermanniella batangensis and Psychotria 
batangana (Tchouto, 2004).  
Vegetation appears as a degraded forest with a dense understory and few epiphytes. In the same 
arena, wetland forests are observed with Rhizophora racemosa and Pandanus satabiei, alongside 
bamboo species (such as Phyllostachys spp.) and raphia palms (Raphia sp.). Also, important 
patches of primary forest are found in this area. In terms of the composition of vegetative cover, 
three vegetative cover layers can be distinguished as shown by table 3.3 below: a tree layer 
composed of trees whose height reaches at least 8 m; a shrub layer composed of shrubs and 
bushes; and an herbaceous layer. 
Table 3.3. Dominant tree species per land-use system in the tree strata of Efoulan (%) 
Rank Dominant species in arboreous strata 
Land Use System (LUS) 
Mixed 
perennial 
tree-crops  
Tree crops 
fallow 
system  
Food crop-
tree crop 
system 
Secondary 
forest 
1 Elaeis guineensis   62.50 12.50 
2 Funtumia elastica   37.50   37.50 
3 Irvingia gabonensis 12.50 25.00 37.50   
4 Albizia spp.   12.50   12.50 
5 Funtumia africana 12.50     12.50 
6 Macaranga spp. 12.50 12.50     
7 Musanga cecropioides       25.00 
8 Ricinodendron heudelotii 25.00       
9 Artocarpus heterophyllus       12.50 
10 Ceiba pentandra 12.50       
(Source: After ICRAFF/ASB Cameroon data base) 
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According to a quick forestry inventory carried out under the ASB initiative in Efoulan 
(Ngendakumana et al., 2011), it was observed that in the “food crop-tree crop system”, 62.5% of 
the trees are Elaeis guineensis. In the tree-crop fallow and secondary forest land-use systems 
Funtumia elastica is predominant (37.50%). Finally, the same assessment indicated that in the 
mixed perennial tree crop systems, Ricinodendron heudelotii is the dominant species (25%).  
3.1.5 Description of the sub- study sites 
The second dataset contains data on three sub-sites (Ngoyla, Edea and Tinto, see Fig.3.4). These 
sites were chosen in three regions of Cameroon based on prior information obtained from local 
partners based on criteria such as (a) cultural diversity, (b) occurrence of customary rights claims 
to forest resources, (c) overlaps between modern and customary tenure regimes, and (d) the 
existence, at least, of a forest management unit under threat. As suggested by Ritchie and Lewis 
(2010), it was decided to include sub-sites in the investigation to enable assessment of the 
implications of the tenure system on deforestation in the current REDD+ context. One sub-site is 
located in the English-speaking part of Cameroon (Tinto in the South West Region) with the two 
others in the French-speaking part of the country (Ngoyla in the East Region, and Edea in UFA 
07002 of the Coastal Region) (UFA= “Unité Forestière d’Aménagement” or Forest Management 
Unit). The three study sites are all located in the southern forest region of Cameroon. 
The first study site, Ngoyla, is a sub-division found in the Upper Nyong Division, which is 
located in the south eastern part of the East Region of Cameroon. Ngoyla Sub-division is located 
approximately between longitudes 12°40’ and 14°18’ east of the Greenwich Meridian and 
between latitudes 2°5’and 3°46’north of the Equator. The local population is made up of Bantu, 
Baka Pygmies and a few immigrants. Their dominant livelihood activities are cocoa cultivation, 
hunting and gathering. Access to land and forest resources is under the influence of the Nki 
National Park. Here the forest management systems are characterised by repeated park boundary 
extensions due to imposed changes in zoning resulting in community farmland-based claims.  
The UFA 07002 Edea study site is found in the south western coastal part of the Sanaga Maritime 
Division in the Coastal Region of Cameroon. It is made up of Ngonga and Kopongo localities 
within the target UFA and BOPO (Boomabong and Pouth-Ndjock) located adjacent to the same 
UFA. The local population is made up of Bassa and migrants. Their dominant livelihood 
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activities are cassava, plantain and oil palm cultivation, and hunting and gathering. Ngonga and 
Kopongo are two communities each with a proposed Community Forest (CF). These two 
proposed CFs are within UFA 07002, a forest area under the control of a state-owned corporation 
called “Edea Technopole”.  
The third site, Tinto, is in Manyu Division of the South West Region of Cameroon. It is 
approximately located between longitudes 9°34’ and 9°38’E and between latitudes 5°32’and 
5°37’N. The local population is made up of the Bayang and migrants. Their dominant livelihood 
activities are cocoa and food crop cultivation, hunting, gathering and fishing.  
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Figure 3.4: Location of the three study sub-sites in the southern Cameroon forest region (source: adapted 
from MINFOF, 2008) 
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3.2. Methods  
To achieve envisaged objectives, this study used the methodological approach described below. 
3.2.1. Data collection across scales 
In an attempt to constitute cogent analytic building blocks during the whole research period 
(Ritchie et al., 2003), information was consolidated using a three-level dataset (local, sub-
national or landscape and national). This type of multi-layer dataset approach was adopted in 
order to obtain a broader view by capturing and recording key observations at all levels (Table 
3.4). The first dataset comes from the local level and concerns farm and socio-economic 
information generated through household surveys, transect walks and focus group discussions in 
the study area. The second dataset goes beyond the study area “Efoulan” to assess forest tenure 
and policy challenges at community (sub-national) level. The third layer consists of national-level 
information to map institutions with stakes in REDD+. In addition, secondary data was obtained 
from a desk review of government policies and research documents available online and/or in 
various libraries.  
In practice, a review of the literature in the domain of REDD+ and climate change was 
undertaken to establish the state of the art and the knowledge gaps in the Cameroon forest sector. 
A search for the review material was undertaken between April 2011 and September 2014, using 
several databases, i.e. Google scholar, ISI web of knowledge and Science Direct. 
As indicated earlier, the study relies on data collected at different scales. The sources of 
information are presented in table 3.4. The entire series of assessments consisted of nine sites, 
encompassing 534 informants of different types from 2010 to 2011. To answer the first two 
research questions, data collection primarily used a household survey (see details in annex). 
Operationally, the questionnaire was completed by face-to-face interviews in nine villages of 
Efoulan (Fig. 3.3). The risk of bias with the survey method was reduced because the enumerators 
knew the area and the local issues. The enumerators were trained only to guide the respondents 
and to avoid interference by proffering their own opinions which could influence the answers. 
During the research, a mixed method approach was used (Richie and Lewis, 2003) to gather 
accurate and detailed information. Additional tools and methods were utilised, ranging from 
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literature review, content analysis applied to policy instruments and institutional mapping 
(Biermann et al., 2009; Angelsen et al., 2012). Focus and large group discussions were used to 
complement qualitative data in order to understand avenues of community empowerment towards 
efficient REDD+ implementation.  
Table 3.4. Summary of sample frame showing data level, sites and number of agents sampled 
Assessment 
Level 
Research 
questions 
Selected 
sample unit/ 
Region 
Target 
sampled sites 
Type of data 
collected/Research 
questions covered 
Number of 
respondents 
/sample unit 
Local Research question 1 
to 2 on policy, 
incentive options 
for REDD+ and 
relationship 
between household 
characteristics and 
deforestation.  
Efoulan 
(South) 
Efoulan 
Council forest 
Socio-economic HH 
characteristics. 
Perceptions of farming 
practices, knowledge of 
law and awareness on 
CC. 
Conditional willingness 
to conserve forest carbon 
stocks. 
48 
   CIG 
MINVAN 
Community 
forest 
38 
   CIG DIMEJ 
1&2 
Community 
forest 
34 
Subnational Research question 4 
on including social 
safeguards in 
REDD+ policy  
Ngoyla (East) Nguti Reserve Relationship “Forest 
tenure, community rights 
and land claims. 
 
Knowledge on policies 
and the 1994 forestry law.  
Potential challenges for 
REDD+ implementation. 
(137) a 
   Nki National 
Park 
 
  Edea (Littoral) Covilam 
Reserve 
(102) 
   Edea Reserve  
  Tinto (South 
West) 
Bayang Mbo 
Sanctuary 
(101) 
   Codem 
Reserve 
 
National Research question 3  
on policy solutions 
and institutional of 
REDD+ dimensions  
Countrywide REDD+ 
stakeholders 
Information on REDD+ 
actors and institutions.  
State of REDD+ pilot 
phase. 
18 
Sub total      138 
a
LGDM      330 
FGD     66 
Total 4 4 10 5 534 
Key: aLGDM=Large Group Discussion Meetings, involving community-based organizations (figures in brackets), 
FGD = Focus Group Discussions. 
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A nested approach was used, as presented by Pedroni et al. (2010) and echoed in Minang and 
Van Noordwijk (2012). The quantitative data used in chapter 4 was generated through household 
surveys as described earlier, and the information obtained was complemented by focus group 
discussions conducted in Efoulan municipality, as similarly applied by van Noordwijk et al. 
(2010). In this study, a binary logit regression model is used to assess individual determinants of 
forest-cover change at local level. The results from the model would ascertain the outcome of 
farmers’ perceptions recorded during the field investigation. Additional assessments were made 
(at the end of the HHS questionnaire) using Rapid Tenure Assessment (RaTa) tools to gain 
insights into land-use history and tree-based rights at the local scale (Galudra, 2010). 
The second layer consists of a stakeholder analysis and helps to present part of chapters 4 and 6. 
A policy analysis framework (fig.3.5) was used to map and understand the perceptions of the 
actors involved, the existing policies and laws as well as conflicts which may influence REDD+ 
in the forest-zone context of Cameroon.  
              
Figure 3.5. Policy analysis framework used in the thesis (adapted from Patton and Sawicki, 1993) 
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The concept of policy analysis refers to the analytical activity to determine which of various 
alternative policies will most achieve a given set of goals in the light of the relationships between 
the policies and goals (Morgan and Henrion, 1990). More accurately, the notion is defined as an 
applied social science producing information for addressing problems to determine alternative 
policy options that achieve a prior set purpose (Patton and Sawicki, 1993). The latter authors 
explain that policy analysis follows six steps, as shown in figure 3.5 above. As per Morgan and 
Henrion (1990), this investigation followed the adapted framework in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
because, with careful thought and synthesis, it was expected to evaluate and structure existing 
incomplete knowledge. The insights generated would support informed decision making based on 
a better understanding of current risks and future policy perspectives within the domain of 
climate change.  
Moreover, the willingness and conditions to pay and participate in the REDD+ process were 
analysed using the choice experiment approach. The last layer explained the current status of one 
key governance principle “prior informed and free consent” for local institutions. Related 
simplified questions were embedded in a study across three sites (Ngoyla, Edea and Tinto) in 
Cameroon’s forest area, targeting 12 villages chosen according to criteria such as (1) remoteness; 
(2) group dynamics; and (3) proximity to a potential REDD+ site. Answers from 330 smallholder 
farmers were recorded. 
After data collection, key elements of the datasets were identified, categorised and classified for 
separate or cross-sectional analysis. The next step involved labeling and tagging data by theme 
(Ritchie et al., 2003). Questionnaires returned from the REDD+ institutional assessment were 
treated and analysed following the coding approach developed by Corbin and Strauss (1990). 
Generally, throughout the research, information was categorised according to similarities in the 
answers obtained from investigation tools, which were, in turn, coded to allow further analysis 
using LIMPED software. Finally, Excel tabulations were built from the database generated in 
Access to allow comparisons and to cross-check the perceptions, challenges and needs of the 
target population in the anticipated REDD+ process in the country. In all, the three-level dataset 
was compiled based on answers from 534 individuals, comprising 70 key informants from 18 
institutions, including community-based organizations and 464 individual smallholder farmers 
from the multi-strata study area (see table 3.4).  
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3.2.2. Some challenges during the investigation 
During the survey, some limitations to the level of data acquisition were noted. Therefore, 
specific measures to overcome these challenges were adopted. It is important to note that, 
although working with a team of three research assistants, it took us a period of six months to 
receive the completed data sheets for the national-level survey and one month to complete data 
coding, before completing the first data quality cross-check. Moreover, out of 35 proponents 
(selected institutions) who were chased up to complete the designed tool, only 18 could 
effectively complete the questionnaire despite several reminder emails and approaches in person 
by the research team. This struggle confirms that various institutional establishments may not 
have the required information in the domain of the forestry sector, especially data relating to the 
REDD+ process, and sometimes they do not have the time or the inclination to cooperate, as 
reported in the literature (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008; Angelsen, 2010; Angelsen et al., 2012). 
Details on limitations and measures taken during the entire investigation process are reported in 
chapter 7.  
3.3. Conceptual research framework 
Forest resources management, land-use changes, policies and community rights are considered 
key building blocks for developing REDD+ interventions (Bernard et al., 2013). The basic 
purpose of REDD+ is to fund conservation through carbon payments based on carbon stock 
increase or conservation over a defined time period (Angelsen et al., 2012; Vetel et al., 2013). 
REDD+ payments depend on the learning ability of individuals, communities and countries to 
effectively reduce carbon emissions through forest cover management (Chia et al., 2013) and 
subsequent tree planting. 
Building on the work of some scholars (Biermann, 2010; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011), we 
defined REDD+ governance as the “process of developing specific rules and rule-making 
mechanisms within a set of institutions and organizations to coordinate local and national 
responses to climate change”. Taking a scientific perspective, the outstanding concern can be 
formulated as follows: “As much as full carbon accounting is needed, it is important to avoid that 
some activities and actors not included in REDD+ are left unconsidered under the upcoming 
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finance mechanism design”. This implies that learning processes, both institutional and social, 
fostering local forest governance need to be reshaped to involve all stakeholders with a clear 
strategy towards fairness in terms of local community priorities and social safeguards.  
The institutional structure for REDD+ can take the form of hierarchies, coalitions or networks 
(Angelsen et al., 2012). These refer to the relationships between agents involved in arrangements 
for REDD+. In the same way, attention should be paid to the different roles of the actors 
involved. In order to deepen this differentiation in roles, some argue that the international and 
national architectural foundation of REDD+ should be built on the principles of good governance, 
because this will positively affect the implementation process (Hyden et al., 2008; Brown, 2013). 
However, these principles are not sufficient to ensure the effectiveness of REDD+, especially in a 
context driven by external processes (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). This is the case in 
Cameroon, where deforestation and degradation are driven by factors beyond the forest sector, 
such as poverty level, the global financial crisis, agricultural commodity value chain implications, 
and more importantly, public infrastructure and urbanisation trends (Ndoye and Tieguhong, 2004; 
Robiglio et al., 2010; Sayer et al., 2012; Ngendakumana et al., 2012; Tieguhong et al., 2012; 
Samndong and Vatn, 2012).  
In order to give legitimacy to the REDD+ process, it was relevant to understand the basic 
architecture of REDD+ to elucidate specific aspects and segregate their implementation into five 
functions against three research levels from a multi-actor decision-making perspective: global, 
national and local. These functions include (see Fig.3.6):  
(a) Planning which focuses on policy reformulation (on rights, tenure, climate change) and other 
regulations, such as strategies to mainstream stakeholder participation (Minang and Von 
Noordwijk, 2012). We also look at the planning function in terms of institutional capacity and 
empowerment, practices/experience, learning processes and learning facilities available, as well 
as training needs. Theoretically, this function is fully characterised by the approval of all required 
national documents and strategies, such as RPIN, RP and National REDD+ policy. 
(b) Coordination: this means synchronising actors’ roles, responsibilities, ideas and schedules to 
align with procedures and enforcement. We also look at this function in the light of the 
operational management capacity in a multi-partnership context to achieve the timely allocation 
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of resources and the willingness to equitably distribute benefits thereafter. At this function’s 
scale, pointers are clarification of participation rules, effective norms and rights tenures, as well 
as other social safeguards according to actors’ perceptions.  
(c) Demonstration and piloting: this function implies the operationalisation of the early action 
phase of REDD+ to test strategies in the areas of capacity building, project portfolio streamlining, 
validation of surveillance and verification tools and models (McCall, 2011). The green light for 
this function should be the final testing of newly developed policy instruments with documented 
outcomes in terms of livelihoods, safeguards and co-benefits. 
(d) Management of incentive schemes: this function is considered in terms of the full 
implementation load of negotiated activities under flexible bi- or multi-lateral agreements, based 
on sets of standards to effectively achieve CER and C-stock increase at national and sub-national 
scales (Minang et al., 2007). Here, the pointer would be the availability of tools to implement 
incentive packages, such as financial services that socially and economically empower clients and 
other stakeholders (Neely and De Leeuw, 2012). 
(e) Surveillance and MRV: the last, but most crucial, function includes national and international 
audit processes for quality control using scientific tools and methods. Based on different 
scenarios, this function would go beyond business-as-usual to carry out regular patrols and 
collect data at local level to measure forest cover changes, biodiversity, carbon stocks and 
transformational land-use changes to ensure long-term emissions reduction, and removal, as well 
as other co-benefits. Payments would then be made according to reported and certified 
performance. The challenges faced at this level are whether the monitoring/control teams have 
sufficient technical capacity to follow up on the new momentum for community forest 
monitoring (Skutsch and Solis, 2011; Verplanke and Zahabu, 2011).  
This resulted in the conceptual framework shown in figure 3.6. During the research process, 
special attention was paid to mapping socio-economic factors and social safeguards i.e. rights in 
terms of policy output and outcome respectively. Theoretically and learning from existing 
institutional and social processes, REDD+ implementation can be influenced by national forest 
conservation policies and safeguards principles simultaneously. The two dimensions are crucial 
in creating enabling conditions for REDD+ to deliver on community expectations and sustainable 
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forest protection. These enabling conditions are harnessed by measures to tackle poverty and 
forest tenure issues as well as an institutional arrangement and an appropriate stakeholder 
participation mechanism. 
 
Figure 3.6. Research framework indicating REDD+ functions across scales 
 
Acting across scales, the above interplay has the potential to lead to the desired implementation 
plan for REDD+ which could be socially attractive and institutionally feasible. The framework 
alleviates the ambiguities on policy options and the sustainable development actions to be 
undertaken during the REDD+ cycle. Both institutional and social learning processes are relevant 
in REDD+ where most stakeholders are having limited implementation capacities especially as 
rules and norms are instituted from global REDD+ policy desk into national forestry systems to 
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interact then with existing policies and perceptions. Together, all stakeholders would eventually 
continue to shape the REDD+ trajectory towards transformational change in addressing 
deforestation, provided that the implementation process chooses to improve quality participation 
of grassroots communities and other social safeguards. 
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PART II: FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One day, Deng Xiaoping decided to take his grandson to visit Mao. “Call me granduncle, Mao 
offered warmly”. “Oh, I certainly couldn’t do that Chairman Mao”, the awe-struck child replied. 
“Why don’t you give him an apple”, suggested Deng. No sooner had Mao done so than the boy 
happily chirped: “Oh, thank you Granduncle”. “You see”, said Deng, “what incentives can 
achieve!” (Capitalism, 1984, after Kathleen Eisenhardt) 
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CHAPTER  
4. REDUCED DEFORESTATION OPPORTUNITIES AND LIVELIHOOD 
PRIORITIES: WILL FARM FACTORS MATTER FOR REDD+? 
Abstract  
Climate change has already produced significant environmental changes in tropical forests and 
agroforestry zones and will continue to do so. This poses a major challenge for rural communities 
that depend on the products and services from these land uses. Recent instruments for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, such as REDD+, have great potential at site level, but there is limited 
understanding of the factors that determine their effectiveness. This study uses a binary logit 
regression model to understand which personal factors affect forest-cover changes at the local 
level. Results show that farmers’ decisions to clear forests depend on the following factors: the 
proportion of non-farm income to total income; the economically active age of the farmer; and 
field ownership, alongside compensation options. Older farmers are less likely to clear a piece of 
land compared to younger farmers. Meanwhile, farmers with a higher proportion of non-farm 
income are less likely to clear forest, and the probability of clearing forest land decreases with 
greater restrictions in access to forest products, meaning implicitly that stricter tenure 
enforcement could lead to reduced deforestation. Inclusive forestry policies would gain from 
factoring-in REDD+ as a tool for poverty reduction within a broader sustainable development 
framework. 
 
Key words: Communities, deforestation determinants, poverty, REDD+ effectiveness 
This chapter is based on:  
Ngendakumana S, Speelman S, Gyau A, Feudjio MP, Minang AP, Tchoundjeu Z and Van Damme P. 
Reduced deforestation opportunities and livelihoods priorities in southern Cameroon: do farm factors 
matter for REDD+? To be submitted in Forest policy and Economics. 
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4.1. Introduction  
Over the past two decades, there has been a growing concern that climate change will continue to 
have significant effects on community livelihoods and that the resulting land-use changes will 
lead to massive deforestation in tropical countries. This concern poses a major challenge to the 
poor rural communities that depend on the products and services from forests and agriculture. 
Scientists have reached a consensus that tropical deforestation is the second largest source of 
carbon dioxide emissions after fossil fuel emissions and ahead of natural phenomena such as 
volcanic eruptions (Lambin et al., 2001; MEA, 2005; IPCC, 2007; Le Quéré et al., 2009; EU-
DGE, 2010). These emissions contribute to the observed increases in greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere that lead to global warming (IPCC, 2007). Carbon dioxide 
emission is estimated to account for approximately 56% of climate change. However, despite 
some policy efforts to halt this trend, more than 13 million hectares of forests continue to be lost 
every year on a global scale (FAO, 2007). More specifically, it is estimated that about 7.3 million 
ha of tropical forest are currently lost annually in developing countries, releasing an estimated 5.8 
gigatons of carbon dioxide (Minang et al., 2012). Moreover, agricultural practices on the cleared 
soils often have a negative impact on ecosystem functions, mainly in terms of the reduced value 
of economic, cultural and environmental returns. 
Deforestation is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization as the process of conversion 
of forest to non-forest land use and/or forest degradation (See details, chap.1, page 5). 
Degradation here refers to a reduction in forest quality or in the capacity of forests to provide 
ecosystem services, such as carbon storage or timber production. As a continent, Africa accounts 
for a net loss of about 4.0 million hectares per year (equivalent to 0.3% of the entire African 
forest cover) and an average annual negative change rate of -0.62% between 2000 to 2005 (FAO, 
2006). In Cameroon, FAO data from the Forest Resources Assessment (2007) indicate an 
increase in the annual deforestation rate from 0.6% for the period 1990 –1995 to 1% for 2000-
2005 (FAO, 1997; FAO, 2006). Forest-cover loss was estimated to have increased by 30% over 
the period from 1990 to 2007 (FAO, 2008). The Congo basin accounts for about 0.16 % of 
annual loss (Eba’a et al., 2009). The annual forest degradation rate in this area is estimated to 
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represent 0.09 % of dense forests (Duveiller et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the basin to which 
Cameroon belongs still retains 15% of all remaining rainforests in the world (Justice et al., 2001). 
Rural poverty and climate change have an increasing influence on the livelihoods of forest-edge 
communities and this influence has led to more anthropogenic activities resulting in increased 
carbon emissions in tropical landscapes (Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg, 2010). As interest 
in poverty, deforestation and CO2 emission reduction has been increasing for the past few years 
(Andersen, 1997; MEA, 2005; Neufeldt et al., 2012), a number of technical options have been 
developed, backed up by appropriate incentives that would achieve adequate climate-change 
mitigation, together with increased food security and improved livelihoods (Wollenberg et al., 
2012). From this perspective, a crucial question is “which farm and socio-economic factors 
determine deforestation and forest degradation?” 
During UNFCC/COP16 held in Durban in 2011, it was highlighted that a consensus has been 
reached in recognising the contribution of forests in meeting the combined and interrelated goals 
of food security, carbon emission removal and economic development. Van Noordwijk et al. 
(2011), in attempting to provide supporting arguments on how trees and people can co-adapt to 
climate change, reported that realising win-win solutions and balancing livelihoods and 
ecological functions (regulating, supporting, provisioning) will require innovative approaches. 
The main approaches highlighted by the above authors are “Agroforestry for Improved land 
uses”, “Landscape management for imporved livelihood”, “PES based forest conservation” and 
“Climate smart agriculture”. It is believed that those approaches can help to overcome challenges, 
both at community and household levels, in order to better maintain ecosystem health and 
improve livelihoods. In the current REDD+ context, this need is supported by the scientific 
evidence that land-use conversion for agriculture is a survival strategy for many smallholder 
farmers (Colfer et al., 2005; Ngendakumana, 2011; Ngendakumana et al., 2012), although this 
land-use change contributes as a major, indirect source of carbon emissions (Wollenberg et al., 
2012; Neely and Leeuw, 2012). Although empirical studies on the causes of land-use change 
have been undertaken in developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America 
(Duraiappah, 1998; Zwane, 2007), the available literature does not seem to provide an integrated 
framework to jointly address climate-change mitigation and poverty reduction, especially in the 
context of Cameroon or even the Congo basin.  
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Nevertheless, linking mitigation initiatives to rural development is critical for successfully 
coordinating interventions that aim to sustain life and generate a positive impact on reversing 
climate change within a global net emission reduction policy framework (Leimona et al., 2011; 
van Noordwijk et al., 2011; Wollenberg et al., 2012). Therefore, understanding the relationships 
between the socio-economic status of households and land-cover changes in different locations of 
a given landscape, as well as farmers’ perceptions on the attributes of anticipated land-use 
changes are crucial for designing incentives and governance structures to reduce CO2 emissions. 
It is thus hypothesied that an increased understanding of the relationship between household 
characteristics and deforestation could provide a solid basis for designing governance 
frameworks aimed at more efficient carbon emission reduction within a given forest landscape. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the socio-economic characteristics influencing deforestation 
and degradation in the Efoulan landscape in South Cameroon. The specific objectives of this 
chapter are to: (i) critically analyse exisiting knowledge on poverty determinants in the current 
context of climate change; (ii) establish relationships between household socio-economic status 
and land-cover change in different locations in the Efoulan landscape; and (iii) assess the 
implications of these characteristics on the success or failure of emission reduction strategies 
such us REDD+. For the statistical analysis, a binomial logistic regression model, commonly 
referred to as the binary logit model was run using LIMDEP. 
4.2. Insights on determinants of deforestation  and forest degradation  
Scientists today agree that agricultural expansion is the most important direct driver of 
deforestation globally, followed by infrastructure development and wood extraction (EU, 2010). 
Worldwide bioenergy-focusing policies and demand for wood products also play a role in 
deforestation. However, deforestation is driven by the interplay of institutional, demographic, 
economic, technological and cultural variables, rather than by a single factor. For Africa, the 
following indirect drivers are most often mentioned in deforestation studies (in order of 
importance): demographic pressure, economic reasons, technological opportunities, governance 
problems and socio-cultural issues (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Furthermore, worldwide bioenergy 
policies, such as the EU bioenergy policy and African bioenergy policy, are likely to indirectly 
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affect deforestation through agricultural expansion, while the global increased demand for wood 
products continues to play a direct role in the forest depletion process. 
Links between economic development and deforestation have been widely investigated. Several 
reports exist on the drivers of deforestation in the tropics (Lambin et al., 2001; Bhattarai and 
Hammig 2001; Scrieciu, 2006; Robiglio et al., 2010). Their results, however, are mainly based on 
empirical analyses using cross-country (or country-specific) case studies. With the exception of 
Zwane (2007), who investigated the relationship between lagged income and cleared 
landholdings in Peru, only a few studies have used site-specific data collected on farmers’ 
perceptions on their future land uses. The most frequently examined factors are wood-product 
prices, population growth, infrastructure, political regime, land tenure and government policies. 
Many were found to be correlated with deforestation in Latin America, but not in Africa. 
Findings seem to confirm a significant causal relationship between the selected macro-economic 
variables and tropical forest depletion, even though all agree on the complexity of the links. For 
instance, in an exploratory work undertaken in Europe by Scrieciu (2006), it was found that, in 
this specific context, population density was the most important driver of deforestation. Other 
important socio-economic drivers were access to drinking water, wealth and primary education. 
In 2010, the European Union noted that, in a deforestation process, one will rarely find a single 
direct or indirect driver. More often, multiple processes work together, simultaneously or 
sequentially, to cause forest cover reduction.  
Deforestation has been extensively discussed since the Rio summit in 1992 (UNCED, 2012). 
Nevertheless, and as explained above, there has been very little understanding of the determinants 
at local level and, so far, there seem to have been few or no studies which discuss how changes in 
livelihood and farming systems are driven by climate change. This means that, at this stage, it is 
useful to assess the relationship between socio-economic factors and deforestation in the context 
of climate change. The tropical deforestation process is a complex topic and could be site-specific 
in terms of drivers (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001). Although plenty of studies focusing on 
individual decision-making processes (mostly based on the Amazon) can be found in the 
literature (Geist et al., 2002; Alix-Garcia et al., 2005; Manson et al., 2007; Caldas et al., 2007), 
Africa, and the Congo basin in particular suffer from a lack of such knowledge, despite its 
importance for adequate forestry-management planning. Site-level studies in the Congo area need 
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to deepen and underpin links between local factors and deforestation, because such relationships 
have not been fully explored, especially from the perspective of smallholder-benefit reality.  
In a paper published in 2007, Scrieciu concluded that tropical deforestation might ultimately 
depend on case-specific factors. He went on to suggest that further research might yield more 
effective policy suggestions if conducted at a more disaggregated level. In the same vein, the 
same author argued that local and sub-national case studies provide more significant insights into 
the causes and drivers of changes in forest-resource patterns than macro-scale investigations. 
Based on these gaps in the literature, and using a binary logit regression model, we want to 
understand to what extent local and individual socio-economic factors affect forest-cover change.   
4.2.1. Description of the study area  
Study site details are reported in chapter 3, section 3.1.2. 
 
4.2.2. Survey sites and experimental design 
In 2011, household surveys and focus group discussions (FGD) were undertaken in nine villages 
grouped around three forest units across the multifunctional landscape of Efoulan. The latter, 
with its various land-use types, was considered as our study site to finally map out the study 
population as presented in table 4.1. Household surveys and focus group discussions formed the 
basis for the investigation. Household data obtained from 104 respondents was used to 
understand factors and variables influencing individual decisions to cut trees in forested land. 
Explanatory variables included levels and sources of household income, the household head’s 
level of education, the proportion of non-farm income to total income and changes to this over 
the last 10 years, access constraints for forest resources, etc. Focus group discussions provided 
implicit or explicit answers to the following questions: 
- What is the average farm size in this village? 
- How frequently do farmers clear the forest to expand their farming area? 
- What types of permission would you need to clear forest? And from whom? 
- What benefits/services do you receive (or get) from the forest landscape surrounding you? 
- How do community and/or the communal forest units improve your livelihood 
conditions? 
- At the level of small farmers, how do people generally perceive climate change and 
environmental degradation mechanisms? 
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- In the case of agreement to avoid clearing the forest to expand their farming area in 
community forests, what compensation mechanisms do farmers need? (through the 
community or individually, cash or payment in kind etc.) 
- If you receive compensation or rewards, what type of supporting organization would you 
prefer to collaborate with? 
Proportional stratified random sampling was used, because it has been reported to be the most 
appropriate method for this type of research work (Galudra, 2010; Hoang et al., 2012). This 
means that the number of inhabitants per stratum was used to determine the number of 
households to be interviewed during the survey. This, however, requires a rigorous cross-check 
of respondent characteristics before analysis to correct any disproportionate representation.  
Based on geographic and preliminary information from the field, obtained during ASB climate-
change meetings (Ngendakumana et al., 2011), we used a multi-strata sample design.  
During the stratification process, important issues referred to were: (i) reported stage of forest 
degradation; (ii) frequency of vegetation clearing for new farm creation; (iii) proximity of farm-
to-market roads; (iv) occurrence of farmers’ groups; and (v) community leadership oriented to 
forest resource management. The next step was to segregate the three sampling groups, which, 
overlaid on the Efoulan vegetation map, best-represented the targeted forest units. The units are: 
1) the council forest; 2) Common Initiative Group (CIG) MINVAN Community forest; and 3) 
Common Initiative Group DIMEJ I and II community forest.  
HHs constituted the experimental units. The sample population was determined based on census 
data available from the local government services in Ebolowa, and on Wilson and Allan (2003) 
who have developed a coherent reasoning for proportional and stratified sampling approaches. 
The number of households to be interviewed was then determined using the following arithmetic 
formula: Gi= Si ⁄ ST × 100 (1), where:  
Gi: sampling group;  
Si: number of households in group Gi; 
ST:  total number of households in the sampling groups; and  
ST: calculated using the following formula: ST =∑ (S1; S2; S3). 
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Table 4.2.1 Sampling design for studied population and experimental units 
Sampling 
group 
Stratified sample 
(target village) 
Number of 
HHs per 
village 
Number of units or 
HHs interviewed 
per stratum 
Number of 
units per 
village 
 
G1 
Ebom Essawo’o 51  
48 
10 
Mekalate Essawo’o 140 27 
Nkoutou 57 11 
 
G2 
Melan Essawo’o 29  
38 
3 
Nkoékouk 262 30 
Ma’anmeyin 40 5 
 
G3 
Mvila Yevol 80  
34 
9 
Tsangué 143 17 
Aloum 70 8 
9 872 120 120 
 
Legend: sampling group made up of the community surrounding the council forest is referred to as G1 (1); 
community forest grouped under CIG MINVAN is G2; whereas G3 represents community forest CIG DIMEJ 1&2 
(3); HH=HouseHold. 
 
During sampling, each group was viewed as a sample selected from the entire population and a 
simple random sampling technique was used. After the stratification process, we used an Excel 
spreadsheet to generate random numbers which were then used to select the potential households 
for interview. The available listings of villages (PNDP, 2011) were combined with efforts to 
representatively observe even the smallest subgroup giving as much as possible the a priori 
chances of individuals to being included in the sample. Such an approach has the advantage of 
enabling statistical analysis with relative control over various sources of sampling error in order 
to increase data accuracy while minimizing the variability. The drawback of the approach is that 
recorded answers are hard to standardize and may be less precise because they are obtained from 
a small sample with individuals who do not keep systematic records. One of the limitations here 
was that, given the unavailability of some informants, from the 120 households targeted at the 
start, we were only ultimately able to interview 104.  
4.2.3. Data collection  
Data collection followed three steps. Step 1 was the gathering of spatial baseline information, 
such as administrative boundaries and forest units, using existing reports, maps and policy 
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documents at local and district levels. This early stage was combined with two transect walks of 6 
km each from east to west [Mvila Yevol-Melan Yevol] and from south-west to east [Nkoutou-
Mekalat] (see fig. 3.3) to characterise the current state of land-use patterns in the Efoulan 
landscape. During the transect walks and informal discussions with elderly people, it was 
observed that Efoulan forest is under constant threat due to human influence and anthropogenic 
activities such as slash-and-burn agriculture. After natural regeneration, these lead to degraded or 
secondary forests. Furthermore, deforestation and degradation of this forest occurs as a result of 
illegal harvesting for building poles and fuelwood. Although the population growth rate is 
gradually increasing, wood has remained the only source of energy for the surrounding 
communities. 
Step 2 was undertaken through organized workshops on climate change and community rights 
issues under local dialogue meetings on climate change. Local dialogue meetings were carried 
out using the Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) method to inform community stakeholders 
about REDD+ mechanisms and to obtain common perspectives on land-use change and rewards 
for carbon-stock stewardship within the context of international efforts to reduce emissions.  
An additional assessment was made using the Rapid Land Tenure Assessment (RaTa) tool to gain 
insights into land-use history and tree-based rights at the local scale (Galudra, 2010). Through a 
combination of semi-structured interviews, analysis of existing policies and focus group 
discussions, the RaTa tool (for details, see Galudra et al., 2010, p.14) was used to understand the 
relationship between forested land tenure and community land claims (property rights, 
arrangements for access and control, governing institutions, rules and norms). This allows to (1) 
explain potential conflicts and (2) understand policy gaps and legal deficiencies with a view to 
increasing future REDD+ effectiveness.  
The last step concerned focus group discussions combined with simplified questionnaires to 
assess Willingness-To-get-Involved (WTI) (Balana et al., 2011). Along the same lines, farmers’ 
perceptions on compensation options and the degree of acceptance of suggested reward packages 
was assessed. During the enquiry, a payment card was used to find the compensation amount 
respondents would accept. Three reward packages were designed and presented to farmers for 
them to choose, as follows: (i) cash bond payments per agreed period (e.g. 1st, 5th, 10th Year); (ii) 
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seasonal agricultural input provision, including agroforestry technologies and training; and (iii) a 
combination of the two.  
Using semi-structured questionnaires, focus group discussions were organized as described by 
Liamputtong (2011) to cross-check the qualitative results of the first two steps. Through focus 
group discussions, background information on smallholders’ perceptions was expected to 
complement the information obtained through the questionnaires. In each of the three forest units, 
one focus group meeting was convened with a proper balance between men and women and 
facilitated in the local Bulu language. In total, three focus group discussions were held, involving 
36 participants out of whom 21 were women. The process sought to obtain insight from local 
stakeholders concerning issues such as forest and fallow management, agricultural practices, 
institutional support to reduce rural poverty, land use and tenure history, as well as to obtain their 
insight on climate change and REDD+-based compensation structures or forms of compensation.  
In our study, there was no direct measure of poverty. Instead, we tried to evidence the socio-
economic characteristics of farmers that are often used as a proxy, such as dwelling types and 
income. Furthermore, education level, proportion of non-farm income to total household income 
and availability of alternative income sources were also selected for regression against the 
decision to clear forest. Other factors, such as the age of the household head, membership of a 
farmers’ group and access to timber products were also included as potential factors affecting 
deforestation. Data was collected by three research assistants who knew the area and spoke the 
local languages.  
 
The questionnaire used had several sections based on pre-identified variables. Individuals were 
chosen randomly from the lists of households actively involved in agricultural activities and 
community forest management efforts, obtained from local administrative authorities and forestry 
agents. In this way, the choice of respondents guaranteed the quality of the answers. A gender-
sensitive sample of respondents among household heads in the target villages was included. 
Household characteristics were selected in view of their potential to influence forest cover and 
land-use changes. This process went through the classic cycle of questionnaire development, pre-
testing and review to ensure the mastery of the tool by enumerators and adjustments to questions 
to ensure accurate answers during the survey.  
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4.2.4. Logistic regression models 
The main statistical tool used in our analysis was the binomial logistic regression model, also 
known as the binary logit model (Chan, 2005). This type of model is appropriate for establishing 
the determinants of deforestation and deforestation decisions at local level (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz, 1999). The method was selected because, in this study, the dependent variable is a 
binary variable capturing the farmer’s decision whether or not to increase the cultivated area by 
clearing forest. Nisel (2001) argued that ordinary least squares regression is not suited to models 
with binary variables. In addition, since the dependent variable here represents the probability of 
the respondents opting for one of two possible actions, it must range between 0 and 1. However, 
using the ordinary least squares regression method, the predicted values cannot be interpreted as 
probabilities; hence the justification for the use of logistic regression is found to be robust.  
In terms of econometric analysis, the dependent variable in the binary logit model describes 
whether the household cleared a piece of forest during the past year.   
The logit model is given as:  
……………………………………………………….…………. (1) 
where  is the logarithm of the odds that a farmer will indeed clear a piece of land, Xi is a 
vector of the farmer or household characteristics; α and β are vectors of the parameters to be 
estimated; and εi is the residual error term, with a mean of zero and a constant variance.  
The logit model is suitable when modeling problems with two alternative outcomes, such as 
whether or not forest was cleared. In the model it is assumed that each alternative decision offers 
the farmer some level of utility at the time the decision is made, and that an individual farmer 
would choose the alternative which yields the highest utility (Lattin et al., 2003). Our 
deforestation model is specified as: 
…………………………………………………………(2), 
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where Pt= the probability that a farmer has cleared a piece of forest, Zt= a weighted sum of 
vectors of farm (xi=x1, x2, x3, ...), farmer and household characteristics for which the impact on 
the decision to clear forest land is assessed.  .  
The model was used to test whether the resources at a household’s disposal and socio-economic 
factors influence a household’s decisions whether or not to clear forest. Household factors used in 
this model were membership of a farmer group, dwelling type, presence of alternative income-
earning activities besides agriculture, level of non-farm income and proportion of non-farm 
income. Some personal characteristics used were age, gender and access to timber products. 
Table 4.2 gives an overview of these factors. The model was estimated using LIMDEP 9. 
4.2.5. Determining alternative farmer compensation structures and the concomitant 
realistic funding level 
Within the same household survey from Efoulan, another analysis was undertaken to determine 
the degree of acceptance by farmers of suggested compensation options to get involved in forest 
carbon stock conservation. The answers obtained in the three types of forest units were compared 
and a quick economic estimate was made to determine the amounts acceptable as incentives 
across the site studied, in relation to carbon stock data available within the ASB and GAF 
databases respectively (GAF, 2005; Yemefack et al., 2013). In so doing, a number of payment 
package scenarios were designed. Finally, in order to guide future investment in REDD+, a 
carbon stock-based realistic annual funding level was extrapolated from the collected 
information.  
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Table 4.2.2. Descriptions of variables used in the binary deforestation model 
 
Dummy variables Measure per 
modality 0 
Measure per 
modality 1 
  
Deforestation (1 if forest cut in past year) 31 69  
Gender (1 if female) 84 16  
Dwelling type (1 if brick house) 58 42  
Access to timber products (1 if easy access) 89 11  
Membership to a farmer group (1 if belong to) 49 51  
Alternative income earning opportunities (1 if 
alternatives exist) 
38 62  
Continuous variables mean St. er. min max
Non-farm income (CFAF) 256,425 741,881 0 6,383,500
Proportion of non-farm income to total income 
(%) 
0.48 0.37 0 1
Age of the HH head (Years) 52.78 14.29 25 91
 
Notes: 1) Figures on dummy variables in the table represent answers per variable. 2) Non-farm income was 
measured by summing up income portion of surveyed HH derived from other activities such as small trading, 
tailoring, waged work, etc. 
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4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Measuring deforestation drivers from a local perspective 
Figure 4.3.1 indicates 10 key causes of deforestation and forest degradation among which 5 are 
associated to smallholder farmer’s livelihood activities. The major ones are slash and burn, cash 
crop plantations and domestic energy needs representing 43% of all drivers’weight. The first two 
explain why farmers decide to convert forest into farmland which would result in increasing 
deforestation in Efoulan. During focus group discussions, it was made clear that new cocoa 
plantations are the key driver for forest clearance in Efoulan; followed by the need for more 
fertile lands for agricultural activities, such as cucumber growing and market gardening, to cover 
basic family needs.  
 
Figure 4.3.1 Diagram of perceived drivers of deforestation based of indigenous knowledge in Efoulan 
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As per the results in the table 4.3.1 below, a large majority of respondents (78%) held that the 
rate of deforestation will either remain at the current level or increase in forthcoming years. No 
significant difference was found in farmers’ perceptions of deforestation trends across forest 
clusters.  
Table 4.3.1. Farmers’ perceptions on the current deforestation trend across forests clusters  
Answer category 
Nearest forest 
Total (n = 93) Council forest 
(n =36) 
Community 
forest CIG 
MINVAN  
(n =33)  
Community 
forest CIG 
DIMEJ 1&2 
 ( n= 24)  
Forest 
clearing 
frequency 
in the 
coming 
years 
Frequency will 
remain the same 
as now 
36% 55% 36% 43% 
Frequency will 
increase 
36% 36% 32% 35% 
Frequency will 
decrease 
28% 9% 32% 22% 
 
The distribution of income sources is shown in table 4.3.2 below. As expected, in postulating that 
deforestation is a farmer’s survival strategy and a livelihood source, the ranking demonstrates 
that agriculture is crucial to livelihoods, seconded by NTFP extraction. The latter results also 
show that in Efoulan, NTPF is the main source of income after agricultural products, suggesting 
that any local intervention should target NTPFs and agriculture-based strategies as a priority.  
Table 4.3.2. Income level estimate (in CFA F) from the main drivers of deforestation for each village sampled 
Forest 
Cluster 
Village Income from 
agricultural products 
Income from 
NTF products 
Income from 
animal products 
Total household 
revenue in 2010 
Council 
forest 
Ebom Essaw 99 6461 223 636 108 685 132 8783 
Mekalate 311 926 93 321 42 250 447 498 
Nkoutou 2 072 175 105 156 118 167 2 295 498 
Community 
forest CIG 
MINVAN 
Melan Yevol 709 928 89 688 33 062.5 832 679 
Ma'anmeyin 916 604 52 500 295 000 1 264 104 
Nkoekouk 1 003 044 77 156 89 625 1 169 825 
Community 
forest CIG 
DIMEJ 1&2 
Mvila Yevol 1 739 875 13 000 14 375 1 767 250 
Aloum Yemv 118 050 103 750 0 221 800 
Tsangue 369 475 64 917 37 875 472 267 
 Total income 8 237 540 823 125 739 039 9 799 705 
 Contribution 
level (%) 
84 8.5 7.5  
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4.3.2. Modeling farm and socio-economic factors affecting deforestation  
The results of the deforestation model are presented in table 4.3.3. Based on the pseudo R2 value 
of 0.182, combined with the predictive power of 78%, our model is highly significant. Four out 
of the eight independent variables (age of the HH head; membership of a farmers’ group; 
proportion of non-farm income to total household income; restricted access to timber products) 
are significant predictors of the decision to clear a piece of forest.  
Table 4.3.3. Binary logit model for binary choice with deforestation as dependent variable  
Variables  Coefficient (log-
odds) 
St. Er. Odds ratio 
(b/St.Er.) 
P[[|Z|>z]] 
Constant 4.668 1.362 3.427 0.000 
Non-farm income -0.350D-06 0.317 D-06 -1.102 0.270 
Proportion non-farm income to total 
income 
-1.375 0.741 -1.855 0.063* 
Dwelling type dummy (1 if brick house)  0.153 0.520 0.295 0.767 
Gender (1 if female) 0.854 0.745 1.147 0.251 
Restricted access to forest products (1 if 
easy access ) 
-1.242 0.702 -1.770 0.076* 
Alternative income opportunities (1 if 
alternatives exist) 
-0.089 0.072 -1.237 0.215 
Age (years) -0.063 0.021 -3.015 0.002*** 
Membership of a farmers’ group 1.016 0.516 1.966 0.049** 
Fit measures     
McFadden Pseudo R2       0.182    
Chi squared X2 22.594**    
Sample size 104    
Percentage of correct prediction 78    
 
P[[|Z|>z]] represents the level of significance:*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** very significant at 1% .           
Note: The pseudo R2 of 0.182 is acceptable threshold in likelihood models like this. 
The first significant variable is the age of the HH head, irrespective of sex (as gender is not 
significant in the model). Older farmers are less likely to clear a piece of land compared to 
younger farmers (p <0.001). The results generated from our model on smallholders’perceptions 
are in line with group discussion information collected, indicating that older people would like to 
retain preserved forests across generations. The possible explanation is that older farmers are 
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better placed to compare forest-cover changes over time, and can understand the link between 
forest preservation and maintaining environmental benefits such as rains, provision of bush meats 
and medicinal herbs.  
Second, the results show that the likelihood of a positive attitude towards felling trees was 
positively and significantly linked to farmer group membership. The probability of a farmer who 
belongs to an association having a positive attitude towards felling trees is twice (1.96) that of 
farmers who do not belong to groups. This likelihood means that farmers’ groups have 
empowered members to maximize the net present value of farming rather than retaining the 
forest, without an alternative incentive. In this case, some forms of payment could be made 
available for farmers’ associations, especially under contractual obligations to adopt sustainable 
forest management practices. The model also shows that the proportion of non-farm income to 
total household income and restricted access to timber products have significant negative effects 
on farmers’ decisions to clear forest for farmland (p<0.10).  
This finding indicated that farmers with a higher proportion of non-farm income are less likely to 
clear forest, whereas the probability of clearing forest land decreased with increasing restrictions 
in accessing forest products, meaning implicitly that stricter tenure enforcement could lead to 
reduced deforestation. This suggests that it would be more efficient to combine negotiated 
governance systems for adaptive access and financial incentives to support grassroots, on-farm 
income-generating activities in order to successfully halt deforestation, as prescriptive practices 
may not work for the rural smallholder farmers.  
Housing type was included in the model as a proxy for the wealth status of the household. It was, 
however, found to be insignificant. Also, gender and the total level of non-farm income did not 
influence deforestation decisions, nor did the availability of alternative income opportunities. 
Forest types were clustered into two groups, but dummies turned out to be highly insignificant 
and negatively influenced the predictive power of the model. This justifies why, in the end, they 
could not be retained among the selected factors. 
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4.3.3. Compensation options for forest conservation 
Considering that willingness to accept possible payments for forest conservation is an important 
aspect of local community involvement in climate-change mitigation and the fight against 
poverty, it was necessary to assess the degree of acceptance of different forms of suggested 
rewards to assess the operational feasibility of the policy. 
Table 4.3.4 shows that 28% of respondents in the study area would be ready to accept 
compensation in the form of a combination of cash + non-cash.  
Table 4.3.4. Degree of acceptance of suggested rewards under different payment scenarios across forest 
units 
Acceptance estimated in % 
Nearest forest 
Total 
(n=91) Council forest 
(n=40) 
Community 
forest CIG 
MINVAN 
(n=35) 
Community 
forest CIG 
DIMEJ 1&2 
(n=26) 
Compensation 
form 
Cash only 32 34 22 34 
Non-cash only 50 37 45 48 
Cash & non-cash 18 29 33 28 
Total 100 100 100 100 
        Source : field data, September 2011. 
 
Of the 91 respondents, 48% would like to receive incentives through a non-cash package; that is 
to say, these farmers would prefer a compensation package consisting of extension and 
distribution of new agricultural and agroforestry technologies, such as improved seeds, tree 
seedlings and modern working tools. On the contrary, 34% would prefer compensation in cash. 
With regard to the required amounts for the desired financial incentive, table 4.3.5 provides range 
estimates of minimums and maximums. 
On the other hand, the variables that had a statistically significant relationship in the first logistic 
regression equation were: age, group membership, proportion of non-farm income and restricted 
access to forest products. The latter factors except “age of the HH head” are amongst the key 
principles of Compensation for Environmental Services (CES) schemes currently under 
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development in pilot countries. CES stands for a forest management approach that would 
compensate smallholders for developing options to increase the proportion of non-farm income. 
This would lead to a double benefit with less deforestation and reduced carbon emissions. 
Compensation would also enhance the sense of tenure security in the forest areas, alongside the 
individual and collective responsibility to preserve existing forests.  
In terms of option packages to be developed, this study finds that in term of choices, farmers 
preferred the non-cash compensation, meaning a payment in-kind rather than cash. In REDD+ 
interventions, individuals will almost double their chances of retaining forest, instead of 
converting it into farmland, if they are given a payment in-kind. This preference may be due to 
the importance attached to agricultural inputs and extension services to improve livelihoods 
rather than cash. During group discussions, some farmers expressed the view that cash can 
sometimes be spent on non-essential items and may not be used to promote long-term family 
benefits. 
The results in table 4.3.5 show that for a piece of forested land of 100 m2 to be protected (avoided 
deforestation) for carbon sequestration in Efoulan, the preferred amounts by farmers varied from 
one position to another with a median price ranging from 25,000 to 50,000 CFA F (CFA F used 
here is the local currency in Cameroon and the exchange rate is as follows: 1Euro= 650 CFA F).  
Table 4.3.5. Estimate of amounts that would be acceptable as cash compensation for 100m2 land under avoided 
deforestation (in CFA F) 
Nearest forest N Respo Median Minimum Maximum 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
Council forest 22 25,000 5,000 300,000 17683.923 
Community forest CIG 
MINVAN 
24 21,250 500 500,000 33073.480 
Community forest CIG 
DIMEJ 1&2 
19 50,000 5,000 500,000 34321.20 
Total 65 25,000 500 500,000 16838.12 
             Source : field data, September, 2011. 
4.4. Discussion  
4.4.1. Farmers’ behavioural change towards deforestation and forest degradation  
Our data shows that it is possible to establish a relationship between the socio-economic 
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characteristics of smallholder farmers and the intensity of deforestation. Our model found four 
parameters stimulating forest degradation and hence increasing CO2 emissions. They are: a) age 
of the household head; b) proportion of non-farm income to total HH income; c) group 
membership; and d) restricted access to forest products.  
The first factor found to decrease deforestation is the proportion of non-farm income to total 
income. The higher the non-farm income, the less likely farmers are to cut forests. Focus group 
discussions revealed that farmers’ non-farm income in this locality derived generally from NTFP-
based activities, such as hunting and the collection of bush mango, honey and termites which 
have a high livelihood value. This can be explained in the following way. Communities in the 
forest zones of Cameroon undertake forest clearance to start farms and other income-generating 
activities. This is done with the aim of securing food and selling the surplus in local markets to 
meet other needs, such as children’s school fees, clothing, cultural events and others.  
Farmers depending more on NTFP are less likely to clear the forest because they obtain more 
benefits from it. Often they perceive the benefits from NTFP collection to be higher than those 
gained from agriculture after clearing the forest. Of course, if they do not rely on NTFPs, they 
lose nothing by clearing the forest and, instead, gain additional agricultural income.   
However, our investigation using group discussion found that farmers with better incomes have 
the capacity to purchase logging equipment, such as chainsaws, used for timber-based business 
which is often organized from Efoulan village to the city capital (Yaoundé) and Ebolowa. This is 
in line with the conclusions of Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) that there is a strong relationship 
between farmers’ income and deforestation. Using the Environmental Kuznets Curve, known as 
the EKC analytical framework, these authors provided strong evidence of the relationship 
between income and deforestation in 65 countries across the Latin American, African and Asian 
continents.  
Our model’s findings go beyond the known case of logging industries to confirm this, because 
the model is also applied to the case of local communities that have established a locally driven 
deforestation system with a serious impact on the forest cover. As incentives are an additional 
opportunity for forest communities to generate income beyond traditional forest values and 
benefits, the way to halt the farmers’ deforestation attitude would be to take into account their 
perceptions when developing incentive options and payment levels under REDD+. Cash 
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Opportunity Skipped, known as the COS package developed by Leimona et al. (2011), could be a 
better option to achieve equitable carbon emissions reduction. The mechanism could be 
operationalised through shorter, but renewable, contracts based on conditions and benefits to 
harness specific landscape forest cover in which gradual emissions reductions, in terms of tons of 
carbon, is the end target.  
Another significant factor identified by our model was smallholder age. Economically active 
farmers (50-65 years) are likely to preserve forests and fallow land instead of clearing them for 
farming. This may be due to the high interest and cultural value older people attach to the forest. 
This is in line with the findings of Colfer et al. (2005) and Oyono et al. (2006) who concluded 
that forest people consider their subsistence to be strongly linked to the surrounding forest, as the 
latter provides several ecosystem services, such as food, medicine, leisure and protection. This 
fits with the relationship observed between the dependent variable and the proportion of non-farm 
income to total household income. In tropical forests, it was observed that forest-adjacent 
households depend on non-timber forest products (NTFP) to obtain cash (Sunderlin et al., 2005, 
van Noordwijk et al., 2011; Tieguhong et al., 2012). The model suggests that facilitating access 
to NTFPs could act as an incentive for the communities to increase their income and, therefore, 
their willingness to retain forests. This change could involve smallholder farmers in carbon 
emissions reduction strategies at local and national levels.  
From the positive correlation found between group membership and deforestation, it can be 
deducted that farmers association might be a good channel to convince smallholders of the 
benefits of protecting forests. Through well tailored meetings in the community, members would 
gain a broader understanding of the value of forest resources and the incentives needed to 
conserve forested areas. This means that farmer’ groups can play a crucial role in supporting 
REDD+ awareness campaigns at a relatively low cost and can also act as a vehicle for effective 
participation in REDD+ scheme implementation.  
Theoretically, restricted access to forest resources refers to tenure inadequacy, which is currently 
gaining attention under REDD+ at various institutional levels. Tenure inadequacy and insecurity 
remain a political priority on paper, but, in many African countries, little action is taken on the 
ground (Hansen et al., 2009). This means that several African countries have elaborated good 
policies on tenure, but their implemention to the benefit of communities is lacking. Our 
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deforestation model indicated that the probability of clearing forest land decreased with 
increasing restrictions in access to forest products, meaning that significant law enforcement 
leads to reduced deforestation. Conversely, smallholder farmers living in Efoulan, and whose 
livelihood depends on the forest, believe that law enforcement means tenure insecurity, which is 
a negative incentive to forest conservation (RRI and ITTO, 2011; Sunderlin et al., 2014; Pfaff et 
al., 2014). Administrative proponents, however, view the law as a way to enhance the protection 
function of forests.  
On the other hand, the model shows that traditional tenure systems can be conducive to nature 
protection because older people always have in mind that the collective benefit is more important 
than individual gains. This raises the issue of protecting both forests and people’s livelihoods 
and, as indicated by Sunderlin et al (2014), REDD+ could have such a dual potential if tenure 
challenges are addressed. We argue that there is a need to develop alternative policy incentives 
and more adaptive mechanisms for access to forest resources in order to successfully halt 
deforestation. This confirms observations by Pfaff et al. (2014) that greater restriction on forest 
resource access will increase the risk of deforestation and thereby increase the erosion of carbon 
stocks. It implies that government and forest management partners should come together to solve 
the problem of restricted access to resources, in accordance with farmers’ livelihoods. if 
deforestation is to be reduced effectively. 
Conversely, discussions with proponents and government officials in Cameroon indicated that 
additional land tenure security would lead to reduced adoption of the proposed interventions to 
conserve trees, thereby leading to increased carbon emissions through the continuous 
disappearance of sinks at landscape level. This suggests that it is necessary to establish clearly 
defined goals in community-negotiated environmental contracts, which would have to specify the 
baseline for given land uses at the outset (Pfaff et al., 2014) as well as the conditions under which 
incentives should be disbursed (Leimona et al., 2011).  
Improving land tenure security would provide local stakeholders with greater negotiating power 
in the ongoing REDD+ schemes in developing countries. More explicitly, improving tenure 
security, for example, means increasing access and ownership status over the resource which, in 
the long term, becomes an important asset for communities, and even individuals, in the current 
context of contractual markets. 
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Additionally, the findings demonstrate the low willingness of young farmers to adopt sustainable 
practices which could gradually lead to carbon emissions reduction. During focus group 
discussions, the young demonstrated that they are more interested in direct income earned from 
the forest than in conserving it. This suggests that well-tailored awareness-raising efforts towards 
young people in the forest zone, on the importance of forest in the context of climate change, 
could have a significant effect on halting forest depletion.  
The relationships based on family size were not significant, suggesting that in our forest zone, 
gender and family size are not segregating factors and might not be a major concern in REDD+ 
implementation at local level. However, focus group discussions had previously indicated 
complaints by young people and women about not being fully involved in the ongoing REDD+, 
especially on aspects of decision making and policy formulation. This area may need further 
investigation. 
4.4.2. Incentive options to boost farmers’ interest in carbon emission reduction scenarios 
In this chapter, the results of our analysis concerning compensation options confirmed the 
qualitative data regarding farmers’ perceptions obtained through the questionnaires and the focus 
group discussions in the nine villages sampled in Efoulan. It has been established that, in certain 
cases, introducing financial incentives at least doubles the probability that a farmer will preserve 
fallow fields with trees rather than cultivating them. Farmers’ preferences rated in the analysis 
proved that their willingness to get involved is very high. Among the many alternatives 
theoretically designed for the assessment, the incentive option suggested as a top priority by most 
farmers is a combination of cash and non-cash compensation. This would encourage most people 
to keep both fallow and forest instead of converting the latter to farmland. Insights from the focus 
groups indicated that non-cash options proposed by farmers in Efoulan mainly consisted of tree-
seedling provision, improved agricultural seed for intensification and training in nursery and on-
farm tree-management techniques. Similar results have been found by Nyhus and Tilson (2004) 
in biodiversity flagship species conservation initiatives using an agroforestry approach.  
Therefore, in order to achieve proper emissions reduction, the REDD+ design should, from a local 
perspective, be based on a rigorous assessment of community willingness to get involved in 
forest emissions reduction schemes and an analysis of the thresholds in terms of planned 
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payments to match farmers’ expectations and priorities. The design could follow the auction 
approach developed by Ajayi et al. (2011). The proponents described the process to improve the 
environmental impacts of smallholding land-use decisions. For instance, during our fieldwork, it 
was noted in order to compensate for an area of 10 m x 10 m, the people living in the communal 
forest anticipated that they would accept a yearly minimum of 25,000 CFAF and a maximum 
amount of 50,000CFAF (equivalent to 600US$). For those in the community forest ICG Dimej 1 
& 2, the maximum amount expected is estimated at 500,000CFAF (equivalent to 1000US$). 
However, for village communities around the community forest Minvan ICG, the amount varies 
between 1US$ and 1000 US$. This suggests that respondents may not be ready to accept the low 
carbon prices practiced at international market level of between 6$ and 14$ /t CO2 as 
compensation or offset price. The implication may be a continuing increase in forest conversion 
into farmlands, because lower compensation levels would fail as an incentive, acting as a 
disincentive to retain trees across diverse land-use systems. Indeed, several research results 
(Borner and Wunder 2012; Minang et al., 2012; Gockowski and Van Asten, 2012) suggested that 
incentives need to be more competitive with benefits obtained from other land uses, so that they 
would create positive environmental impacts through both forest conservation and private 
smallholders land use decision making. In practice, generated changes from incentives (avoided 
deforestation and additional income) would be mainstreamed through forest management plans or 
family yearly plans.  
Importantly, recent data show that Efoulan humid forest can store up to approximately 2.6 
Megatons of Carbon equivalent. This figure is obtained from the average quantity of 311 TC/Ha 
estimated in Yemefack et al. (2013) times the Efoulan humid forest cover equivalent of 8300Ha 
in total. Further, let the minimum carbon market price be considered as 2.5USD/t (the price 
fluctuates and is mostly kept secret [Dr Rene Siwe, German international carbon expert, personal 
communication on the 26 May 2014; See also Hamrick and Goldstein (2016)]. A carbon stocks 
conservation scheme such as REDD+ would then cost a minimum of 2.5US$/t*311tC/ha*8300ha, 
giving an estimated budget of 6.453.250 US$/year. The estimated annual budget identified 
suggests that there is a need to invest significant effort to mobilise funding for REDD+ activities 
if carbon stock conservation is to be realistic, both economically and socially (Brown, 2013). 
However, the critical issue stands as to whether the country is able to raise the required funding 
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for REDD+ under the current circumstances. Cameroon has been characterised by a limited 
capacity to attract funding for sustainable forest and other land-use management (Cameroon RPP, 
2012). Scholars have identified diverse reasons for this. Some showcased rampant corruption and 
limited law enforcement in the forest sector, which slowed down donors’ trust in the long-term 
policies of developing countries (Bellasen and Gitz, 2008; Samndong and Vatn, 2012). We argue 
that it might be the case for the bilateral cooperation programs of the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom and recently Canada, which, due to poor governance, took the decision to stop their 
traditional support. Others claimed that the current worldwide financial crisis has definitely had 
an effect, resulting in reduced investment in livelihood activities. In poor countries, this leads to 
greater deforestation because of an expansion in the smallholding agricultural sector (Sayer et al., 
2012). In some areas, it will resurrect the dormant critical issues of tenure rights (indigenous 
forest communities) and power relations among stakeholders, whereas livelihood standards 
would continue to decline if REDD+ was not operationalised with appropriate funding. 
4.4.3. What policy outcomes stimulate effectiveness in emission reductions?  
Understanding the links between farm-level socio-economic factors and forest depletion is 
essential to formulate robust policy instruments and even more so, to get to know how much, 
what, where and when in terms of the interventions to be targeted. This may affect the future 
success or failure of incentive mechanisms for any environmental issue cycle including REDD+. 
Therefore, taking a governance perspective, and based on the above analyses, the following key 
areas need special consideration to obtain optimal emission reduction: 
1. Underpinning the legitimacy of smallholders’ efforts and participation: our model found 
four factors that link socio-economic characteristics to deforestation and forest 
degradation and would hence increase CO2 emission. They are: (a) age of the household 
head, b) proportion of non-farm income to total HH income, c) group membership, and d) 
restricted access to forest products. The above factors indicate that policy reforms should 
be tailored to integrate these determinants in order to underpin the legitimacy of 
smallholders’ perceptions in the developing REDD+ process. This would render the 
establishment of these policy mechanisms efficient and credible at country as well as at 
local levels. It is clear that classic conservation-inspired regulations using the well-known 
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forestry policing approach will only continue to limit timber extraction (Oyono et al., 
2008; Pulhin et al., 2010) but not smallholders’ survival activities (clearing of land for 
new farms, NTFP harvest, bush-meat trading) in the context of increasing poverty.  
2. Recognising the role of smallholder farmers in carbon emission reduction-based 
institutions is crucial. This study has demonstrated that farmers, through their 
perceptions, possess substantial and valid knowledge which, to some extent, is as robust 
as the regression-model outcomes. This indicates that local stakeholders are 
knowledgeable to play a central role in any initiative, such as REDD+, that aims to halt 
deforestation. This could be materialised via multi-stakeholder-signed agreements which 
define, in advance, the rules of the game, complemented by emission reduction 
mechanisms and efforts/performance-based benefit sharing. Similar to the highlights 
identified by Larson et al. (2010) in their concluding reflections, the success of such 
reforms needs transparent and credible institutions at local, regional and national levels. A 
subsequent implication to this would be to value the participation of such stakeholders as 
much as possible in order to adequately implement REDD+. The suggestion to 
mainstream participation is in line with findings by Hoang et al. (2011) who talked about 
REDD+ benefit distribution in Vietnam, as well as those of Hansen et al. (2009) who 
assessed the prospects for REDD+ implementation in Ghana. Otherwise, it is becoming 
clear, as observed by Mbosso (2011) in her study in Efoulan, that forest conversion into 
other land uses may continue to occur to the detriment of community livelihood survival 
efforts, if collective carbon-stock governance institutions are not put in place before 
attempting to implement the suggested CER schemes. 
3. Acting effectively on community livelihoods as per people’s perceptions: according to the 
Durban outcomes in 2011 and donors’ commitments thereafter, REDD+ payments may 
likely perform below farmers’ expectations in terms of cash income. It is anticipated that 
any top-down designed scheme would fail to compensate up to the level of the foregone 
community efforts in forest stewardship carried out over centuries. This is because the 
REDD+ process may eventually undermine livelihoods challenges to the detriment of 
carbon-protective strategies in Efoulan and elsewhere in southern Cameroon. Our model 
has established a strong relationship between four farm and socio-economic factors and 
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deforestation, hence emissions reduction. Community perceptions indicated that 
acceptable levels of annual payment per surface area should be in the range of 34US$/100 
m2 of forest in the Efoulan landscape. Meanwhile, previous assessments based on average 
carbon sequestration and current carbon market prices, indicated figures far below the 
above suggested levels, which are estimated at less than 5 US$ return per ton CO2-eq 
(Ngendakumana et al., 2011). As already anticipated, the economic gap is due to the 
overall low profitability of the REDD+ system, which seems to be neither fair nor efficient 
to serve as an alternative compensation opportunity compared to income that could be 
obtained from other land uses. Here, international stakeholders, mostly donor agencies 
running carbon funds, such as the World Bank will benefit from rethinking funding levels 
in order to meet forest stewardship efforts through financial processes under REDD+.  
4.5. Conclusions 
The above findings demonstrate that it is possible to determine socio-economic farm-level factors 
relating to deforestation and forest degradation. They imply that further steps to implement 
REDD+ mechanisms in the forest area should take facilitating access to NTFPs as an entry point - 
this being one of the critical forest tenure issues in Cameroon - as well as integrating realistic and 
efficient economic incentive options into current forest conservation.  
Finally, as this chapter attempts to understand to what extent socio-economic characteristics have 
an impact on forest-cover change, alongside changes in emissions, it has stressed that REDD+ 
design should, from a local perspective, be based on rigorous assessments of community 
willingness to get involved and the analysis of compensation thresholds. The latter should be 
considered in terms of planned payments to match farmers’ expectations and priorities, in order 
to achieve proper emissions reduction. For all stakeholders, especially eligible governments and 
international implementing agencies, more attention should be given to participation as a 
governance principle and to inclusive forestry policy review processes towards appropriate tenure 
reforms. The latter could factor in REDD+ financial mechanisms and carbon rights as a joint tool 
for poverty reduction to be included within a broader, more sustainable development policy 
framework.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In many contexts, and in developing countries in particular, going for the obvious is bad policy. 
[…] Often, a clever mixture of formal and informal elements has two main advantages: harnessing 
new resources for corporate governance, and making the firm more responsive to its 
environment”. 
(Christoph Engel) 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE DEVELOPING REDD+ 
PROCESS  
 
Abstract  
The Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation REDD, now REDD+ 
incorporating carbon-stock enhancement and biodiversity conservation, has emerged in recent 
years as a mechanism to simultaneously address climate change and poverty-reduction challenges 
at the margins of tropical forests. Congo basin countries, including Cameroon, have embraced the 
opportunities that REDD+ provides with high expectations. Yet, it is unclear whether the enabling 
institutional environment, required for implementing REDD+ is present. Understanding is still 
limited on how to build adequate and strong institutional relationships which could shape the 
reforms and establish efficient emission reduction schemes. Furthermore, uncertainty remains on 
the operational mechanisms of REDD+, suggesting that to guarantee effectiveness, there is a need 
to come up with a governance model nested in relevant policy frameworks. This study builds on a 
modified “4 Is” framework (Institutions, Interests, Ideas and Information) to analyse REDD+ and 
explores stakeholders’ perceptions on the existing potential for local forest governance. A 
structural implementation model to optimise the effectiveness of REDD+ is developed. Findings 
suggest that governments need to review existing policies to factor in participation, local people’s 
rights and access to information as a way to stimulate actors’ willingness to contribute to 
emission reductions and carbon-stock increases under REDD+ regimes. 
Key words: policy instruments, REDD+, rights, forest governance, Cameroon 
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5.1. Introduction 
The REDD+ initiative has emerged in recent years as a mechanism to simultaneously address 
issues of climate change, biodiversity loss and poverty reduction in the tropical forest margins 
(UNFCC, 2010; Kanowski et al., 2011; Minang and van Noordwijk, 2012). Deforestation and 
forest degradation are responsible for 12–17% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (Pfaff et 
al., 2011), and for about 65% of carbon emissions in developing countries (UN-DESA, 2009). 
This demonstrates the potential significance of the REDD+ initiative in the fight against global 
warming. The mechanism is designed to provide incentives to protect forests, and has gained 
widespread acceptance in the international policy arena since the Bali conference in 2007 
(Clements, 2010; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2010). REDD+ is very popular amongst policy makers and 
shapers because it is a type of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scheme, which would 
entail a flow of money at national levels. This makes it more attractive to the governments of 
most developing countries with a view to enhancing existing conservation instruments.  
While Clements (2010) argues that the initiative can lead to long-term conservation outcomes, 
especially in the tropics, many uncertainties remain as to how REDD+ will be operationalised at 
the global level (Hajek et al., 2011; Kanowski et al., 2011). At the same time, it is clear that local 
evidence and models nested in relevant policy frameworks should guide the strategic positioning 
of local actors (Minang and Van Noordwijk, 2012). Hiraldo and Tanner (2011) highlight that the 
trend towards decentralisation has shown that local communities can also fail to make effective 
decisions about the management of their forests. Moreover, REDD+ decision-making processes 
are likely to be complex as they require the convergence of diverse interests, narratives and 
actors (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). 
The Congo basin countries, including Cameroon, have shown great interest in the opportunities 
that REDD+ provides (for details on the REDD+ development process in Cameroon, see chapter 
2, paragraph 2.7). In this region, forest-cover erosion is speeding up and this contributes 
significantly to rising greenhouse gas emissions (Skutch, 2011). Policy implementation 
experience suggests that a substantial foundation exists for achieving reduced emissions from 
deforestation. However, in some of the poorest countries, this could be undermined by 
inappropriate institutional arrangements and poverty challenges (May et al., 2010; Lawlor et al., 
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2010). Therefore, greater effort towards understanding the governance processes of mitigation 
and adaptation are needed (Adger, 2001; Biermann, 2010; Lawlor et al., 2010; Hiraldo and 
Tanner, 2010).  
Since its inception in Cameroon, several debates concerning REDD+ are still ongoing. Viewed 
from a social and environmental perspective, the challenge lies in finding trade-offs between 
livelihoods and climate-change mitigation strategies through articulated coordination paired with 
credible stakeholder participation. A good number of actors have been consulted in the REDD+ 
process at country level, but several experts noted that it did not necessarily revolve around the 
right actors (Dkamela, 2011; Freudenthal et al., 2011). The national REDD+ setting hence 
indicates a poor stakeholder engagement fuelled institutional failures such as lack of clarity on 
who should take the lead, what the responsibilities are and how the process should be governed. 
Thus, there is a need to rethink the existing systems of coordination, collaboration and 
partnerships. According to Suding and Limpp (2007), agents should pool their skills and other 
resources in partnership to achieve their shared goals. The institutional arrangement suggested in 
the Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) appears to be too simplistic, with only weak potential 
to ensure efficiency along the REDD+ value chain. There is still little understanding on how to 
build strong institutional relationships which could shape reforms towards efficient emission 
reduction schemes.  
Suding and Limpp (2007) therefore agree with Saunders and Reeve (2010) that for the REDD+ 
process to realise positive impacts in Cameroon, an additional situational analysis is necessary to 
address governance gaps in the current emission reduction schemes.  
The aim of this investigation is to shed more light on the uncertain and ambiguous operational 
mechanism of REDD+, based on the current institutional arrangement and the power relations 
among stakeholders in Cameroon. The overarching question of this chapter therefore is: what are 
the institutional requirements for successful implementation of REDD+ and which specific gaps 
need to be addressed? 
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5.2. Theories and methods 
5.2.1. Conceptual framework  
As indicated in the 3rd Chapter, institutional structures to ensure the implementation of REDD+ 
can take the form of hierarchies, coalitions or networks (Angelsen et al. 2012) as they refer to 
relationships between agents involved in existing institutional arrangements for REDD+. The role 
of each actor can also be differentiated. In order to deepen the differentiation of roles, some argue 
that it suffices that the analysis is built on good governance principles (Hyden et al., 2008). To 
add greater meaning to the ongoing REDD+ debate, we looked into the architecture of REDD+, 
assuming that this emerging policy instrument is characterised by a multitude of actors operating 
across various decision-making levels: local, sub-national, national and global.  
Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012) proposed a useful framework for understanding the REDD+ 
policy arena. They identified four “I”s as key elements: Institutions, Interests, Ideas and 
Information. Institutions refer to the set of rules of the game within which all actors operate in the 
REDD+ policy domain. Institutions shape the way in which humans relate to their environment 
and guide interactions between actors in a given arena (Corbera and Brown, 2008). Climate 
change institutions are assigned different roles to meet the targets of the REDD+ design process at 
country level, and institutional linkages are formed towards its implementation.  Norms, 
regulations and desired arrangements are shaped by a historical trajectory which is somehow 
rooted in drivers of forest-cover change. Those drivers are influenced by the interests of the 
actors, for example in a country such as Cameroon, forests are considered as a source of formal 
or informal income leading to diverse beliefs on how to manage those forests (Oyono et al., 
2008). Often, power is concentrated with the State as the manager of all forest resources, ignoring 
the actors who are directly involved. Over recent decades, the latter have fought in vain via 
lobbying and advocacy for some structural changes. Different actors also have different ideas and 
perceptions on how forest management should be organized in the REDD+ policy arena (Hiraldo 
and Tanner, 2011). Actors often use discursive practices and ideologies to legitimate their 
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positions, which often conflict with the government’s priority to ensure that REDD+ leads to 
socially and environmentally optimal results.  
In this type of loose governance system, actors also use legitimate practices to seek and pursue 
interests according to normative rights (Oyono et al., 2008; Larson et al., 2008). This brings 
together diverse flows of information which constitute the basis for lobbying and negotiation 
during the different phases of the REDD+ cycle. REDD+-related information requires knowledge 
and capacity to ensure in-situ action planning, the effective coordination of actors as well as the 
skills to monitor, report and verify that targets have been met and additional carbon stocks and 
removals achieved. This means going beyond business as usual (BAU) to collect data at local 
level to measure forest-cover changes, carbon stocks and transformational land-use changes. The 
challenges at this level are whether existing institutions have sufficient technical capacity to 
coordinate the multiple emerging REDD+ agencies across key functions (planning, 
demonstration, management of incentives) and to incorporate the new momentum of community 
forest monitoring (Skutsch and Solis, 2011; Verplanke and Zahabu, 2011). This is presented in 
the analytical framework (see figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1. Nested REDD+ policy structure based on levels of decision making with social safeguards 
(modified from Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012).  
 
Although the structure may look complex at first glance, this modified framework actually 
portrays the simplicity of the REDD+ idea. It indicates the various links to be established to 
render this performance - based mechanism successful in the policy context of Cameroon. The 
framework alleviates the ambiguities on policy options and sustainable development actions to be 
undertaken during the REDD+ cycle. It is clear that using this analytical tool may build strong 
interplays for actors’ flexibility in discourses and mutual trust within CO2 emissions reduction 
schemes. Using the mechanism developed, all actors and institutions would ultimately continue 
to shape the REDD+ trajectory towards transformational change in land use. Consequently, local 
stakeholders need adequate technical and financial support to reduce carbon emissions during the 
REDD+ implementation process. Furthermore, Cameroon needs to enact specific social safeguard 
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policies and measures to support REDD+. According to Lawlor et al. (2010), this goes beyond 
benefit sharing, as framed by many scholars (Larson et al., 2010; Galudra et al., 2011; Hoang et 
al., 2012), to avoid negative impacts on rural communities, and thus promotes their positive 
commitment to the overall effectiveness of REDD+ program.  
5.2.2. Grounded theory and data collection approach  
In an attempt to understand key dynamics relating to the implementation of REDD+ in Cameroon, 
a survey was first designed to investigate who (among the international and national 
organizations or projects) is doing what in relation to REDD+. In this way, the aim was to identify 
the extent to which they are effective, efficient and equitable. Secondly, problems relating to the 
design and implementation of REDD+ and the roles of the different stakeholders were identified, 
as well as the institutional requirements for adequate implementation of REDD+.  
This qualitative approach should offer detailed insights into all the implementation phases of 
REDD+. In line with some proponents, social sciences have widely used the “grounded theory” 
approach developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Kerselaers et al., 
2012), particularly when actors make choices according to their perceptions about options, 
opinions and changing conditions. The theory derives its robustness from the concepts of 
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. It embodies the following principles: change and 
determinism.  
Through the practical application of theories, a new theory can emerge from collected data, 
unlike when reasoning builds on an a priori outlined hypothesis (Kerselaers et al., 2013). This 
aligns with the objective of our study, which seeks to elucidate actors’ viewpoints on REDD+ in 
Cameroon. We try to gain a picture of the institutions that are effectively, or potentially, engaged 
in REDD+, identifying their stakes and logics. We also capture their perceptions on levels of 
participation as a way to advance climate-change policy reforms, and rectify social imbalances in 
the process. Some of the questions included in the survey were: (1) to what extent has your 
organization been involved in the Cameroon REDD+ readiness process? (2) At which level of the 
process have you been involved? (3) What prevents you from fully participating in the REDD+ 
process? 
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5.2.3. Data collection  
Based on the theoretical approach described above, this chapter draws on information collected 
within the institutional set-up for REDD+, covering three levels of the process in Cameroon 
(national, sub-regional and local). Information was collected throughout the 2011 REDD+ 
readiness process and was analysed gradually. Data sources comprise several layers. Stakeholders 
interviewed included forest services, staff from other ministries, staff from international and 
national non-governmental organizations and community-based associations. Furthermore, 
available scientific and policy literature was consulted, including the high-level UNFCCC 
meeting reports and the policy documents from the environmental and forestry departments of 
Cameroon. These were used to understand the concepts and dynamics relating to REDD+, as well 
as their implications for forest management systems in the country. In order to assess the 
institutions and their concerns regarding the ongoing REDD+ process, preliminary data was 
collected through open questionnaires, as described by Minang et al. (2012). 
The first set of respondents was from 35 stakeholder organizations selected from 78 institutions 
identified. They included state services (15%), international organizations (20%) and national 
NGOs (65%). They were identified using key criteria such as: (a) being involved in REDD+ and 
climate-change debates; (b) having ongoing REDD+ pilot activities in the field; (c) being based in 
Cameroon during the period of the study; and (d) willingness to take part in the survey. At the 
preliminary stage of the assessment, we defined stakeholder classes. The classes were segregated 
through expert focus group discussions using criteria such as: (i) current interest in REDD+; (ii) 
their power level in the process; (iii) the amount of information they received in advance; and (iv) 
their knowledge of REDD+ implementation. Finally, only 18 organizations responded to our 
research questionnaire (table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Classification of respondents according to interest and power in the ongoing REDD+ process at 
country level 
Institutions 
 
Number of 
respondents 
/ class 
Current 
Interest 
Power level Prior 
information 
Knowledge of 
REDD+ 
implementation 
National forest 
NGOs 
9 +++ + ++ + 
Forest and 
environmental 
state services 
2 +++ +++ + ++ 
Research 
institutions 
5 ++ + +++ ++ 
Other state 
services 
1 + + - - 
Other NGOs 0 + + - - 
Private sector 
agents 
0 - - + - 
Average trend 
estimation 
 ++ NA + + 
Key:  +: weak: ++: strong; +++: very strong 
Apart from the above respondents, we also interviewed specific actors based on the capacity of 
each institution to answer the technical questions used in the in-depth REDD+ discussions. Eight 
among the 18 institutions were interviewed separately to provide greater insight into their 
perceptions of the REDD+ process in Cameroon. Furthermore, key informants were asked to 
assess evidence concerning REDD+ readiness in terms of methods, capacities and coordination 
facilities at national and regional levels. The two data collection steps were complemented by 
expert focus group discussions, as side events during several formal meetings organized in 2010 
and 2011, under the REDD+ stakeholder dialogue/round tables on climate change policy and 
emission reduction strategies. In order to triangulate and validate the answers obtained, the same 
process was repeated alongside discussions during the regular meetings of the national climate 
group held in Yaoundé in preparation for the “Readiness Preparation Proposal” (RPP) launching 
event.  
As a matter of institutional right, Free, Prior and Informed consent in REDD+ was assessed with 
regards to 3 local communities organized in east, littoral and south west regions. In total, 330 
farmers from 12 villages were covered using the focus group discussion with guiding questions 
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as follow: 1) Are you aware of climate change and the strategy to cope with it which called 
REDD+?; 2) Has any actor come to ask you for your willingness to get involved in REDD+ or has 
your consent been sought sufficiently in advance for the same effect under your customary 
institution? 
At the end, data was treated and analysed following the coding approach developed by Corbin 
and Strauss (1990). Datasheet content allowed the use of open and selective coding respectively, 
during the analysis. Information was categorised according to similarities in answers obtained for 
each of the 72 questions, which were, in turn, coded to allow further analysis using Excel. 
Quantitative descriptive analysis was also used to obtain graphical representations of the results 
in order to make relative judgements with precision. Finally, the latter step enabled the design of 
a schematic governance model for REDD+ in Cameroon. 
5.3. Results and discussions 
5.3.1. REDD+ governance profile and forest policies in Cameroon 
Early REDD+ projects have emerged in Cameroon since 2008, in parallel with several CDM 
initiatives under the coordination of the government with the support of international 
organizations such as GIZ, WWF, IUCN and the World Bank. Together with evolving actions 
that fostered forest management and biodiversity conservation, there has also been a proliferation 
of multilateral funds provided by NORAD, CARPE-USA and DFID to support demonstration 
activities through different arrangements (see Table 5.3). The latter resulted in functional 
partnerships with local, national and international organizations from which REDD+ could learn 
lessons. Some PES projects were also identified in localised areas, but without adequate capacity 
to develop tools and rules to govern concrete payments at community level.  
Our assessment confirmed the absence of a countrywide REDD+ strategy. Such a policy 
instrument should first define the climate-change-related “rules of the game” (e.g. clarification on 
who holds rights to trade carbon credits and other environmental services). Second, the policy 
should provide guidance on how different stakeholder rights will be protected, whereby the latter 
rights should include rights to share in the financial benefits of REDD+, rights to participate in the 
decision-making processes, cultural rights (Lyster, 2011), property rights to indigenous 
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knowledge, and know-how about forestry resources. Third, this strategy should then reorient 
REDD+ targets, taking into account current trends in deforestation and land-use plans.  
During this investigation, it was noted that, so far, all institutions involved in the demonstration 
and pilot activities used a purely top-down approach. This is also true for organizations claiming 
to speak on behalf of local communities, such as NGOs and Community-Based Organizations 
(CBOs). In the context of a performance-based evolution mechanism, we argue that the processes 
put in place would rather gain by anticipating institutional learning for a transformational change 
towards a more “bottom-up” approach, as per current experiences reported in Peru (Hajek et al., 
2011), to ensure the likelihood of REDD+ success. This implies that forest governance systems 
need to transcend the common practice of pseudo-transparence and dictatorship within the overall 
institutional establishment. Otherwise, the overall legitimacy of REDD+ will remain questionable, 
with tenure insecurity at all user levels the potential consequence.  
In Cameroon, there is serious concern as to whether existing policy frameworks will be sufficient 
to effectively govern REDD+ (Robiglio et al., 2010; Dkamela, 2011, IUCN, 2011, 
Ngendakumana et al., 2012). A large number of proponents agree on the fact that Cameroon has 
successfully enacted several legal and regulatory instruments in forestry, environment, 
decentralisation and land tenure. However, up until now, these laws have been unable to achieve 
the hoped-for results.  
Our study examined some 15 instruments with regards to REDD+ policy readiness. They are:  
(1) The constitution of the Republic of Cameroon;  
(2) National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan;  
(3) The Forestry and Wildlife Law (Law No. 94-01 of 20 January 1994);  
(4) The National Environmental Management Plan (1996); and  
(5) The Community-Based Natural Resources Management Act of 1992.  
These documents provide the framework for community participation in natural-resource 
management and use through the formation of viable, tax-free common initiative groups. Of 
particular relevance are procedures that guarantee ownership of community forests. Other decrees 
and ordinances analysed were:  
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 (6) The recently promulgated Law No 2011/008 of 6 May 2011 on the orientation of 
management and sustainable territorial development of Cameroon;  
(7) The Land use and Land Tenure Act of 1974 (Law No. 74-1);  
(8) The Environmental Management Law No. 96/12 of 1996; (9) Law No. 90/053 of 19/12/1990 
on associations; (10) Decree N°92/455/PM of 23/11/1992 that provides for AAss; and 
 (11) Decree n°2009/410 of 10-12-2009 (National observatory for Climate change in Cameroon.  
Finally, some newly developed policy documents reviewed include but are not limited to:  
(12) The Cameroon Readiness Project Idea Note;  
(13) The Cameroon Readiness Project Proposal finalised and submitted in September 2012;  
(14) The Prime Minister decree No103/CAB/PM of 13/06/2012 creating the Cameroon REDD+ 
Steering Committee and regulating how it functions; and finally  
(15) The Sectorial Program for Forestry and Environment (PSFE) which seeks to address issues 
relating to environment, participatory forest management, biodiversity and capacity 
strengthening.  
With regard to the connection between country policy and the international governance system, 
organizations such as Cameroon’s Ecology and Wildlife Conservation Society noted in their 
responses that cautious efforts have been made by the government in signing the different 
international instruments, followed by the elaboration of different national action plans. The latter 
include a national biodiversity action plan and proposals to revise various laws and codes. NGOs 
have also been at the forefront of forest conservation and community-based forestry and 
biodiversity projects. As a result of the NGOs’ engagement in the implementation of international 
conventions at country level, improvements have been observed in recent reports, compared to 
the local forest governance situation in previous years which had been described as very alarming 
by Oyono et al. (2006) among others.  
On the other hand, it is clear that Cameroon has recently made progress on actor participation and 
forest sector decentralisation. As forefront strategies to improve governance, the country also 
slightly improved on its fight against corruption. Nonetheless, vagueness and ambiguities remain 
in its policy instruments which may significantly hamper the implementation of upcoming 
REDD+ processes (Fobissie et al., 2012). While it is as yet unclear whether decentralisation 
105 
 
would have a positive or negative impact on deforestation, existing policy instruments 
inexplicably continue to have many uncertainties, especially in the area of land and forest tenure. 
Despite the fact that these issues have been raised by several civil society forums (Oyono et al., 
2008 and 2009; Ngendakumana et al., 2010; IUCN, 2011), Cameroon has not moved much 
further forward with the legal and policy frames that are needed to demonstrate the international 
climate change directives expected to be observed by each country that is a “Party of the 
UNFCCC-COP”. Instead, policy enactment in the country is reputed to be very slow (Oyono, 
2004). For instance, a decree creating the REDD+ national committee stood for around two years 
before the official signature by the relevant government authority. Another example in the same 
vein is the review of the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Act that started some four years ago, but, to 
date, the process has not yet come to a complete end.  
Many scholars had earlier viewed the revision process for this instrument as a golden opportunity 
to incorporate emerging concepts (REDD+, PES, CDM) as well as local people’s concerns about 
improving forest governance and rural livelihoods (Dkamela, 2011; IUCN, 2011; Ngendakumana 
et al., 2011). Unfortunately, the 1994 Forestry Law review process seems to take one step 
forward and two steps back. There could be two reasons for this lethargy. Firstly, there may be a 
lack of appropriate policy conditions and adequate budgetary allocations to complete the process, 
as it involves lengthy consultations, dialogue and inclusivity.  
Secondly, institutional instability may be detrimental to the review process, because frequent 
staff changes often disrupt the flow whenever some progress has been made in any working 
domain. This finding aligns with earlier observations by Oyono (2004) in his analysis of forest 
management decentralisation. This author reported that a similar review process launched in 1991 
stagnated until 1997 and ended up by reverting to “re-centralisation” of the forest management 
systems.  
However, during expert meetings occurring between 2010 and 2012, enthusiasm could be noted 
from all stakeholders (donors, NGOs, CBOs) for raising the standards for conserving the Congo 
basin. Moreover, in Cameroon, one can clearly observe a political will from the national REDD+ 
team to transform climate-change mitigation into an opportunity for poverty alleviation. It is 
becoming more evident that existing policy frameworks may not work under current scenarios in 
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developing countries. This observation is in line with Pedroni et al. (2008) who looked at some 
governance indicators in 8 countries to come to the conclusion that gouvernments in theses 
countries are unable to provide and enforce robust policies in their territories. Likewise, 
Kanowski et al. (2011) while studing policies in a number of developing countries found that the 
enforcement of existing policies is often lacking. For this reason, we strongly argue that the 
ongoing REDD+ implementation process in the country could serve as a catalyst to accelerate 
reforms to satisfy international requirements so as not to miss anticipated forest funding flows.  
   
5.3.2. Free and prior informed consent as a REDD+ governance principle at local level 
Whether one views REDD+ as a policy instrument or an international aid opportunity, the social 
safeguards issue comes to the forefront, together with some other issues such as governance 
principles, benefit distribution, and forest surveillance and monitoring. This will characterise 
REDD+’s future regime in practice. Findings from focus group discussions indicated that the 
right to information by stakeholders, and more importantly local communities, is becoming 
crucial as UNFCCC recommends that they should be invited to give their full consent before any 
REDD+ initiative becomes operational (Cancun agreements Decision 1/CP.16). The consequence 
is that parties are expected to promote and support principles and conditions that respect human 
rights, and address land tenure issues, forest governance and benefit sharing.  
The same applies to the engagement of stakeholders with the effective and full participation of 
women and local people. Field findings revealed that local communities around our study sites in 
Cameroon (see Figure 3.5, chapter 3, section 3.1.3) were ignorant about ongoing international 
debates on climate change. It was also noted that due to their limited knowledge of the Forestry 
and Wildlife Law, they were rather vindictive, displaying very low concern about forestry 
conservation initiatives. Only 33% of respondents indicated awareness of the content of climate-
related debates, mostly gained through each year’s radio broadcasts, which often focus on COP 
meetings during the December period. Based on these responses, it was observed that only a few 
members (10% of the sampled group) have been consulted in REDD+-related discussions (Table 
5.2).  
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Table 5.2. Local population awareness of climate change debates and consent on REDD+ prospects 
Region Study site Village 
community 
Number of 
respondents 
Are you aware of 
CC and the strategy 
to cope with it which 
is called REDD+? 
Has any actor come to ask for 
your willingness to get involved 
in said strategy? 
Yes  No  Yes  % No  % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
East 
Ngoyla  Menkouom 14 0 14 3 21.4 11 78.6 
Ngoyla Messok-
Messok 
16 0 16 1 6.3 15 93.7 
Ngoyla Ba’aBa 
(Zoulabot) 
14 0 14 2 14.3 12 85.7 
Ngoyla Etekessang 19 0 19 3 15.8 16 84.2 
Ngoyla  Lelene 14 0 14 2 14.3 12 85.7 
Ngoyla Doumzock 12 0 12 3 25 9 75 
Ngoyla Ngoyla 
Village 
25 0 25 2 8 23 92 
Ngoyla Lamson 13 0 13 1 7.7 12 92.3 
 
 
Littoral 
UFA 07002 Edea Ngonga  39 0 39 3 7.7 36 92.3 
UFA 07002 Edea Kopongo  50 0 50 5 10 45 90 
UFA 07002 Edea BOPO 13 0 13 2 15.4 11 84.6 
South 
West 
Tinto  Tinto 101 0 101 6 5.9 95 94.1 
Total  12 12 330 0 330 33 10 297 90  
% 100 100 100 0 100 10 10 90 90 
Source: Fieldwork 2010 
Most local people interviewed during our research acknowledged that they had not been 
consulted about either future implementation of REDD+ or details on how related financial 
benefits would be channelled to their community’s institutions. In the focus group discussions, 
communities were very concerned about the slow or absent involvement by the government in 
policy development on forest resource issues. Most of the time, they are called upon to 
collaborate during project implementation phases without prior consultation or consent during 
their design. In all study sites, local populations were unanimous that their consent was not 
sought when carving out the boundaries of permanent and non-permanent forests. Instead, they 
had simply been informed of the existence of such forest compartments, such as Nki National 
Park, UFA 07002 and Bayang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary. Local communities have to compete for 
Community Forests (CF) with safari hunters in non-permanent forest domains. The imposition of 
these protected forest regimes on local communities ties in with the provisions of the Land 
Tenure Code of 1963 where all land belongs to the State. This amplifies conflicts relating to loss 
of access to land and resources, as local people can neither own a Community Forest free of an 
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imposed Simplified Management Plan (SMP) nor exploit fauna or timber resources in forest land 
that has become a State prerogative.  
The situation described thus raises the burning need to shed more light on the question: “To 
whom will carbon credits be attributed?” which is under consideration by many scholars 
investigating REDD+ worldwide (Van Noordwijk et al., 2011; Galudra et al., 2011; Corbera and 
Schroeder, 2011; Angelsen et al., 2012). 
 
5.3.3. Institutions: REDD+ demonstration activities, stakes, logics and beyond  
This study identified approximately 29 REDD+ demonstration and pilot projects involving 39 
organizations, mostly in the southern forest part of Cameroon. The checklist had indicated that 
about 78 actors were potentially involved in forestry and agricultural projects, which could 
possibly be linked with the REDD+ mechanism. Stakes encompass many initiatives geared 
towards emission reductions through land-use changes, conservation and sustainable 
management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (Fig.5.2). This can be achieved 
through agroforestry and reforestation interventions, as well as surveillance and monitoring 
during natural regeneration processes. Both donors and implementing agents at local, sub-
regional, national and international level were considered. 
Table 5.3 summarises the categories of institutions actively involved in the REDD+ consultation 
process at country level. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show how different actors perceived the involvement 
and capacities of different structures to implement REDD+-related activities in Cameroon. From 
these results, it should be noted a kind of balance in terms of engagement scope between national 
and international organizations with a minor trends of international agencies being involved in a 
wider portfolio of functions than local organizations. 
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Table 5.3. List of organizations included in the mapping count sequence indicated to affect REDD+ 
activities 
Organization 
category (2) 
Organization Score (appearance sequence 
mentioned by respondents 
during the survey) 
Donors 
International 
organization 
WWF 6 NOVIB, DIFID, 
SVN 
 CIFOR 3 NORAD, CBFF 
 ONF International 1 NS 
 IUCN 6 CBFF/AfDB 
 GIZ 2 Germany 
 ICRAF 3 NORAD, RRI 
 CARPE 1 USAID 
 COMIFAC 1 AfDB,  
 PNUD 1 World Bank 
 FFP 1 RRI 
 WCS 1 NS 
 FERN 1 NS 
 CIFORD, climate change 
project  
1 ALGore 
Total count  27  
National 
institution 
   
National NGO CWCS 1 NOVIB, RRI 
 NESDA-Ca 1 CARPE 
 Living Earth Fundation  1 NS 
 CAFER 2 NS 
 OPED 1 CARPE 
 CED 1 GoC 
 RFUK 1 NS 
 CEW 1 NS 
 Cam Ecology 1 CBFF, RRI 
Goverment 
(GoC) 
MINEF, MINFOF, 
MINEPIA 
1 World Bank, 
IUCN, UK 
Academia Yaoundé and Dschang 2 NS 
Total count  13  
NS=Not specified 
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Figure 5.2. Self reported involvement (in terms of months per year) of institutions in carbon-related forest 
actions under REDD+ piloting phase         
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Figure 5.3. Perception of investigated institutions on REDD+ implementation capacity segregated across identified 
functions   
[Key: The Y axis is the perceived capacity of institutions with regards to several REDD+ related 
functions, measured on a scale of over 100]. MRV=Monitoring, Reporting and Verification. 
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The same finding demonstrates a rich cross-section of actors, including donors in Cameroon, 
especially when it comes to participating in emission reduction and forest conservation 
initiatives. However, there seems to be an indication of the preponderant role played by external 
organizations in the implementation of REDD+ demonstration activities. As a consequence, our 
findings show a high level of ambiguity in the early phases of REDD+ in Cameroon, especially 
for institutionalised patterns of actions, as also reported in a number of other recent assessments 
(Robiglio et al., 2010; Dkamela, 2011; UNREDD, 2011). 
The same ambiguity became apparent during sub-regional and national workshops on climate 
change in the country. For instance, during these events, held since 2010, one could clearly 
observe a form of dependence by state actors on international consulting agents and international 
development organizations, especially in relation to norm setting but also with regard to 
leadership of the debate. This was also reported for the REDD+ case in Peru and for carbon 
financing in the forest sector in Uganda (Hajek et al., 2011; Peskett et al., 2011). It is argued that 
this recurrent situation illustrates the exact nature of UNFCCC-COP debates since the inception 
of REDD/REDD+ which ultimately do not fully incorporate developing countries’ viewpoints 
during various deliberation sessions. Therefore, based on our findings, we advocate for fairer and 
more open-minded debates during future events.  
Otherwise, these types of initiative do not seem to be at all consistent with the principles of 
Agenda 21. As it is, Agenda 21, deriving from the Rio 92 summit, advocates for all countries to 
become sovereign owners of, and responsible for tackling development and environmental 
problems (Oyono et al., 2006; Lyster, 2011). Collaboration with international bodies is, of course, 
the way to go in designing and implementing REDD+, especially in the search for adequate 
policy frameworks and technical Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) capacities. 
However, to ensure its sustainability, national actors working in the forestry and climate-change 
sector need to establish clear and transparent country-specific norms and rules. These regulations 
can make this highly attractive and innovative process more successful.  
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5.3.4. Power relations and participation principles 
The REDD+ arena in Cameroon has a very young institutional structure to spearhead climate 
change negotiations and lead project development initiatives within the available funding 
mechanisms. The analysis presented here is rooted in stakeholder perceptions of forest 
governance at national and local level, particularly concerning power relations, participation and 
prior information. Figure 5.3 below summarises the results of stakeholder scoring for actors 
involved in implementing REDD+ projects on different REDD+-segregated governance variables. 
In order to move from a business-as-usual analysis to a more equitable incentive scheme, it was 
judged important to consider the following four key variables for each category of actor: current 
interest in REDD+, power level, prior information and technical knowledge to implement REDD+ 
initiatives.  
We observed a very high level of power (5/5 on the score rate) for forest and environmental state 
services, but a very low score for other state services. National forest NGOs and research 
institutions scored high in technical knowledge and provision of prior information. These results 
indicate that the availability of technical knowledge and access to information are the only 
variables reducing the strong influence of the government in the REDD+ decision-making process 
which scored high on current interest and power. Clearly, the private sector, other state services 
and NGOs have very little interest in REDD+. The findings indicate a need to expand the climate-
change debate substantially by including non-forest actors such as the private sector and non-
forest state services, especially agriculture, planning and finance ministries in the REDD+ process 
at country and local levels.  
In figure 5.4., stakeholders’ opinions and perceptions on the responsibility for the four main 
governance issues with regard to emissions reduction and carbon-stock enhancement are quite 
diverse. The latter figure indicates that there are several institutions with a stake in forest-related 
activities, but with significant disparities. The Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife is clearly 
identified as a dominant actor. This is the case for all the issues herein investigated which are 
mainly decisions making (power), participation, access to information and implementation 
capacity. Observations and interactions at landscape level during our field investigations confirm 
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this for all the study sites. However, in contrast, the mandate for REDD+ activities on the ground 
has been given to the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP). This is enforced 
by the presidential decree organizing the government, and is operationalised by “Arrêté” no 105 
CAB PM signed on 15/06/2012 by the Head of government. 
 
Figure 5.4. Stakeholders radial ranking based on REDD+ governance variables  
Key: Scores levels: from 0 (very weak) to 5 (very high). The score is based on both self-assessment and assessment 
by others.  
Although it is clear that MINEP is coordinating the overall REDD+ process in Cameroon through 
its Ecological Monitoring Unit, this assessment raises concern about the contradiction observed 
in ongoing practice, even among the state services, whereby the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 
seems to be in the driving seat, putting itself in charge.  A second interesting finding from this 
graph is observed when summing up the cumulative responsibilities held by state agents 
compared to the remaining actors. In summary, the state seems to have continued its traditional 
mode of governing the REDD+-related debates. As a result, there is a risk that the same approach 
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will be followed when implementing REDD+ projects, leading to greater frustration among forest 
communities, when incentives and benefits become operational. 
It is clear that state institutions alone have exclusively been mandated to implement most 
initiatives on forest matters (Fig. 5.5). This results in a concentration of state power over forest 
management matters. During our research, only a limited number of local stakeholders were 
observed to be engaged in the REDD+ process. 
           
Figure 5.5. Responsibilities with respect to REDD+ attributed to institutional actors by the sampled institutions 
(n= 17)1’  
                                                            
1Key for abreviations. MINFOF: Ministère des Forȇts et de la Faune, MINEP: Ministère de l’Environnement et de 
la Protection de la nature ; MINADER: Ministère de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural ; MINEPAT : Ministère 
de  l’Economie,  Planification  et  Administration  du  Territoire ;  ANAFOR :  Agence  Nationale  pour  la  Foresterie ; 
MINRESI : Ministère de  la Recherche Scientifique ; CTFC : Centre Technique pour  la Foresterie Communale ; WRI : 
World  Resource  Institute;  WCS :  Wildlife  Conservation  Society;  IUCN:  International  Union  for  Conservation  of 
Nature ;  ICRAF:  International  Centre  for  Research  in Agroforestry;  IRAD:  Institut  de  Recherche Agricole  pour  le 
Développement ; WWF : World Wide Fund for nature; ONG: Organisation Non Gouvernementale ; LAGA: Last Great 
Ape organisation ; BET : Bureau d’Etudes Techniques. [Note: Y axis represents the frequency of citations as per 
REDD+ actor at country level] 
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This is in line with the findings of an UNREDD report which earlier stated that only a few 
Cameroonian civil society organizations are involved in REDD+ (UNREDD, 2011). This 
situation contradicts the theoretical governance and policy frameworks enacted by several texts in 
Cameroon. Our findings confirm what several scholars qualified as “pseudo-devolution” instead 
of co-management (Oyono et al., 2006; Dkamela, 2010; Robiglio et al., 2010; Ajonina, 2011; 
Ngendakumana et al., 2012).  
Ultimately, the observed power concentration shows that state institutions will be both regulators 
and managers of forest carbon mitigation, therefore leading to further concerns about the 
effectiveness of the REDD+ process at country level. At the same time, Cameroon, like many 
other developing countries, has underfinanced state institutions with a poor governance record in 
the forestry sector as a result. According to Lawlor et al. (2010), the forest sector in Cameroon is 
characterised by corruption, sluggish policy reform, and by weakly defined property rights for 
forest communities. Although forests in Cameroon are public properties (Oyono et al., 2006), 
reliance on these powerful state institutions may demotivate other important actors, such as local 
people and external bodies, to get involved in forest management activities. Moreover, if no 
policy change takes place, there is a risk that the distribution of national funding for REDD+ will 
be ineffective. The latter unequal distribution would then be viewed by some stakeholders to be 
mandatory or voluntary (Huettner, 2012). As REDD+ takes effect, we anticipate that state agents 
will base their discourse on existing policy instruments which give the government full rights to 
rule over all forestry initiatives and they will willingly exclude other stakeholders on carbon 
rights as is the case with timber.  Effectiveness here means time-bound equity to channel funds to 
the institutions involved. This would explain why most site-level actors, especially communities 
in our study areas, expressed their preference for channelling incentives directly to projects, 
rather than through governmental systems (Ngendakumana et al., 2012; Huettner, 2012). 
During this study, it was found that institutional frameworks for REDD+ are being put in place, 
but without sufficient clarity on the scale of participation by stakeholders other than State agents. 
It is understood by current scholars (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008; Clements, 2010; Awono et al., 
2014) that REDD+ seeks to address the fundamental causes of deforestation and forest 
degradation through carbon credits versus compensation for less agricultural and logging 
activities. From these findings, Cameroon offers a very good case for understanding how REDD+ 
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processes work (or otherwise). Fortunately REDD+, as a commitment and performance-based 
mechanism, seems to provide a strong rationale to reform and strengthen forest governance, 
including catalysing the interests and capacity of local institutions to deliver forest conservation 
(Clements, 2010). However, we conclude that unless a deep transformational change takes place, 
the policy frameworks, which are still nested in the state-dominated institutional arena, cannot 
govern REDD+ effectively.  
In terms of inclusivity, REDD+ process in Cameroon appears to have ignored an important 
category of actors in forest management (MINEPDED, 2012; Fobissie et al., 2012). Indeed, our 
results indicate an absence of logging companies, mining companies and agro-industries in the 
REDD+ meetings organized at both national and local levels. It is unclear whether these actors 
were overlooked by the leading body for the process or whether these private organizations were 
unwilling to get involved in emission reduction initiatives, as this might have a counter-effect on 
their business agendas.  
This observation brings back the issue of how open and participatory such processes can be in 
developing countries such as Cameroon. The situation contrasts with that in Peru which offered a 
good example of technical and organizational innovation (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). The 
same authors reported that, in the case of Peru, a diversity of local and international for-profit and 
not-for-profit actors came together to design and implement emission reduction schemes. We 
observe that legislation in Cameroon gives full forest ownership to the state as public property, 
and some informants used the prevailing policy instruments to support the fact that all 
stakeholders are free to take part in the REDD+ process. The government attributes the 
unwillingness of private actors to participate in the large REDD+ consultations to their busy 
schedules. We argue, however, that the issue is not that private institutions are unwilling to be 
part of the new forest carbon regimes. Rather, when REDD+ is in place, payments through 
designed benefit-sharing mechanisms may reinforce policy instruments to conserve forests, and 
this would negatively affect them. Additional policies will create conditions that will commodify 
forest carbon towards reducing forest clearance and logging (Clements, 2010), and will allow 
local communities to participate in forest management-related decisions towards greater fairness.  
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Furthermore, those boundary institutions involved in logging and agribusiness are widely 
believed to constitute both threats and opportunities for REDD+ initiatives in tropical-forest 
management systems (Bellassen and Gitz, 2008; Blom et al., 2010). They are threats insofar as 
externality-based emissions risks are concerned, but opportunities if the potential to design 
certification systems to prevent illegal logging, uncontrolled mining and less environmentally-
friendly agricultural production systems is considered. The latter are components of best practice 
with an empirical potential to reduce deforestation. In addition, several agro-industries operating 
in Cameroon could be funding sources through PES schemes to complement REDD+ 
mechanisms during the operational stages. Other REDD+ activities which could reinforce the 
process are biodiversity monitoring, tree planting on degraded areas and promotion of tree-crop 
farming as alternative options to local forestry users. Finally, the critical need here is a concept to 
guide the involvement of all actors and allow the management of interrelationships from design 
to implementation in REDD+ regimes.  
5.4. Policy solutions to achieve carbon emission reduction in the forest zone of 
Cameroon 
Our study showed that a prerequisite for the success of REDD+ is that governance structures for 
carbon emission reduction can be designed and efficiently applied in multi-functional landscapes. 
We argue, at this stage, that appropriate structures and forms of partnership should be developed 
to provide optimal benefits in terms of improved governance, sufficient REDD+ funding leverage 
and the sustainable well-being of communities and ecosystems. Based on our findings, we 
suggest the schematic governance model in Figure 5.5. This model provides an operational 
structure with potential to establish an efficient mechanism using synergies between various 
institutions (Actions), and policy instruments relevant for monitoring land-use change dynamics 
(goals). It is a cross-sectoral trade-offs between livelihoods and ecosystems in a win-win 
prototype which is likely to contribute to emission reduction and reward people for maintaining 
forest cover in forested landscapes (Leimona et al., 2011; Van Noordwijk et al., 2011, Atela et 
al., 2016). [For full operationalization of the suggested policy actions, see chapter 7, Section 7.3, 
table 7.1]  
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Figure 5.6. Suggested governance structure to achieve landscape-level carbon emissions reduction   
The robustness of the model lies in its potential to:  
(i) build trust among stakeholders who previously had diverse or competing interests about 
REDD+ readiness;  
(ii) catalyse experience sharing through active discourse and other collective actions, such as 
training, tree-planting campaigns and policy forums;  
(iii) increase the likelihood that decisions, agreements and choices are made together based 
on the ideas and concerns of all actors;  
(iv) enable government and other stakeholders (academia, NGOs, private sector agents, local 
communities) to legitimate the ongoing REDD+ process, as they are able to initiate 
inclusive policies towards more participatory decision-making systems.  
The implementation of the model presented in figure 5.6 alleviates the gradual decrease in 
biodiversity and livelihoods, as reported by several authors (Ndoye and Tieguhong, 2004; Sayer 
et al., 2012; Samndong and Vatn, 2012), and could eventually substantiate the potential to 
increase carbon stocks through collective tree planting and agroforestry activities. Nonetheless, 
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for this to happen, there is a need to change the institutional settings and arrangements, taking 
into account the perspectives and the interests of the different protagonists. 
If implemented, the model could be a game changer by introducing new actors and new ideas to 
the REDD+ process, leading towards greater effectiveness. The ongoing decentralisation process 
initiated more than a decade ago in Cameroon, constitutes an ideal opportunity to undertake such 
reform.  
There are at least three policy implications that can be derived from this model. First, building 
capacities of grassroot organizations and local institutions is seen to be an alternative to 
externally driven processes aimed at the reduction of emissions from deforestation, while at the 
same time reducing community and tree vulnerability to climate change. It would increase 
institutional capacity to directly manage monies from the global REDD+ funding, and therefore, 
help to minimise the risk of ineffective distribution of REDD+ funding by national governments 
(Huettner, 2012). 
Second, to solve the problems concerning the ongoing REDD+ process in Cameroon (weak 
coordination, limited tenure rights, lack of a national strategy, income and compensation 
options), choosing the right policy instruments is essential.  With the conflicting interests over 
land and tree-based resources, the policy process is crucial for existing and future institutions to 
continue playing the role of tree stewardship. 
Finally, emissions reduction schemes could have an impact on ecosystem functions if 
communities were to give free and prior informed consent on financial capital mechanisms, 
before adhering to the proposed compensation options. This normally occurs after being informed 
about and exposed to mitigation and adaptation concepts, as well as other climate-change 
challenges. Among options suggested by van Noordwijk and Leimona (2010) to incentivize 
smallholder communities towards avoiding deforestation, the Compensation for Opportunity 
Skipped (COS) may be the most suitable in the case of the southern forest zone in Cameroon. 
This follows from the fact that the analysis of the tenure system demonstrated that local 
stakeholders are willing to take up opportunities to reduce carbon emissions pending policy 
reform in the country.  
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Our findings are in line with a research need identified by Larson et al. (2010) in the domain of 
community rights and forest tenure reform. The latter authors proposed that in cases where there 
are clear interests in alternative land uses, communities themselves need to be part of the 
decision-making process for compensation to determine the real value of their assets. We 
recognise, however, that this would increase the complexity of the REDD+ process, particularly in 
terms of coordination, because the REDD+ mechanism would need to become more inclusive and 
participatory across the institutional platform. Its implementation may thus require a broadening 
from REDD+ to REDD++ (this second + points to the inclusive dimension for Reducing Emissions 
from All Land Uses or REALU. For details on REALU, see Bernard et al., 2013). The model 
would have a snowball effect in subduing the apical dominance of state institutions, and reduce 
the risks of contradictory mandates leading to competition between line ministries of the same 
central government.  
5.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The focus of REDD+ is on reduced emissions and increased removal of greenhouse gases. It 
concerns a set of policies and actions necessary to govern the attainment of controlled greenhouse 
gases. REDD+ is an incentive-based approach nested in global forest governance and institutional 
frameworks. This chapter identifies strategies to overcome past failures within the domain of 
forest management, using new policy instruments and ways to tackle potential risks under 
REDD+ regimes. The findings demonstrated that to achieve the expected performance, a cross-
sectoral implementation framework has to emerge to allow for the incorporation of all 
stakeholders’ viewpoints and to remain flexible to the experimental nature of the REDD+ road 
ahead.  
Current institutional arrangements and governance structures for the REDD+ process do not seem 
to be effective in a multi-actor and multi-scale arena. As there is no clear policy framework for 
REDD+ initiatives across scales in Cameroon, its implementation may not meet international 
requirements. This, in turn, may lead to failures as per certified standards agreed by the 
international community who have so far pledged no less than US$ 4.5 billion dollars to REDD+ 
for some 50 developing countries (Angelsen, 2010) alongside the 10 billion USD “Green Climate 
fund”committed under the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). We therefore suggest the 
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enactment of REDD+ across sectoral policy arenas, which could be developed separately from 
existing laws and codes. An attempt could be made to mainstream the ideas from the currently 
reviewed forestry Act. However, we think that a stand-alone instrument would be able to 
differentiate and clarify specific rules and transaction mechanisms in a transparent manner, and 
determine compliance and enforcement systems in an equitable manner. Co-benefits and resource 
tenure issues are also important for consideration by policy makers.  
Finally, in terms of gaps, scientific knowledge based on field evidence about deforestation drivers 
and carbon stocks remains scarce. Little or no attention has been paid to setting up robust 
experiments to draw lessons from real-life landscapes. In this article, a structural implementation 
model to optimise the effectiveness of REDD+ was developed. It shows that, to ensure better 
inclusiveness, actors can go beyond the current simplistic institutional arrangements. It is our 
hope that this model could serve as a guideline for further emission reduction schemes, especially 
regarding actor power relations, the responsibilities of organizations across implementation levels 
and stakeholder logics to operationalise real financial mechanisms. In summary, our findings 
suggest that governments need to review the existing policies to factor in credible stakeholder 
participation, local peoples’ rights and information access. These aspects are crucial for effective 
implementation of REDD+ at all levels.  Further, it will be critical for the Cameroon government 
to stimulate coordination between different land-use policies and practices, as well as maintaining 
actors’ willingness to contribute to emission reductions and carbon stock increases under REDD+ 
regimes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything” 
(Georges Bernard Shaw) 
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6. FOREST TENURE RIGHTS: CRUCIAL SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS IN 
REDD+ 
 
Abstract 
It is increasingly becoming clear that reforms based on the claims of local forest communities 
regarding the right to natural resource use will be needed to adequately address issues of 
sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The current institutional and policy 
frameworks of Cameroon and other SSA countries have bestowed exclusive land tenure rights on 
the State, while curtailing access by local farmers to forest and forest-based resources on which 
they depend for a living. It is therefore unlikely that successful forest conservation and 
implementation of REDD+ can be achieved without recognition and enforcement of customary 
tenure. This chapter aims at assessing smallholders’ perceptions on tenure rights, forest laws and 
policy compliance with regard to onground feasibility and social acceptability of the designed 
REDD+ in southern Cameroon. Using a semi-structured questionnaire and focus group 
discussions, involving seven key informants and 66 community forest users, opinions about 
current tenure systems and the risks of related conflicts was investigated. Findings from the field 
provide empirical evidence on the sources of conflict. These include denied rights to forest 
resources, unfair distribution of benefits from forests and power struggle to control forestry 
sector. These lessons learnt from community forestry could enrich the ongoing debates on 
safeguards in REDD+ and serve as guiding milestones towards increasing the effectiveness of this 
mechanism throughout the country and the continent. 
 
Key words: Community forests, perceptions, conflicts, climate change, Cameroon 
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6.1. Introduction  
Cameroon is a tropical forest country with about 48 % forest cover (De Wasseige et al., 2009). 
For this reason it is known as a country with a high potential to implement REDD+. As in many 
other developing countries, there are few reliable statistics on forest-cover loss in Cameroon. 
However, estimates of annual deforestation range from 0.4 to 1.0 %, the second highest in the 
Congo basin after DR Congo (De Wasseige et al., 2009; Sunderlin et al., 2009). Deforestation 
causes are diverse and in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), drivers are embedded in inadequate socio-
economic relations between the state, the private sector and local people, as well as in poor 
governance within the forestry sector (Mustalahti et al., 2012). While smallholder-driven slash-
and-burn agriculture and increasing fuelwood demand are widely believed to be responsible for 
about 80% of deforestation (Kissinger et al., 2012), these mechanisms are often the secondary 
effects of tropical timber harvesting that degrades forest cover and contributes to associated 
declines in biodiversity. 
Since the inception of REDD+, one of the major challenges has been to develop strategies to 
maintain social safeguards, such as community rights to forest resources and actors’ free consent 
to this land-use mechanism. Nevertheless, Galudra et al. (2011) have indicated that there could be 
an interaction between carbon-stock-related rights and other property rights. REDD+ regimes 
hereby create additional complexity, and greater clarity and procedural justice are needed to 
showcase who owns which resource for what benefit. The same authors explained that carbon 
rights come as an addition to the already complex layers of unresolved property rights. Risks of 
conflicts between local communities and managing authorities have been reported in many 
studies across tropical ecosystems when anticipating large-scale conservation projects. This was 
the case, for example, in India, Cameroon and Brazil (Pandey, 2002; Oyono et al., 2008; Cotula 
and Mayers 2009). International governance approaches emerging in the current context of 
climate-change mitigation have, therefore, opened the eyes of social scientists leading to the 
consideration of safeguards which could reduce the risks of conflict over forest resources, when 
the negotiated mechanisms are put in place (Oyono et al., 2008; Angelsen and Wertz-
Kanounnikoff 2008; Larson et al., 2010; Galudra et al., 2011). This poses the challenge of 
mainstreaming community rights as one of the key social safeguards, as well as equity in benefits 
125 
 
distribution to enhance other forest-related co-benefits from REDD+. The success of this financial 
mechanism could be very significant, not only in contributing to stabilise global warming below a 
two-degree increase, but also in terms of expected critical additionalities (Bernard et al., 2013; 
Brown, 2013) such as (1) enhancing biodiversity; (2) enhancing adaptation to climate change; (3) 
improving livelihoods and forest governance; and (4) protecting peoples’ rights and watersheds.   
Although, at the current time, some steps have been made to move from the REDD+ pilot phase 
to a quick-start implementation in the Congo basin countries (FAO-COMIFAC, 2012; 
Ngendakumana et al., 2012b), there is still limited information concerning the perception of local 
communities on the links between forest tenure rights, existing policy instruments and the climate 
change debate (Guariguata et al., 2012). From a research perspective, the following questions still 
need to be clarified: (1) how are forest rights viewed by smallholder farmers dwelling in forest 
areas in the light of the upcoming REDD+ process implementation? (2) in terms of social 
safeguards, what lessons can be learnt from the current forestry policy framework and how could 
this help to make REDD+ successful in Cameroon?  
Many reports on tenure rights have been produced for Cameroon’s forestry sector. These show 
that there is a growing consensus among contemporary scholars that without guaranteeing 
adequate forest tenure and the resource rights of local populations, conservation of biodiversity 
and sustainable development will probably not be achieved in Cameroon, or in Africa as a whole 
(Nguiffo et al., 2009; Posey, 1994; Ngwasiri, 2001; Tumnde, 2001; PAPLRR-West, 2002; 
PAPLRR-West, 2004; Saruchera, 2004; Mope Simo, 2004a; ACHPR, 2005). However, 
consideration of the links between REDD+ and social safeguards, such as fairness in forest 
benefit-sharing at field level, is fairly recent. Moreover, to date, there have been few studies 
focusing on smallholder perceptions on tenure rights at site-level based on the existing policy 
environment. In the current context of the international debates on climate change, it is therefore 
imperative to assess what the population in Cameroon feels about the flaws in the currently 
applied legal instruments for forest tenure and property rights; how they understand the 
implementation of these laws and policies; and what the possible areas of conflict are.  
It is hypothesised that flaws in current community forestry laws in Cameroon have pervaded their 
implementation, divested local populations of forest resource access rights and engendered latent 
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conflicts which could reduce the effectiveness of REDD+. This chapter aims to give an overview 
of smallholders’perceptions on tenure rights, forest laws and policy compliance with regard to the 
onground feasibility and social acceptability of the designed REDD+ in Southern Cameroon. It is 
actually in this part of the country where there is an apparent confusing local situation of property 
rights dominated by the co-existence of de facto tenure rights and de jure state property. The 
investigation draws from the theory of access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) to understand the current 
rights of forest communities, using focus group discussions and conflict mapping tools. In this 
way, we discern smallholders’ perceptions on rights and risks in the current forestry policy arena 
in relation to the climate change debate. Findings from field investigations are thus intended to 
provide empirical evidence on sources of community forest-related conflicts. The lessons learnt 
could enrich the social and environmental safeguard framework at local level and serve as 
guiding milestones towards increased REDD+ effectiveness across the country and the tropics as 
a whole. 
6.2. Community forest management: ownership, tenure and threats 
Community forestry refers to the form of state power devolution to local communities to jointly 
manage forest resources under certain legal dispositions (Oyono, 2004; Minang et al., 2007). The 
community forest management approach (CFM) had been viewed as a strategy by which, through 
collective action, local people can move beyond deforestation and degradation, and achieve 
sustainable management and livelihoods (Minang et al., 2007; Larson et al. 2010, Mustalahti et 
al., 2012). Taking the case of Latin America, Larson et al. (2010) have found that if lessons are 
learnt from previous experiences, CMF may be an equitable means to reduce emissions under the 
REDD+ initiatives. Tropical forests are often sites of conflict and competing claims for land and 
trees, and insecure forest tenure rights are often believed to be associated with deforestation and 
degradation (Larson et al 2010, Galudra et al., 2011; Ngendakumana et al., 2012 a). 
According to current literature, tenure rights are complex and can be viewed as “bundles of 
rights”. They include the ability to access, withdraw, manage, exclude and alienate a resource. 
The whole bundle constitutes the property rights which are often governed by policies, laws and 
regulations (Oyono et al., 2006, Larson et al., 2010, Galudra et al., 2011). The theory of access 
developed by Ribot and Peluso  
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(2003) clarifies access as “the ability to benefit from resources and provides the interpretation 
that the bundle of rights gives effective power, based on mechanisms put in place combined with 
social relations built”. The issue of tenure is so fundamental that the role it plays in promoting 
sustainable natural-resource management cannot be ignored given the current status quo in the 
country. Tenure rights of rural communities, where recognised by law, have often proven to be a 
strong incentive for enhancing the conservation of natural resources (Leimona al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, governments in Africa have often recognised forest tenure and the resource rights 
of rural communities on paper, but not in practice. As a consequence, the continent lags behind in 
terms of recognising the tenure and access rights of local communities (Springate-Baginski and 
Wollenberg, 2010). This is illustrated in figure 6.1 where the % of state devolution in the 
management of natural resources in various continents is presented.  
 
Figure 6.1. Percentage of State devolution in natural-resource management across the tropics 
Source: Computed from Springate-Baginski and Wollenberg (2010) 
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In Africa, the state has effectively withdrawn from only 2% of the forest area (Springate-Baginski 
and Wollenberg, 2010), and local communities are basically denied ownership of, and resource 
rights to, forest resources that constitute their principal source of livelihood. In Cameroon, forest 
ownership is regulated by the Land Tenure Code of 1963 and the Forestry Ordinance of 22 May, 
1974 which introduced the concept of ‘national lands’ and individual land title registration. These 
legal instruments were inspired by the German colonial Decrees of 15/6/1896 and 11/8/1920 
which declared all native land that was effectively occupied as ‘terres vacantes et sans maître’ or 
‘terra nullius’ (Ngwasiri, 2001; Tumnde, 2001; Ngoufo and Tsalefac, 2003). This form of land 
ownership by the State has negatively impacted on forest tenure and the resource rights of local 
communities, as continued to influence subsequent legal instruments even after the 1994 forests 
law, which was intended to increase participation by local communities in the management of 
forest and forest-based resources. The legal divestment of local populations of access rights to 
forest and forest-based resources has undermined participatory conservation in favour of 
competition between local communities and State conservation agencies. The result is that the 
occurrence of horizontal and vertical conflicts between these forest stakeholders has become 
widespread. The most frequently observed are conflicts about access to and benefits from forest 
resources between local communities, and those between local communities and forestry agents. 
Creating protected areas within the vicinity of local communities without the consent of these 
local populations does not only undermine their tenure rights but also leads to scarcity of land on 
which they rely for their survival. This may cause conflicts. For instance, the creation of the 
Bayang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary and the Tinto community forest has caused severe farmland 
scarcity that instigated the Tinto-Mbu and Tinto-Wire communities to fight over the remaining 
patches of forest outside the boundaries of these protected areas (Minang et al., 2007).  
It is unlikely that forest conservation and the implementation of REDD+ can be effective without 
recognising and respecting customary tenure. Written law, although arguably understood to be 
adequate in matters outside natural-resource management, is insufficient for, and inconsistent 
with, emerging equitable forest management approaches advocated by many national and 
international actors (Singer, 2008; REPAR, 2009). Such approaches encompass the withdrawal of 
States from natural-resource management and recognition of the customary and collective tenure 
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rights of local people. The replication of a German Decree of the 19th century in a country that 
intends to use the forestry sector for poverty alleviation shows that there is a missing link in the 
country’s forestry policy.  
Cameroon has hundreds of community forests (Minang et al., 2007) based on the 1994 forestry 
law and policy regulations elaborated in the Manual of Procedure for the Management of 
Community Forests (MINEF, 1998). Unfortunately, in the modern legal system, these are 
considered de facto as state property, thereby creating confusion (Tumnde, 2001). Part of, if not 
the entire, regulatory framework for the conservation of natural resources in developing countries 
is based on western ideas and concepts that were introduced in their respective territories by 
colonial masters to ensure state control over natural resources (Ngwasiri, 2001; Linjouom, 2008). 
This therefore pervades any reforms made in the domain. This legacy has permeated the tenure 
fabric of African States to the extent that even the most recent laws are still oriented towards 
encouraging foreign investment in the country’s forestry sector (REPAR, 2009).   
The same is reported by many authors in Cameroon (Ngoufo and Tsalefac, 2003; Linjouom, 
2008; Singer, 2008). State authority also regards communal ownership and property rights as de 
facto rights, whereas no communal land titles are allowed in practice (ACHPR, 2005). As 
opposed to this, the forestry Ordinance of 22 May, 1973 replicated the provisions of the June 15, 
1896 German Decree to proscribe registration of individual land titles and property rights (Posey, 
1994; Ngwasiri, 2001; Nguiffo and Djeukam, 2008).  
It should be noted that, at the outset, the government of Cameroon perceived the community 
forests regime as a way to divert part of the income from logging to local development (Asanga, 
2002). This perception has become a conservation disincentive, since it dissuaded local 
communities in areas without timber exploitation from managing community forests for mainly 
ecological and environmental reasons, such as carbon sequestration.  
Land and forest tenure systems have played an important role in shaping access to natural 
resources in Cameroon. The legal instruments regulating land and forest tenure have often been 
drafted in ways that alienate the local people for whom the policies were meant. Such alienation, 
which stems from the non-consideration of customary tenure systems and the conspicuous 
absence of contributions by local people to legal instruments, have largely been considered as a 
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major cause of the ineffective implementation of the laws governing forest management and 
access to resources for poverty alleviation (Oyono et al., 2009, Nguiffo et al., 2009). 
Conservation policies in Cameroon appear piecemeal and ad hoc rather than forming a coherent 
whole. The creation of separate ministries for forestry, land tenure, agriculture, mining and the 
environment has led to compartmentalised policies, as each perceives its ministry as its sphere of 
competence, thereby turning a blind eye to areas of convergence. Furthermore, national and 
international policies and laws have a common content characteristic which has been associated 
with the tenure insecurity of local communities, poor management and the divestment of access 
to forest and forest-based resources (Ngwasiri, 2001; Larson et al., 2010; Cotula and Mayers, 
2010). This has caused continual abuse and conflict in the course of their implementation (Posey, 
1994; Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg, 2010).  
As Minang et al. (2007) explained, most community forests in Cameroon are a mix of primary 
and secondary forests. It should be clear that both are similarly targeted by REDD+ initiatives. 
Hence, there is a need for a clear understanding of the successes and failures of community forest 
management, as well as smallholder perceptions on what is viewed as an opportunity for forest-
sector actors (Larson et al., 2010; Hoang et al., 2013). Otherwise, the effectiveness of REDD+ can 
be questioned even further in terms of its capacity to offer solutions to rural populations. 
6.3. Material and methods  
6.3.1. Study sites 
Three sites, located in three different regions, were selected for this study. The regions are all 
situated in the humid forest zones of Cameroon and represent three levels of deforestation. They 
also differ in culture, political history and types of prevailing forestry activities. The regions are: 
(1) Tinto in the South West Region; (2) Ngoyla in the East Region; and (3) Ngonga - Kopongo in 
forest management unit (UFA) n° 07002 Edea in the Littoral Region. They fully reflect the bi-
cultural nature of the country. Detailed characteristics of the target study areas, including a map, 
is provided in chapter 3, section 3.1.3. 
131 
 
6.3.2. Research process, methods of data collection and analysis 
Secondary and primary data for this study were collected in two research runs. Secondary data 
were derived from a review of documents relating to the evolution of the major forestry laws in 
the country that led to the drafting of the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law, the 1994 Law itself 
and its Decree of application, and recent publications on REDD+ debates. A substantial 
proportion of the secondary data was assembled from existing literature on forestry laws in the 
English and French Cameroons. Archives were consulted, particularly those on various 
community forests and on the NGOs that facilitated their acquisition by local forest communities. 
Further, an internet search was conducted using key words such as community rights, forestry 
tenure, REDD+ safeguards, conflicts in natural-resource management, etc. The documents 
consulted provided invaluable information on statutory and customary land tenure, ownership 
and property rights, the devolution of the State from management, climate change and REDD+. 
Maps and satellite images of the study sites served as secondary sources of data.  
Primary data was collected firstly through questionnaires. The target population consisted of key 
informants and members of community-based organizations living near community forests. The 
latter were selected according to predefined criteria such as (i) proximity to forest reserves; (ii) 
involvement in community forestry; and (iii) knowledge on community rights issues.  
During the research implementation, focus group discussions were held with nine common 
initiative groups (CIGs) of crop farmers, hunters, fishermen and gatherers of non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs), together with interviews with seven key informants, three of whom were 
conservators working with different conservation NGOs identified with the aid of questionnaires, 
while the other four were farmers. In total, three focus groups were held in each of the three study 
sites (in Zoulabot, Lelene and Lamson, in the East, with 6, 8 and 5 participants, respectively; in 
Ngonga, Kopongo and BOPO in the Littoral with 9, 7 and 6 participants, respectively and in 
Tinto-Mbu, Tinto-Kerieh and Tinto-Wire in the South West with 8, 7 and 10 participants, 
respectively). In total, 66 participants (10 women and 56 men) were involved (table 6.1).  
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Table 6.1. Focus group design for investigated forest communities organized in Common Initative Groups 
(CIGs) 
Region   Target village 
CIGs  
Number of 
FGD meetings 
Number of participants 
Sites Female Male Total 
East  
Ngoyla 
Zoulabot 1 0 5 6 
Lelene 1 2 6 8 
Lamson 1 1 4 5 
 
Littoral 
Edea 
Ngonga 2 2 7 9 
Kopongo 2 2 5 7 
Bopo 2 0 6 6 
 
South 
West/ 
Tinto 
Tinto-Mbu 1 1 6 8 
Tinto-Kerieh 1 0 7 7 
Tinto-Wire 1 2 8 10 
9 12 10 56 66 
 
Before starting, participants were asked to evaluate the content of a number of legal instruments 
and to identify legal omissions, appealing clauses as well as conflicting provisions. At the end, 
aspects of the climate-change mitigation were explained to them, along with the role of forests 
and trees in stocking carbon at the landscape level. The focus group discussions were intended to 
gain additional insights for the analyses of the information found in the current literature. 
Qualitative data gathered from the focus group discussions would allow triangulation and 
validation of complementary information gathered from partner NGOs intervening in the study 
sites. The tools used in primary data collection were further designed to elicit information on the 
extent of devolution of government power over forest management. To this effect, legal 
instruments on forestry were reviewed and information collated as appropriate.  
In all, 11 legislation and policy texts that have relevance to tenure rights and climate change were 
reviewed during the study. They are: (1) the constitution of the Republic of Cameroon; (2) 
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan; (3) the Forestry, Wildlife and Fisheries Law 
(Law No. 94-01 of 20 January 1994); (4) the National Environmental Management Plan (1996); 
(5) the Community Based Natural Resources Management Act of 1992. The latter was targeted as 
it provides the framework for community participation in natural-resource management through 
the formation of viable tax-free common initiative groups. Of particular relevance are procedures 
for ownership of community forests. Many other decrees and ordinances were analysed, amongst 
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which (6) the recently promulgated Law No 2011/008 of 6 May 2011 on orientation for the 
management and sustainable territorial development of Cameroon; (7) the Land use and Land 
Tenure Act of 1974 (Law No. 74-1); (8) the Environmental Management Law No. 96/12 of 1996; 
(9) Decree N°92/455/PM of 23/11/1992 that provides for AA; (10) the Law No. 90/053 of 
19/12/1990 on associations; and (11) decree N°2009/410 of 10-12-2009 creating a National 
observatory for Climate change in Cameroon). 
During the FGD the awareness of forest-dwelling populations on, and their familiarity with, the 
1994 Forestry Law was investigated. They were asked to evaluate whether there was any 
significant difference between this recent and previous laws and whether local populations had 
been consulted before drafting the new law, their involvement in the implementation of the law, 
their opinion on the sizes of their CFs, alternative livelihood activities, benefit sharing from 
forestry activities, conflicts between the different stakeholders and perceptions on the links 
between rights and climate change.  
Interviews with seven forestry agents intended to identify whether they have copies of the 1994 
Forestry Law and how far they understand its content. They were asked to identify flaws in the 
law and ensuing abuses. The level of discussion between them and local communities was 
assessed, as well as the difficulties they encounter in the course of implementing the laws and 
policies regulating land and forest tenure in the country. Finally, they were questioned about the 
complementary role played by the modern and traditional tenure systems and issues of alternative 
livelihood and benefit sharing.  
On-the-spot observation of conflict sites was carried out. A GPS was used to take 33 waypoints 
and to track around some conflict areas in the study sites. Photographs were also taken in the 
field to document current conflicts. The information obtained by the field observations, 
interviews and focus group discussions enabled us to draw maps of existing conflicts in the study 
sites. Qualitative data were processed through simple policy content analysis (See figure 3.5. in 
chapter 3). Maps were designed using Map Info software and diagrams drawn using Microsoft 
PowerPoint. Preliminary findings were discussed with several relevant stakeholders, including 
community leaders and traditional rulers on the ground. At the end of our research, comments 
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from policy makers and shapers were obtained during the findings validation workshop held in 
the Yaoundé National Assembly House, November 8th 2011. 
6.4. Results and discussions 
6.4.1. Poor law application and interpretation: flaws and benefit-sharing distortion 
The interviews and focus group discussions revealed that, in the three study sites, neither local 
populations nor officials enforcing the forestry law and its Decree of Application possessed any 
printed copies of the said legal instrument. During participatory analysis of forest-law content in 
the three sites, participants of the focus group discussion could instantly identify some inherent 
flaws: (a) absence of a clear definition of those with rights to own a community forest; (b) non-
recognition of customary rights in terms of forest classification; (c) legal marginalisation of 
indigenous peoples; and (d) conflicting legal provisions in SMPs and Articles of Associations. 
Furthermore, our investigation found that the creation of the “COVAREF”, (“Comité de 
Valorisation des Resources Fauniques”, a French acronym for the body managing funds from 
fauna resources for local development) was effective in only one out of the three study sites, 
namely Ngoyla in the East Region.  
During interviews, as well as during focus group discussions, communities identified, with a high 
degree of precision and clarity, four legal flaws relating to community-based forests. These are (i) 
the limited lifespan of the community forest (25 years); (ii) the exclusion of potential 
stakeholders from the community forest; (iii) the inadequate sizes of community forests; and (iv) 
the divestment of their rights to sub-soil resources and limitation of use rights to NTFPs. This 
confirms findings reported by researchers who have previously attempted to understand 
competing claims and policy contestation in the community forestry sector in Cameroon (Forster, 
1996; Tumnde, 2001; MINEF and GTZ 2004; Singer, 2004; Julve et al., 2007; Enchaw, 2009). 
Nevertheless, our assessments discovered that despite legal flaws, the laws contain some 
appealing clauses, which are poorly implemented (disrespect for rights of use).   
The investigation furthermore revealed three additional legal flaws. These are located more at the 
national level, beyond the study sites: (1) absence of loyalties for communities in petroleum 
production areas; (2) 10% annual forestry loyalties only to those communities where logging 
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activities take place; and (3) non-compulsory reforestation and a three-year period of grace for 
uncontrolled timber exploitation by logging companies. Respondents cited articles of the 1994 
forestry law, which prohibit the individual sale of NTFPs. They also pointed out Article 105 of 
the same instrument alleging that it provides no direct allocation of safari funds to local 
development. Respondents equally alleged that both simplified management plans and articles of 
association create conflicts at the boundaries of a community forest and that crop destruction by 
protected wildlife causes conflicts. These conflicting legal provisions often instigate conservation 
NGOs/forest guards to abuse the rights of local populations, indigenous people and women, who 
may also become marginalised in the process.   
Moreover, focus group discussions revealed important positive elements within the 1994 Forestry 
Law. They showed that: (1) community forests have, to some extent, increased participation by 
smallholder farmers in village resource management. Here, forest group dynamics brought about 
issues of membership, adhesion and collective discussions on access and use rights which were 
simply denied previously; (2) some income-generating activities and agroforestry initiatives were 
initiated by support organizations, thus contributing to community livelihood improvements; (3) 
information sharing on CFM strategies and capacity building are regularly ensured through 
village committees and technical support services; and (4) the legal instruments enacted by the 
Government raised the hope by the communities that the poor governance might be mitigated via 
these very instruments. This mostly concerns corruption in the sector, the power struggle over 
forest resources and the opacity in benefit allocation. 
During the study, however, participants and interviewees strongly affirmed the inappropriateness 
and ineffectiveness of the channels (print, audio-visual and personal discussions) through which 
conservation NGOs and/or forestry administration personnel had been passing out information to 
local populations (farmers, hunters, fishermen, custodians of indigenous knowledge and women). 
In an attempt to evolve from the bequeathed colonial tenure system to that of an independent 
State, the Government of Cameroon enacted a battery of legal instruments (the Land Tenure 
Code of 1963; the Decree of 1964 that prohibited native communities from registering their land 
titles; the Law of 7/7/1966 that abolished prior authentication; the Forestry Ordinance of 22 May 
1974 that introduced the land title registration, the Forestry and Wildlife Law N° 94/01 of 1994 
that provides for community forest acquisition by local communities; Law N°92/006 of 14/8/92 
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and Decree N°92/455/PM of 23/11/1992 that provide for AA). These initiatives dilute, rather 
than stimulate, the endogenous customary tenure.  
From the findings, it was noted that, after more than 30 years under the modern law, land tenure 
insecurity in Cameroon has increased. This confirms a similar conclusion by Ngwasiri in 2001 in 
his assessment on tenure legacies and legislation in Cameroon. The situation has resulted in 
growing conflicts, continuous community rights erosion, and galloping deforestation and forest 
degradation, as also noted by Bellassen and Gitz (2008) and recently by Awono et al. (2014). All 
these authors argued that deforestation in Cameroon is very high. It is clear that communities 
kept their normal approaches of shifting cultivation and fuelwood harvesting regardless of the 
regulations put in place, causing irreversible damage to the forest integrity and biodiversity. This 
situation calls for further attention on more concerted local partnership arrangements in relation 
to forest management strategies, especially in the current context of population growth, which is 
being exacerbated by the impacts of climate change on traditional land-use options in tropical 
landscapes.  
 
6.4.2. Forest tenure-based conflicts and governance implications 
It was found that the legal classification in Cameroon into permanent and non-permanent forests 
has ignored customary forest regulations. This brought severe tenure threats between local 
communities and State conservation agencies, as well as to natural ecosystems hosting valuable 
biodiversity. Three types of conflict were identified during this study (Fig.6.2.):  
i) vertical conflicts involving local communities and conservators;  
ii) horizontal conflicts  involving CFM leaders versus non-member local users (this 
type was mostly reported in Tinto CF); and finally  
iii) verti-horizontal conflicts where there is conflict between humans and wildlife 
through animal encroachment (reported around the Tinto wildlife sanctuary).   
Maps generated based on field data are presented below and provide further details on where 
current issues are located in study sites.  
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Figure 6.2. Relationships and type of existing conflict as perceived around community forests 
Figure 6.3 shows the spatial distribution of the conflicts emanating from five areas in, and 
adjacent to, Tinto community forest, while Figure 6.4 illustrates the numerous conflict sites 
between Edea Technopole and the local communities of Ngonga, Kopongo and Poutloloma 
villages.  
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.  
Figure 6.3. Map of Tinto Community Forest showing spatial distribution of conflict areas  
Source: Adapted from the Participatory map of Tinto Community Forest, 2009 and fieldwork, 2010. 
 
During fieldwork, the Civil Administrator in Tinto alleged that conflicts erupted between 
members of Tinto FMI and young people from Tinto-Wire in parts of compartment I, when the 
latter were summoned to court for farming encroachment even though their revised simplified 
management plans devolved such use rights. In these plans, it is stated that crop farming, fishing, 
hunting, NTFP collection and other activities are allowed in the community forests. A visit to the 
community forests showed that farms were only allowed beyond the community forest’s confines 
and that any form of encroachment was a source of conflict. Local fishermen were denied fishing 
rights in River Manyu in the northern limit of the community forest. In Ngoyla, on the contrary, it 
was noted that a large portion of the community forest was under cocoa cultivation, as specified 
in its simplified management plan. It was, however, observed that the confiscation of game, 
hunting and fishing equipment resulted in more conflicts than solutions at local level.  
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Source: Cameroon Ecology (2008) and fieldwork 14-20 October 2010 
 
Figure 6.4. Map of UFA 07002 showing spatial distribution of conflict areas 
  
Deforestation in 
Edea Technopole 
Conflicts due to poor classification of 
permanent forest (loss of tenure rights)  
Conflicts due to resource exploitation 
Conflicts due to refusal of 
rights to a CF  
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In the west of the UFA, a powerful political elite member was allowed to develop an oil palm 
plantation for commercial purposes, while the rest of the local people are denied settlement rights 
in their ancestral land within the UFA. Communities are instead requested to relocate and resettle 
elsewhere. The implication was an increase in unhealthy relations between local communities and 
forest administration. The law exacerbated this tension, as it also prevents smallholder farmers 
from carrying out livelihood activities in the UFA. In this regard, the Edea Technopole authority 
refers to current laws to prevent local populations from gathering even dead tree trunks for 
firewood use. The wood could have solved their fuelwood problems, at least for a time, and 
would have reduced fuelwood pressure on nearby forests over that period.  
The forestry administration argues that, by law, these communities lost access rights to the forest 
resources and the land of their ancestors simply because the State, with the complicity of some 
elite members, carved out forest units and put their village communities within a permanent 
forest. Such an approach to tenure and resource-right issues has led to frustration and thereby 
forced local communities to violate the regulations. The result of community frustration was 
reported by informants. It concerns intensive poaching of crocodiles in the northeast of Ngonga 
and other animals along the Kopongo-Ngonga road axis since the creation of the UFA. Other 
illegal activities in this UFA include logging along the Kopongo-Ngonga road axis. 
Notwithstanding this, local people in this area strongly claim that their communities have owned 
that land and its resources for several centuries. According to our inquiries, local communities 
could claim that “as long as we have not been compensated and resettled as Article 26(1) of the 
1994 Forest law stipulates, we will continue to live there and carry out our normal livelihood 
activities”. This is probably the reason why crop farming was common in UFA 07002.  
This study highlighted that the local population continues to stay in its current location, and to 
cultivate in UFA 07002, particularly in parts of the contested community forests and along the 
Kopongo-Ngonga road axis, against the 1994 Law. The reported situation has the implication that 
tenure difficulties are becoming increasingly rampant around the UFA and other community 
forests, as in various other types of protected area in Cameroon. Similar situations of latent 
claims exist in several officially proclaimed forest units, as reported by several authors (Oyono et 
al., 2008; Foundjem-Tita, 2013; Awono et al., 2014) and are these also exacerbated by 
government agents’ behaviour. That is, when it comes to prevent communities accessing forest 
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resources, even for their survival, field foresters have often used physical force and verbal 
aggression, sometimes based on poor interpretation of the law and policy instruments 
promulgated in the forestry sector. 
It is argued that the implementation of REDD+ may suffer from the current legal systems, as well 
as foresters’ poor behaviour, especially with regards to corruption and local rights extortion. It is 
therefore necessary to adapt existing policy instruments to local community rights and claims. 
The adaptation could be done by capturing, within new instruments and regulatory frameworks, 
documented requests from communities and supporting partners working at grassroots level. 
Experience has shown that, in order to benefit from opportunities following policy reforms, the 
breakthrough will require accurate vigilance, effort and support from engaged stakeholders 
(Larson et al., 2010) to make them work for local people and REDD+ target forests. New 
opportunities in Cameroon will come from the strong political will to fully achieve the call for 
decentralisation and the current move on human rights (Oyono et al., 2008). Additionally, there 
has been a concrete effort from the government, since early 2009, to control powerful actors such 
as ministers and businessmen in the national fight against corruption, including that in the 
forestry sector. As noted by Rights and Resources Initiatives (RRI) in 2009, it appears that claims 
and property rights enforced in favour of both communities and State may reduce tenure 
insecurity perceptions while at the same time increasing a community sense of co-ownership of 
REDD+ initiatives.  
6.4.3. Stakeholders’ perceptions on law enforcement  
Our study found that some park conservators, MINFOF field staff and agents from conservation 
NGOs such as WWF, GTZ and Birdlife International, failed to understand that law enforcement 
and community participation in conservation are not compatible within the same communities, 
particularly when applied simultaneously. Attempts to combine law enforcement and community 
participation in conservation in the three study sites have rather led to severe conflicts between 
forest dwellers and conservationists. The consequence of unilateral law enforcement has been 
that local communities perceive conservation as a government affair serving the interests of 
conservators who mostly do not belong to the community. This perception ties in with the view 
that conservationists in the study sites, as well as in other parts of the country, utilise 
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conservation as a means to alleviate personal poverty. This assertion is corroborated by the fact 
that the individuals who work for projects that provide technical and financial assistance to local 
communities to allow them to acquire Community Forests (CFs) always tend to be at the centre 
of coveted arrangements when the projects phase out. As long as these projects are ongoing, these 
individuals usually earn huge salaries. When the projects phase out, and when they are given the 
opportunity to run the acquired CFs with funds generated from community forestry, they promote 
clientelism.  
This situation is compounded by the fact that even nature conservation agents do not own copies 
of the law and its text of application. Information furnished on the contents of the legal 
instruments is speculative, particularly as these laws are poorly disseminated and contain flaws, 
conflicting and inapplicable clauses. Law enforcers often lack an enabling environment for 
effective implementation and first strive to safeguard their personal interests. These limitations 
explain the suboptimal application of the 1994 FWL, 18 years after its promulgation, as 
confirmed by numerous abuses suffered by local people, conflicts between stakeholders, 
increasing poverty among forest dwellers, passive participation of local populations in 
conservation and a continuous, and even aggravated, depletion of the country’s forest ecosystems 
(REPAR, 2009).  
Between 1994 and 2009, more than 40 forest management-related texts have been developed 
with little change in the basic policy orientation. It is still strongly maintained by the government 
that the design of a project or its components and the identification of the desired project results 
and activities should be undertaken following the existing legal framework. Simplified 
Management Plans require a forest management institution (FMI) to have an elected forest 
management officer (FMO) who enters into contract with the Forestry Administration to head a 
community forest, whereas law N°92/006 of 14/8/92 and Decree N°92/455/PM of 23/11/1992 
that introduced the notion of delegate of a forest management institution warrants an appointed 
DFMI to lead the FMO. It may be considered that the issue is at the level of interpreting the legal 
instruments, since the Simple Management Plan talks of an FMO while the Article of Association 
talks of a DFMI. However, in practice, the two entities exercise the same functions. Interviewees 
revealed that FMOs were made to believe that they were mere secretaries, while DFMIs were 
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rather at the helm of the community forest. This distorted information may be based on an 
inadequate understanding of the contents of the legal instruments. The argument as to the 
interpretation of the law may give way to a new situation where state authority would like to 
maintain firm control over resources, thus confirming pseudo-devolution of the State.  
At this juncture, one can conclude that there are divergences in forest tenure perceptions by local 
communities, government foresters and migrants. The same was found in some other community 
forests, such as Bimbia Bonadikombo in the South West region of Cameroon (Minang et al., 
2007). Native populations think that the existing regulatory framework rather constitutes a kind 
of disincentive to maintain their active involvement in forest conservation, especially as those 
who benefit from local resources are outsiders who obtained government permits as forests users. 
This would indicate that in the forthcoming efforts to reduce deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD+), actor relationship trends are not very clear when it comes to equitable forest 
management at local level.  
6.4.4. Mitigation efforts and participation challenges 
Communities, government and other institutions will need to develop coherent rules and 
principles on how to design and implement Locally Adapted Mitigation Actions “LAMA” (Van 
Noordwijk et al., 2010). LAMA stands as a better governance option in order to achieve fewer 
emissions from land-use changes and increased carbon stocks, while at the same time continuing 
to ensure community livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Additionally, decision making 
and participation should be carefully tailored during REDD+ implementation, implying that it will 
be necessary to always factor in community needs and priorities. In the current multi-stakeholder 
arena which recognises the importance of trees and sustainable forest management in climate-
change mitigation mechanisms, concerns are emerging as to the need to rethink the rights and 
interests of local communities in the design of REDD+ (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 
2008, Galudra et al., 2011; Awono et ). 
Moreover, actors will need to deal with uncertainties about conflicts over resources in forest 
areas. It is anticipated that REDD+ schemes would upgrade natural capital value through inflow 
payments as rewards and compensation to local forest users. Natural regeneration through fallow 
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and agroforestry systems is likely to increase carbon stocks at landscape level across all pools 
(below- and above-ground biomass and litter). As indicated by Larson et al. (2010), at global 
level, the question of who has ownership over various carbon pools will soon become redundant 
because in Cameroon the state has retained most of the decision-making powers over land 
allocation and other resource uses. 
Opportunities exist to integrate smallholder priorities with national and international perspectives.  
For instance, ideas could derive from the recommendations by various COP syntheses in the form 
of declarations, such as those of Cancun, Durban, and Doha in 2012 Warsaw in 2013 (UNFCCC, 
2011; Fobissie et al., 2012; Awono et al., 2014). Another feasible linkage could be found in the 
acceptance of peoples’ rights to participation in environmental issues as a human right in the 
1998 Aarhus Convention of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
signed in Denmark (http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf). At national policy 
level, community rights could connect to the newly developed country policy documents such as 
the R-PP document (Readiness Preparation Proposal). The latter is, in turn, linked to the existing 
regulatory framework in the forestry sector and the Forest and Environmental Sector Plan 
(PSFE). More importantly, Cameroon’s forest sector strategy gives priority to poverty reduction 
as formulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper, which, in turn, is linked to the 
Millennium Development Goals (Tieguhong et al., 2012).  
6.5. Policy perspectives and implications 
Pseudo-devolution of the State in the area of forest management, and poor implementation of 
conservation laws in SSA, has led to a myriad of claims to forest and land resource access by 
local populations. In the three sites investigated, local populations’ perceptions evidenced legal 
abuses from the forest administration as well as conflicting provisions in current policy 
instruments. The government should take into account these profound desiderata if sustainable 
forest management in the REDD+ context is to be achieved. The suggested change from 
community claims would only be possible if there is the political will to promulgate adapted 
tenure and resource-right laws in the country. In this light, guidance on effective co-management 
approaches would be needed to guarantee participatory rural livelihoods and environmental 
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resilience. In order to gain long-lasting local support for REDD+, “participatory management” 
would mean that initiatives should be developed and implemented in a cooperative manner by all 
relevant stakeholders, rather than restricting participation to hearings and subsequent information 
campaigns on potential project consequences and expected benefits (Pistorius, 2009).  
Notwithstanding the claims of the local populations, the most-devolved statutory tenure may not 
serve any purpose if the latter is not enforced. Cases of non-enforcement of clear and devolved 
statutory tenure to local communities through access or ownership rights are rife in Cameroon 
and most of Africa. It should, however, be underscored here that strong tenure at community 
level has been presumed to impact positively on the socio-political and economic well-being of 
local communities and environmental resilience (Springate-Baginski, 2010). In our study areas, a 
similar positive impact could be recorded if their claims are taken into consideration in terms of:  
i) more viable community forest enterprises. For example, Mexico and some other 
countries such as Argentina, Tanzania, Nepal and Ethiopia refer to CF lessons. These 
countries have been making giant strides in this domain (Benneker and McCall, 2009; 
Skutsch and McCall, 2012) and they are examples to emulate. As Community Forest 
activities increased, local communities have learnt to run forest-related business 
collectively for the benefit of individual members. Forest communities are becoming 
wise in developing fair sharing mechanisms which would be largely beneficial to 
REDD+ in the case of carbon stock growth at community level. 
ii) improved livelihoods, well-being and poverty alleviation in practice (Pistorius, 2009). 
Under such conditions, there will be improved forest management and conservation 
because claims will be reduced as much as possible. With investment incentives, 
conflicts will diminish. 
iii) effective and efficient REDD+ schemes for carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
conservation alongside other co-benefits, such as water, suitable lands for sustainable 
agriculture and climate regulation (Pistorius, 2009).  
iv) enhancement of the effective functioning of community forests not only on paper but 
also on the ground across the rest of the country (Larson et al., 2010). 
v) Stable forest sector investment and economic growth at regional level. 
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6.6. Conclusion  
Overall, findings from this investigation show that negative and positive elements from the 
current legal frameworks can be mapped based on existing forestry management instruments to 
provide lessons to future REDD+ implementation initiatives. Unless social safeguards, such as 
community tenure rights and benefit sharing between all actors are integrated within the 
mechanism, efforts to reduce carbon emissions from land uses may result in similar failures to 
those currently observed in the community forestry sector in Cameroon. Communities conserving 
their forest lands may still not receive forestry royalties, while those in areas where drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation are perpetuated might just as well continue to receive 
forestry royalties.  
In many case studies, forest tenure rights were shown to be a strong incentive for enhancing the 
conservation of natural resources (Larson et al., 2010; Angelsen et al., 2011). Unfortunately, 
based on inadequate legal and policy instruments, after independency, governments in Africa 
have tended to promulgate tenure and resource-right laws that institutionalise State monopoly in 
natural-resource management while relegating local communities to the background. The 
implication is that perverse incentives may be given under these institutional arrangements. Local 
communities may not benefit from REDD+ funds as they will be misdirected by those with 
political and economic powers. In this way, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation will 
be maintained and enforced, thereby jeopardizing carbon sequestration and climate-change 
mitigation efforts.  
Undertaking forest tenure reforms prior to REDD+ is important to ensure that forest benefits 
under REDD+ schemes will not only go to facilitators or intermediaries and members of legal 
entities. This needs greater support from international governance bodies, who should pay more 
attention to the adequate application of principles, and may imply moving to a more 
comprehensive approach which could help to extend the multiple benefits to all relevant actors. 
Comprehensive includes exploring ways to Reduce Emissions across All Land Uses with tenure 
emphasis “REALU” (Van Noordwijk and Minang, 2009). More details on the REALU approach 
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are found in Bernard et al., 2013. To this end, a benefit distribution system needs to be developed 
in Cameroon, while the link between REDD+ and community rights needs greater visibility and 
clarity in the national policy documents currently under review. REDD+ could significantly 
benefit from instruments developed for community management and it could be even more 
effective when national programmes stimulate participation and strikingly clarify how payment 
flows would operate during the implementation of this national and results-based policy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In view of all this, what can we say? If God is for us, who can be against us” (Romans 8:31, 
GNB).  
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7. GENERAL DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
7.1. General discussion  
Within the framework of climate change policies and focus on community livelihoods, forest 
management issues have gained increasing importance worldwide. An analysis of forestry 
policies and institutions governing the developing REDD+ mechanism is vital to obtain insights 
into the gaps and deficiencies in conservation approaches and regulatory instruments currently 
used across actors and scales alongside local livelihoods challenges.  
There is a consensus among contemporary social scientists that implementation of REDD+ 
requires robust national policies which can effectively drive change in current land- and forest-
use decision-making processes at various scales (Blom et al., 2010; Skutsch and McCall, 2012; 
Hoang et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2013, Somorin et al., 2014). For REDD+ to deliver on its 
promises, there is a need for concerted institutional arrangements, as well as for appropriate 
incentives at smallholder and community levels, to ensure that equity and cost effectiveness can 
be met. The prevailing forest context shows that it is crucial to look at smallholders’ socio-
economic priorities and at deforestation drivers in order to determine feasible incentive packages, 
with improved governance principles, to achieve carbon emission reductions. We hold the 
premise that incentive-based forestry policy instruments, such as REDD+, can be designed in 
such a way that they are socially attractive and institutionally feasible through locally defined 
governance principles and policy reforms.  
The study was divided into 2 parts. Part one comprises chapters 1 to 3 providing background 
knowledge the problem statement, general literature and the methodological approach. Part two is 
made up of three empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6) ending with a brief general discussion, a 
conclusion and research perspectives. As for policy implications and stakeholders’ expectations 
for which solutions could not be found in the current literature, four specific research questions 
were posed: 
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1. What are the policy conditions and how can existing gaps and constraints be addressed to 
ensure the effectiveness of REDD+ at local level?  
2. What micro-level factors drive land-use change and how do these factors influence 
REDD+ design and implementation?  
3. Which institutional structure and policy solutions could act as a governance framework 
for local communities and other stakeholders to effectively implement REDD+ as a 
climate-change mitigation intervention? 
4. How are forest rights and the claims of local communities viewed by villagers, and how 
will the precedence of modern tenure rights over traditional rights affect the design and 
implementation of REDD+?  
The research was conducted through surveys and focus group discussions with smallholder 
farmers, the community associations and proponents’ institutions. Two survey forms were used 
(i) one at household level for information on the socio-economic situation and local responses to 
deforestation drivers and (ii) the other for the appraisal of institutions on REDD+ functions, pilot 
activities underway and participation. The findings and discussion are presented in the empirical 
chapters, but hereafter follows an overall discussion, considering each research question 
separately.  
 What are the policy conditions and how can existing gaps and constraints be addressed to 
ensure the effectiveness of REDD+ at local level? 
A detailed policy analysis is presented in chapter 2. The aim was to understand existing 
knowledge on conservation approaches and to identify policy deficiencies with regards to 
REDD+ implementation. The results of the review revealed several gaps and constraints within 
the Cameroon forestry sector, as follows: (1) inadequate decision-support tools in the community 
forest concept, (2) overnormative and complex approaches used in current forest management 
which would constraint the flow in REDD+ implementation, (3) more top-down, instead of 
bottom-up, approaches which intentionally cast aside community rights and smallholder farmers’ 
interests ; and (4) limited understanding of linkages between local community poverty 
determinants and trends in forest-cover loss.  
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Lessons learnt from current regulatory frameworks and national conservation strategies are 
mostly modalities to consider in designing REDD+. They are namely targeting, participation or 
stakeholder involvement, integrating the positive aspects of traditional land tenure and the 
opportunity within current policies and laws to integrate reforms. In the same vein, forest tenure 
conflicts need to be resolved through adequate policy reforms and the payments, or the forms of 
compensation, needs to be clarified and agreed upon before REDD+ is implemented. 
Cameroon has been engaged in international negotiations on climate change since 2005. In 2008, 
it signed the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union which was 
expected to come into force within two years. Although the RPP had been approved in early 
2013, up to now the country is still expected to clarify the structure of the REDD+ process, both 
among ministries and with other stakeholders (i.e. donors, civil society and the private sector). 
Between 2011 and 2012, there were around 29 REDD+ and REDD+-like activities identified at 
various stages of implementation in Cameroon (IUCN, 2011). These activities were found to 
have varying objectives, ranging from biodiversity conservation (and poverty alleviation) to the 
development of a national carbon accounting mechanism. Therefore, finding an optimum 
scenario to put REDD+ into practice at the local level has remained a challenge in the current 
climate change debate in Cameroon.  
Within the complex REDD+ system (Blom et al., 2010), it is clear that there is a need for climate 
policies to integrate the concerns of local communities and other actors, as well as attempting to 
mainstream conservation law enforcement in classified forest units. Sound policies would also 
provide the basis for technical issues to help monitor emissions reduction progress at local and 
sub-national level during REDD+ project implementation. Therefore, a better REDD+ structure 
has to diligently combine a soft regime of agreed regulatory enforcement and should be oriented 
towards actors’ priorities and flexibility. This would help to create an enabling environment to 
attract funding to meet key social and technical REDD+ requirements, such as design and 
implementation costs. With the rapid development of climate change debates in Cameroon, it is 
not irrational to think that public action will follow the international move to enact more policies 
and laws in line with available scientific knowledge and, more importantly, under the 
contingency of external aid.   
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 What micro-level factors drive land-use change and how could these factors influence 
REDD+ design and implementation?  
Local smallholder farmers’ perceptions, analysed in chapter four, showed that almost half of the 
farmers interviewed (48%) considered that the first driver for forest clearance is the creation of 
new cocoa plantations, followed by the need for more fertile lands for agricultural activities, such 
as cucumber growing and market gardening to cover basic needs. In the same chapter it is found 
that a large majority (72%) believed that the rate of deforestation will either remain as high as it 
currently is or will increase in forthcoming years. A logistic regression model revealed four 
significant variables influencing farmers’ decisions to clear forests. They are: age of HH head, 
membership of a farmers’ group, the proportion of non-farm income to total household income 
and restricted access to timber products. At the household level, these variables can be considered 
as predictors in the decision-making process to clear a forest. 
These findings are in line with information collected during the focus group discussions with key 
respondents in the target sites of Efoulan Municipality. It was demonstrated that, compared to 
young people, older people have a sound consideration for the environment and the services 
delivered by it, such as water/medicine provision and carbon sequestration. Increasing access to 
NTFPs in the natural forests, which are targeted by REDD+, could potentially guarantee an 
income source for the poor and marginalised people in forest areas. This conforms to the findings 
of Tieguhong et al. (2012) who observed that non-wood forest products are of great importance 
in terms of economic opportunities for the local population in Central Africa. Similar conclusions 
were found in Cameroon, Burkina Faso and some southern African countries (Ndoye and 
Tieguhong, 2004; Tiveau, 2008; Akinnifesi et al., 2008; Gyau et al., 2012). The challenge is that 
poor farmers generally lack the resources to invest in NTFP transformation to increase added 
value. This could be overcome by collective action through strong community-based 
organizations. We argue that such institutional set-ups may not only serve in marketing non-
wood forest products, but could also offer significant support in the implementation of REDD+ at 
local level.  
This arrangement would certainly work under a scenario of direct funding to forest communities, 
as is believed to be the case by some prominent scholars in developing countries (Dam and 
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Trines, 2011; Singh et al., 2011; Parasai, 2011; Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011). In line with 
observations highlighted earlier in the case of incentive packages in Kenya (Lager and Nyberg, 
2012; Neely and De Leeuw, 2012), our findings suggest that working directly with farmers is 
absolutely necessary. An a priori empowerment process for the local community is very 
important in the domain of group dynamics before, or alongside, the commencement of concrete 
REDD+ actions at country level. From the present discussion, we can derive that the socio-
economic-based empirical model described in this study has great potential to align poverty 
alleviation and climate-change mitigation, because it provides a clearer understanding on how 
deforestation could be at least slowed down. Compensation or payment options for REDD+ have 
been identified as critical in this study (chapter 2 and chapter 4) in order to design better 
structures for REDD+ schemes. Our investigation showed that forest communities would prefer a 
combination of cash payments and non-cash returns in terms of capacity-building and 
agroforestry innovations. This is consistent with the conclusions of Neely and De Leeuw (2012) 
who remarked that under REDD+, given their current low value, carbon credits would serve only 
as “icing on the cake”. In the same vein, many authors have argued that increased productivity 
can be a prominent incentive, together with appropriate capacity development and livelihood 
services (ICRAF, 2010; Gockowski and Van Asten, 2012; Neely and De Leeuw, 2012). This 
highlights another important need to develop an institutional framework at national level to fund 
and implement sustainable strategies for the intensification of mitigation, as also noted by 
Gockowski and Van Asten (2012).  
Of course, when discussing intensification, agroforestry as an integrative land use should be 
highlighted, as proven by several international institutions, such as the World Agroforestry 
Centre (ICRAF), the Center for International Forest Research (CIFOR) and IITA (International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture). To this end, Semroc et al. (2012) asserted that successful 
smallholder agroforestry carbon projects require a sound understanding of the local, social, 
economic and political context to ensure that constraints from land tenure, institutional 
weaknesses, incentive mechanisms and lack of technical capacity can be resolved over time. The 
payment options identified confirm the need to establish a multi-dimensional instrument built on 
PES schemes to stimulate forest stewards to comply with CER goals. As reported from Indonesia 
(Leimona, 2010), Latin America (Larson et al., 2010), and recently echoed by Bernard et 
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al.(2013), conditional tenure and agroforestry technologies stand as opportunities to be included 
within policy packages in order to complement approaches already underway in Cameroon to 
promote carbon-stock conservation.  
These findings contrast with the reality of the carbon emissions reduction schemes that are built 
solely on fluid cash flows in a poor forest context (Havemann, 2012). Other cases have recently 
reported that REDD+ pilot projects in Peru, Uganda, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malawi paid cash to 
local stakeholders through carbon credit bonds using conditional contracts (Peskett et al., 2011; 
Hajek et al., 2011; Hoang et al., 2012; Ajayi et al., 2012). Within this optional structure, there 
may be, at a given time, an additional risk associated with contract agreements and performance 
monitoring. For example, in committing to sequestrate or to stock a certain carbon tonnage, 
communities may divert their upgraded income to other “less important” expenditures. At the 
start, such agents would become more vulnerable to household food insecurity. Subsequently, 
they may break contract agreements at some point because of a lack of alternative livelihood 
options.  
Furthermore, another risk lies in the fact that the value of carbon credits may continue to decrease 
due to the ongoing global economic crisis that has also hit less-developed countries, in such a 
way that they may not be able to pursue the attainment of newly agreed Sustainable Development 
Goals (SGD). Scholars have observed that a change in both livelihoods and natural values at 
landscape level is linked more to external economic drivers than to small-scale interventions 
(Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011; Sayer et al. 2012). This illustrates the potential risk, as alluded to 
above.  
For REDD+ to be effective, it may be very important to ascertain whether there is any potential 
conflict between economic incentives and carbon stock conservation. There are assumptions that 
economic incentives may lead to increased deforestation and hence carbon stock erosion (Neely 
and De Leeuw, 2012). Meanwhile, focusing on CER within a given landscape can decrease the 
level of incentives from which local stakeholders can benefit. In a multiplicity of land uses, we 
argue that management options and choices should be efficiently tailored to strike a balance 
between economic incentives and carbon stocks. Otherwise, the risk would be to promote greater 
division, which would lead to increased carbon emissions instead. In an attempt to assess 
155 
 
challenges facing agricultural access to carbon markets, De Pinto et al. (2012) noted that financial 
incentives might have to compensate for the risks associated with the adoption of mitigation 
practices. As such, the contracts must reflect the scale of various risks on the possibility for 
defaulting on contractual obligations.  
Thus, one of the few avenues to minimise the above risks would be to promote pro-poor 
livelihood options, such as quick-yielding innovations within an intensified agroforestry 
framework. The latter would serve as a shock-absorber in the case of lower income for the rural 
poor in the context of strict carbon emissions reduction. This gives the combined incentive option 
suggested by our study an edge over the classic incentive options (cash or non-cash), although its 
results may vary from landscape to landscape depending on the poverty levels of households and 
the institutional layouts. 
 
 What institutional structure and policy solutions could act as a governance framework for 
local communities and other stakeholders to effectively implement REDD+ as a climate-
change mitigation intervention? 
As highlighted in chapter 5, key governance factors directly pertinent to REDD+ implementation 
in the country have been identified. They deal with participation, power relations, synergy among 
actors, access to strategic information and coordination capacity. The analysis of REDD+-related 
activities showed that there has been a remarkable progress in stakeholders’ involvement in the 
implementation process (IUCN, 2011; MINEPDED, 2012; Fobissie et al., 2012; Awono et al., 
2013). However, the scale concept of the reported involvement may remain crucial at this mid-
stage of REDD+ piloting. This is because current understanding of future prospects for 
institutional synergies is limited as unprecedented political turbulence may occur at any time.  
During our research, it was observed that ongoing interventions in the landscape mostly use 
sectoral approaches. The governance model developed provides a room towards transformational 
changes within the designed institutional arrangement to implement REDD+. Opportunities for 
such institutional and behavioural change exist in Cameroon. REDD+ may actually benefit from 
ongoing multi-sectoral programs, such as the Forest and Environment Sector Program (PSFE), 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the new PRSP “Poverty Reduction 
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Strategy Paper” for Cameroon. These are viewed as the main vehicles to implement a 
comprehensive sustainable development framework nationwide. They are the long-term 
strategies of Cameroon’s development agenda, involving all ministerial departments under the 
leadership of the central government with the aim of tackling poverty and inequality in the 
country.  
In terms of inclusivness, the ongoing REDD+ process in Cameroon, while still incomplete, 
appears not to have identified a particular actor category as of high importance in forest 
management. Indeed, our findings indicated an absence of logging companies, mining companies 
and agro-industries. The findings are in line with those of several scholars who previously 
analysed forestry governance systems under REDD+ processes (Angelsen, 2008; Oyono et al., 
2008; Galudra et al., 2011; Guariguata et al., 2012; Hoang et al., 2012; Purnomo et al., 2012; 
Awono et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2013). The above authors asserted that the forestry 
governance systems in tropical forest countries had been characterised mostly by poor 
coordination and limited inclusivness. Previously, some reports highlighted that there are 
alarming gaps in the local forestry systems of Cameroon, which under REDD+, need particular 
attention (IUCN, 2011; Ngendakumana et al., 2011; MINEPDED, 2012).  
We wondered what could be the reason behind the situation in Cameroon. Meanwhile, these 
boundary actors, which are currently not included in the process, are widely believed to constitute 
both threats and opportunities for fostering REDD+ initiatives in forest management systems 
(Bellasen and Gitz, 2008; Blom et al., 2010). They are threats in terms of externality-based 
emission risks and opportunities when one considers the possible establishment of certification 
systems to halt illegal logging, uncontrolled mining and less environmentally-friendly 
agricultural production systems. These form part of best practice, with an empirical potential to 
reduce deforestation. Additionally, several agro-industries operating in Cameroon, such as 
HEVECAM, SOCAPALM, or CDC-Demonte to name but a few, could be sources of funding 
through PES schemes to complement the REDD+ mechanism during its operational stages. 
Engaging them could be operationalized through “business case meetings” combined with policy 
measures based on the “corporate social responsibility” concept. Finally, the most important 
challenge in this case is the development of a concept that guides all actors’ involvement and 
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allows inter-relationship management from the design to the implementation phase of the REDD+ 
cycle.  
We recommend and reaffirm the need to attentively build strong partnerships with structured 
community-based organizations within the current REDD+ process at country level. This locally 
based synergy would be one of only a few effective approaches to increase the likelihood of 
success of REDD+ in Cameroon. A concern from this perspective for the country is the low 
interest of the non-forest sector in climate change debates, despite the fact that it has been proven 
that in the long term, their activities, strategies and plans will be influenced by climate variability. 
The latter is being exacerbated by these sector groups’ actions and practices, such as illegal 
logging, mining and agricultural plantations within forest blocks (Ngendakumana et al., 2011). 
This calls for an inclusive intervention model, the development of which was one of the 
objectives addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis. Our empirical model did not find a significant 
relationship between deforestation and “gender” and could not deal with the issues of benefit-
sharing linked to gender. However, we strongly suggest an in-depth study which would consider 
the gender attribute from the perspective of REDD+, with a particular focus on benefit 
distribution mechanisms. A similar approach has been taken in countries such as Vietnam and 
Indonesia (Hoang et al., 2012).  
 How are forest related community rights and claims viewed by villagers and how will the 
precedence of modern tenure rights over traditional rights affect the design and 
implementation of REDD+?  
Tenure rights are complex and when considering forest communities, they can be viewed as 
“bundles of rights”. They include the ability to access, withdraw, manage, exclude and alienate a 
resource. It was found in this study (chapter 6) that the legal classification in Cameroon into 
permanent and non-permanent forests has ignored customary forest regulations. This has led to 
severe threats between local communities and State conservation agencies, as well as to natural 
ecosystems hosting valuable biodiversity. During participatory analysis of the content of the 
Cameroon Forestry and Wildlife law in the three sites, participants in large group discussions 
identified some inherent flaws in the laws as follows: (a) absence of a clear definition of those 
with rights to own a CF; (b) non-recognition of customary rights in terms of forest classification; 
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(c) legal marginalisation of indigenous peoples; and (d) conflicting legal provisions in SMPs and 
Articles of Associations (AA). Furthermore, our investigation found that the creation of the 
“COVAREF”, (“Comité de Valorisation des Resources Fauniques”, a French acronym for the 
body managing funds for local development from fauna resources) was only effective in one out 
of the three study sites, namely Ngoyla in the East Region.  
During interviews, as well as during focus group discussions, informants and communities 
identified four community forest-based legal flaws with a high degree of precision and clarity. 
These are (i) the limited lifespan of the community forests (25 years); (ii) the exclusion of 
potential stakeholders from community forest management; (iii) the inadequate sizes of CFs; and 
(iv) the divestment of stakeholder rights to sub-soil resources and limitations on rights of use for 
NTFPs. This confirms findings reported by researchers who previously attempted to understand 
competing claims and policy contestation within the community forestry sector in Cameroon 
(Forster, 1996; Tumnde, 2001; MINEF and GTZ 2004; Singer, 2004; Julve et al., 2007; Enchaw, 
2009). Nevertheless, our assessments discovered that, despite legal flaws, the laws contain some 
appealing clauses, which were poorly implemented (disrespect of use rights).  
From the rural development perspective, the dominant debate is more about poverty and tenure 
rights than themes such as REDD+ or climate change, especially in our study sites which are 
remote forest areas. Some smallholder farmers have even voiced the fear of having REDD+ as an 
additional internationally disguised way to reinforce the secular dominion over natural resources 
in the country. The reason may be the fact that, although massive in scale, public consultations 
were too evasive, broad and, to some extent, placed under sole government control. Therefore, 
we strongly suggest that the central government should foster fair active partnership, instead of 
the “dominance” type of leadership style currently observed in state agent services. The first step 
would to enact national policies and measures that can convincingly have a positive impact on 
forest change and tenure at low cost. Such policy instruments may include, but should not be 
limited to, supporting effective community forestry, workable devolution systems to local 
communities, funding agroforestry for rural livelihoods and reforestation of degraded areas and 
engaging a public budget to promote intensification of smallholding agriculture.  
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According to the UNFCCC conference of parties in 2010 (Decision 1/16)  a list of international 
standards is set for special safeguards in any REDD+ implementation activity. Hence, parties are 
expected to promote and support principles and conditions that respect human rights, address 
land tenure issues, forest governance and benefit sharing. The same applies to the engagement of 
stakeholders, with effective participation of local communities. As reported by Fobissie et al. 
(2012), Cameroon is also required to meet most of the above conditions, which are linked to the 
creation of an enabling policy environment for timely emission reduction deliverables. 
It is crucial to safeguard forestry rights and the active participation of local communities 
throughout the appropriate design and implementation of REDD+ projects in southern Cameroon. 
Informants’ perceptions and large focus group discussions during our assessment (chapter 6) 
indicated that there had been only a limited number of consultations since the REDD+ inception. 
This may be partially explained by the limited financial means, as the government was solely 
funding the process with little or no external support. Through observations and interactions with 
key actors, we found that, at site level, the legitimacy of “stakeholder representation” was 
questionable, whereas the choice of a representative to speak on behalf of vulnerable 
communities in the REDD+ forums was uncertain. Engaging local stakeholders at an early stage 
in developing conditional carbon stock schemes, such as REDD+, may increase the likelihood of 
success.  
Both Skutsch et al. (2011) and Corbera and Schroeder (2011) came to the same conclusions with 
regard to the role of community forest management in REDD+. These authors respectively 
advocate the need to involve forest communities in the whole REDD+ process, including the issue 
of carbon credit ownership, tenure rights and MRV, irrespective of the prevailing skepticism 
about local agents’ capacity. This suggests that the implementation of REDD+ should, from a 
local perspective, be based on increased community willingness to get involved. This is in line 
with the findings of some scholars who echoed that the design of REDD+ should be flexible and 
provide information on basic details about how it works at local levels, the expected benefits and 
possible implications (Pesket et al., 2008; Blom et al., 2010; Skutsch and McCall, 2012; Awono 
et al., 2013). By so doing, this could help to improve community involvement in the entire 
REDD+ process at the same time minimising risks of forest cover loss through diverse 
athropogenic activities.  
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Additionally, during this study, discussions held with key technical and expert proponents led us 
to understand that it may be far from trivial for policy makers and leading government agents to 
make REDD+ work successfully across scales and actors’ interests. Hence, we anticipate the 
challenge on three scales:  
First, the challenge for local communities is to keep pace with the evolving dynamics of financial 
mechanisms that are being designed to slow down deforestation, most of the time without their 
consent. Nonetheless, community support services ought to be able to transform the suggested 
schemes into opportunities to improve livelihoods in a sustainable environment. By so doing, 
other co-benefits such as clean water, NTFPs and fertile croplands would remain accessible for 
future generations. The next challenge in this regard is to be addressed by scientists and 
international support services in the REDD+ process. They actually have to develop workable and 
inclusive approaches that are cost-effective, with the potential to reinforce social safeguards and 
ensure forest resource management from a long-term perspective. Finally, the REDD+-related 
challenge for policy makers and grassroots initiative managers is to identify and explore cases 
where synergies can exist between local communities and conservationists to set guiding 
standards. In addition to this, they need to be sensitive and cautious about the needs and interests 
of engaged actors and then focus policy efforts on institutional and behavioural changes towards 
improved governance and significant socio-economic benefits for local communities.  
Although not a panacea, at this early stage of learning and redesigning, it is clear that a step-by-
step application of the suggested institutional framework, combined with the empirical socio-
economic design model, could lead to the following governance solutions to mitigate threats and 
suspicions relating to REDD+:  
 greater cohesion among forested landscape users and managers as linkages could bridge 
their multiple perspectives; 
 possible compromise on rules and laws to govern and shape carbon emission reduction 
and carbon stock conservation schemes from the local perspective upwards;  
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 negotiated and agreed land-use changes derived from new collaborative work, whereby 
these changes could be incorporated into local and national mitigation and adaptation 
plans; 
 continuous and strong trust built via open discussion and a gradual common 
understanding of the environmental benefits of REDD+ across scales; 
 effective intra- and cross-sectoral institutional arrangements which regularly address key 
stakes at community level in accordance with set rules and responsibilities for all actors. 
This stands as an answer to the top-down approach which is highlighted in international 
and national REDD+ debates; 
 socially and environmentally desirable land-use decisions in line with the required 
performance of REDD+; and 
 forest cover increase in order to finally reverse deforestation, biodiversity loss and carbon 
stock erosion. 
Landscape attribute variations across regions may be a distinctive issue in materialising the above 
solutions, depending on poverty levels, other economic opportunities, the sensitivity of local 
communities to climate change issues, disposition of rights claims and other factors. The 
rationale for having such incentives and governance structures, as designed in this study, is that 
the financial mechanism of REDD+ may help to establish feasible options, including a direct 
funding scenario to forest stewards. This conforms with the current thinking that REDD+ has the 
potential to provide a new way forward for tropical forest conservation and management (Blom 
et al., 2010; Angelsen et al., 2012; Minang and van Noordwijk, 2012). However, some 
environmental activists have concerns about intermediate agencies’ interests which could 
undermine local actors’ perceptions and forest value. Emphasis is being placed on ensuring that 
REDD+ is more pro-poor, with support systems for local institutions and the use of “soft 
enforcement” alongside measures to improve equity and reduce the risks of the perverse effects 
of REDD+ on rural livelihoods (Angelsen et al., 2012). Although the design of REDD+ has been 
complicated by the complexity of the previous REDD architecture, our findings have hopefully 
162 
 
laid a strong baseline for actual REDD+ implementation in relation to the role of local 
communities, institutional logics and actor relationships.  
7.2. Validity and robustness of research findings with link to posed hypothesis  
This research has focused on relatively poor communities with few economic opportunities in the 
southern forest zone of Cameroon. The findings derived from such a large sample, combined 
with analysis beyond target sites, portray significant levels of salience, credibility and legitimacy 
to improve the building blocks of REDD+. One might expect to find similar results in most of the 
other forest landscapes of Cameroon. The conclusion could therefore easily be extrapolated to the 
rest of the forest regions in the country, as well as other tropical areas with similar forest-
management systems. The study builds mostly on qualitative practices, taking a social science 
perspective, but gives empirical evidence on how to incorporate social dimensions into the 
current climate change debate. The investigation process was part of the REDD+ feasibility 
assessments conducted in the country since 2010. We believe that our inquisitive approach during 
data collection, and workshops held with almost all REDD+ partners, has influenced and already 
started to feed into the process nationwide. Cameroon has an ambitious future plan to develop its 
national REDD+ strategy. Models developed and the tenure rights-based lessons learnt in 
southern Cameroon may serve to restructure the ongoing REDD+ process design and frame the 
forthcoming policy instruments. The findings also contribute to a better governance flow towards 
effective and equitable emissions reduction both locally and globally.  
These results are valid and consistent with the context and period that data was collected from 
2010 to 2011. Presently, the country has witnessed significant progress across described REDD+ 
functions and the target population perceptions identified. Conclusions under the present research 
accurately reflect available information in the Cameroon forestry arena over that period of time. 
Recent developments in the sub-region in the domain of the emission reduction business 
showcase rather more credibility for our formulated hypothesis and findings (see 
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2015/10/09/cameroons-redd-plans-critiqued-by-ngos-ahead-of-
world-bank-meeting/  ). We strongly believe that this research has brought about an accelerative 
thinking towards actions and transformational change for the recipient institutions. It constitutes a 
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partial confirmation of Hypothesis H2 of our thesis, which postulated that “the long-term success 
or failure of incentive mechanisms is conditional on the specific design of the institutional 
framework. Tenure rights, compensation options and the level of stakeholders’ involvement 
during the implementation processes should be taken critically into account”. Part of the 
validating findings is found in chapters 5 and 6. Hypothesis H1, in its part, stipulated that 
“current forestry policies and regulatory frameworks in Cameroon are not clear enough to govern 
REDD+; reforms and incentives are needed, learning from socio-economic challenges at local and 
national levels to change the behaviour of local communities towards deforestation”. This was 
fully confirmed by the results presented in chapters 4 and 5.  
7.3. Emerging policy actions from the study 
The overall purpose of this thesis was to determine local factors, as well as to describe 
institutional arrangements and social safeguards which could be used to restructure the current 
incentive and governance schemes aiming to effectively reduce carbon emissions in Efoulan and 
beyond. The findings presented here offer evidence and lessons for the growing REDD+ activity 
portfolios which are in the pilot phase and still need to be implemented. We offer a structural 
implementation model and a socio-economic model to optimise REDD+ effectiveness at local 
level. Discursive comparison revealed the potential of the models developed as guidelines for 
conservation and the climate-change policy reforms needed to improve the technical content of 
the ongoing debates in Cameroon and the Congo basin. The results demonstrated that during the 
REDD+ process, it is necessary to develop inter-sectoral approaches that link forest management 
and other land uses, such as agriculture, agroforestry, and community forestry, at a scale which 
allows a learning process for policy makers and shapers.  
As indicated in this study, risks and challenges exist with regard to this financial mechanism, 
such as ignoring tenure issues, inadequate local stakeholder participation, power struggles 
between governing agents and dominance by international organizations and past conservation 
approaches. We argue that, if not wisely tackled, they may lead to some social and biodiversity 
tragedies, just as in the case of the commons described earlier by Ostrom et al. (1999). This 
would therefore result in unsustainable forest resource use in the long run, leading to detrimental 
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carbon stock erosion, as such contrasting with the expected emission reduction performance 
through the originally designed REDD+ mechanism. From a scholarly perspective, expectations 
drawn from actors’ perceptions indicate that coping with REDD+ acceptability across scales will 
require four keys points (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1. Operationalization roadmap of key emerging policy issues from the doctoral work across all chapters 
Fundamental Policy 
issues 
Expected output Target action Accountable 
stakeholders 
i)Dealing with actors’ 
diverse interests and 
benefits  
Improved 
community rights 
and forest 
management for 
increased carbon 
stocks  
-Empower actors and 
strengthen coordination  
-Adopt FPIC principles and 
bottom up approach  (in line 
with UNFCCC’s decisions ) 
-Secure community rights to 
forest carbon 
Government 
CBOs and CSOs 
Private sector 
 Better stakeholder 
engagement in 
REDD+ process 
-Increase sensitization for 
actors active participation 
-Organise business case 
meetings  
-Develop information 
management system 
ii)Cultivating the 
monitoring and 
reporting culture 
Improved 
performance based 
payment for C-
stocks and credible  
REDD+ financing 
mechanisms 
-Accelerate knowledge based 
forest management for C-
Stocks 
-Promote farmer based REDD+ 
implementation schemes 
-Create carbon credit registry 
services 
Government  
Research services 
CBOS and CSOs 
Private sector 
iii)Developing 
equitable and 
sustainable policies 
Strong forest 
governance rules and 
institutions for 
REDD+ 
-Invest in and accelerate the 
forest policies reforms 
-Promote the application of 
rules towards an enabling 
environment for REDD+ 
-Develop strong forest research 
and conservation institutions   
Government  
Research services 
CBOS and CSOs 
 
iv)Setting up low-cost 
conflict management 
systems 
Improved 
legitimacy and fair 
benefit sharing 
options 
-Anticipate governance gaps 
and policy incoherencies 
-Develop fair benefit sharing 
options 
-Operationalize equitable 
compensation options  
Government  
Research services 
Private sector  
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(i) dealing with actors’ diverse interests and benefits. Here, the empirical and structural models 
designed in chapters 4 and 5 indicate socio-economic factors such as level of income, tenure 
security/land ownership, age and feeling included (participation) would definitely influence 
REDD+ effectiveness. As noted in our findings throughout the thesis (chapters 2, 4 and 5), 
REDD+ is a multi-stakeholder policy issue and therefore the coordination function will play a 
vital role, as also found in carbon projects in Uganda (Peskett et al., 2011). This could be done by 
promoting more landscape-based planning, alongside an appropriate information management 
system to maintain trust and cohesion throughout this complex mechanism. Furthermore, another 
way to tackle the diversity of REDD+ actors could be to establish a code of conduct and practice 
to guarantee quality delivery ahead of the MRV process.  
 (ii) cultivating the monitoring and reporting culture. From the conceptual framework in chapter 
3, MRV activity can be undertaken through collective intelligence and joint capacity building of 
actors along the REDD+ value chain. The community of practice now exists (though with some 
need to refine some tools) to guide data collection, including local knowledge on forest 
management and livelihoods. As discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, local participation is viewed as 
an essential element for communities to be able to credit and register sequestered carbon in their 
natural terrain. This also has the advantage of reducing operational costs (Skutch et al., 2011).  
(iii) developing equitable and sustainable climate change policies to adequately address the 
realities of land-use change with regard to local population concerns and expected emission 
reduction performance. This would need to catalyse strong partnerships across landscape 
complexities to deal with externalities, such as emission leakage, and also to push for increased 
funding from donors. Indeed, here we argue that improved policies and strong partnerships 
constitute additional arguments to channel conservation funding to complement REDD+ 
allocations for a country.  
(iv) setting up low-cost conflict management systems. In this case, several risks of conflict are 
reported, for which there are several reasons, such as unclear rights, diverse interests in the 
distribution of potential benefits and control in the forest sector. The communities surveyed have 
legitimately proven to be very expressive and sensitive about the forest tenure rights issues. 
166 
 
Additionally, concerns may arise with regard to funding allocations to support actors during the 
implementation process for the designed REDD+ projects. Critical conflicts may occur as a result 
of the power struggle to control more of the project finances or illegitimately expropriate some 
rights during REDD+ value chain implementation. In line with Ostrom’s theory on management 
of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), we suggest the development of a REDD+ 
management system which will be organized and governed by forest resource-dependent users. In 
fact, we believe this may have a significant implication for the effectiveness of REDD+ 
governance. The point is clear: engaging responsible community leadership as the legitimate and 
secular forest stewards in the emissions reduction regime would be the antidote to REDD+ 
failure.  
In this research, we developed a schematic model to shape relations between institutions, ideas 
and information use around two main building blocks, namely local livelihoods and land-use 
planning aspects across forest and non-forest sectors. Although this structure has slight 
similarities with the national framework found in the RPP of Cameroon, its uniqueness resides in 
the fact that it anticipates addressing the governance gaps identified by several reports in the local 
forestry administration of Cameroon. Forestry governance systems have been assessed by many 
scholars, who asserted that these systems are often characterised by poor coordination and limited 
inclusivity (Biermann, 2010; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011; Angelsen et al., 2012; Megevand et al., 
2013; Somorin et al., 2014). The effect of top-down approaches and excessive power within 
current forestry regulation activities, such as agriculture and Non Timber Forest Products 
(NTFP), are more attractive, but provide incentives or disincentives for forest conversion 
irrespective of the law.  
We arguably believe that applying the models developed from this thesis to the REDD+ 
implementation process may ascertain healthy relationships and discussions between local and 
sub-national level actors. Additionally, the models could lead to increased effectiveness in 
emission reduction and attainment of carbon stock goals, while accelerating the achievement of 
other co-benefits aimed at sustaining livelihoods and landscapes. However, for this to happen, the 
mechanism first requires more funding from international bodies and national gouvernments, as 
mainstreaming joint efforts and cross-cutting ideas bring additional costs (Minang and van 
Noordwijk, 2012). Secondly, some changes need to be made by policy makers to the “business as 
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usual” local governance system, in terms of compliance with principles such as enforcement of 
participation and transparent information flow through a consent-based approach, namely FPIC. 
Within this context, and as also noted in Peru (Hajek et al., 2011), the challenge lies in the fact 
that REDD+ is viewed by conservation elites as a means to protect nature, as opposed to other 
state agents and civil society elites who consider it an opportunity for Cameroon to benefit from 
new investment to alleviate poverty. 
7.4. Key scientific advancements made through the present research 
As anticipated in the first chapter of this thesis, our research generates new knowledge on farm 
and socio-economic factors driving the deforestation process at a local scale, as well as insights 
into the institutions and policy arena from which REDD+ could be grafted. It consequently 
formulates alternative policy options for the effectiveness of the REDD+ mechanism in 
Cameroon. Based on the main empirical findings, this research showcased at least four important 
scientific advancements.   
 It has identified, in chapter 2, many policy gaps and deficiencies in the current regulatory 
instruments governing the forestry sector, which need to be addressed in order to enhance 
the social feasibility of REDD+ and its effectiveness on the ground.  
 From this study, an innovative way forward emerged which is sufficiently robust to assess 
micro-level factors affecting deforestation and forest degradation processes. Through the 
Efoulan case study, a type of experimental combination of smallholders’ perceptions and 
regression modelling against the decision to clear forests the previous year came up with 
some significant variables which need special attention in redesigning 
REDD+implementation. These include the proportion of non-farm income level, 
membership of a farmer group, age of the household head and restricted access to forest 
resources. Furthermore, the method demonstrates that smallholder farmers and 
community perceptions can be as valid as the binary regression model in terms of 
outcomes (see results 1 and 3, chapter 4). This level of precision could motivate policy 
action and donor positions towards a brighter future for fund raising for REDD+.  
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  It was established throughout this investigation that communities and local-level 
technocrats involved in forest management are, in the same way, able to understand legal 
aspects and law enforcement perspectives with their direct implications on tenure and 
livelihood issues. This new finding indicates that communities and local-level technocrats 
can jointly take the central role in REDD+, although capacity-building must be tailored 
accordingly. The study also added some scientific insight by confirming that stakeholder 
participation (whether at a local or national level) and forest tenure are critical for REDD+ 
implementation and governance. A new dimension of the knowledge generated here has 
been the development of the compensation and funding thresholds for REDD+ success in 
an Efoulan-like forested area.  
 The structural model developed from the new research framework designed by the author 
can function effectively within the REDD+ operational phase. The model brings key 
actors and institutions together and indicates the importance of collective action across the 
suggested functions through coordinated efforts between government and other 
stakeholders. This could have strong implications in reducing REDD+ implementation 
costs through economies of scale at project-site level, especially in the current situation of 
a global funding crisis in the forestry sector. However, although the results portray a new 
understanding of cumulative thresholds, the extent to which costs (transaction and direct 
benefits) could be reduced fairly and realistically to keep REDD+ on the right track is still 
to be determined. 
7.5. Limitations of the study and future research activities  
The REDD+ initiative, with its increasing complexity and growing uncertainties, needs to 
continuously learn lessons from the success and pitfalls of existing forest management systems. It 
is against this background that this thesis was developed to provide additional insights on local-
level evidence to underpin REDD+ processes, learning from policy gaps and stakeholder 
perceptions in relation to segregated functions. Methods used and the circumstances which 
prevailed during the series of assessments demonstrated some pitfalls and shortcomings which 
need particular attention in future.  
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The first limitation of this study is that it relied mostly on qualitative data based on the 
perceptions of farmers and other stakeholders who often do not have written records of their land-
use change processes or keep accounts of farm operations. This means that, at times, answers to 
the questions demand deep thinking about the past. Some errors might naturally occur due to the 
oral aspect of traditional African communication. A multi-dimenensional study is therefore 
needed in the same context, whereas further similar research may be useful in some different 
areas to validate the present findings. 
The second limitation could be viewed in terms of the experience and scope encompassed. 
Indeed, the socio-economic context and forest governance principles at local level are important 
in determining the ultimate success of REDD+ projects in Cameroon. However, this is not enough 
to guarantee effectiveness and equity, due to the fact that, at this stage, our understanding of 
future prospects for institutional synergies is limited dues to small sample used. Furthermore, as 
indicated above, there might be cross-cultural variations in local perceptions, and also over time, 
as REDD+ debates evolve very quickly, adding greater complexity to the current framework. In 
order to capture the risks of this variability, more assessments encompassing all agro-ecological 
zones are therefore recommended. This is important to understand the local perceptions and to 
collect evidence on the opportunity costs of forest conservation, agricultural and afforestation 
activities to avoid deforestation and forest degradation.  
In chapter 4, only four variables, out of more than 20 factors considered during the survey design, 
were significant. Furthermore, the model draws on information collected in only 104 households 
in nine villages. This was due to funding limitations. Consequently, there is room to think that 
analysis based on a bigger sample size across several regions and gradients may demonstrate 
more micro-factors linked to deforestation and forest degradation with potentially a higher 
predictive power.  
Synthesized results of this thesis led to crucial findings contributing to govern the REDD+ 
process locally. Thus, future research should focus on the following seven perspectives:  
 Investigate the risks of potential conflict between incentives and carbon stock 
conservation. 
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 Explore patterns of inclusive multi-actor governance logics across scales. 
 Study the relationship between REDD+ boundary organizations, gender and benefit 
distribution under public-private sector partnerships in the Congo basin. 
 Determine policy choices and trends under current REDD+ using FPIC and grounded 
theory. 
 Assess the quantity and quality impacts of national policies on forest ecosystem services. 
 Examine key factors to domesticate international climate change policies at country level. 
 Monitor forest cover change using biophysical methods under different emission 
reduction scenarios in southern Cameroon and in the Congo basin. 
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APPENDIX A: LOCATION OF THE FOUR STUDY SITES IN SOUTHERN CAMEROON 
LAID ON THE VEGETATION MAP OF THE AREA 
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APPENDIX B: BOX PLOTS REPRESENTING DISTRIBUTION RANGES OF THE THREE 
MAIN VARIABLES RECORDED IN EFOULAN FOREST BLOCKS FOR THE YEAR 2010	
 
 
                    Non farm income 
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                  Age  
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Share of farm income in total  
 
           
 
         Correlation between Non farm income and share of income by farming   
Correlations 
 VAR00001 VAR00002 
VAR00001 Pearson Correlation 1 -,408** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 100 100 
VAR00002 Pearson Correlation -,408** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 100 100 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). So, ideed there is a significant 
negative correlation between both, but not of an excessive magnitude which could create 
problems in the model.  
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APPENDIX C: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN EFOULAN 
MUNICIPALITY 
 
Reducing Emissions from All Land Uses /REDD+ 
Reducing Emissions from all Land uses in the Rainforests of the Tropics: In-depth Assessment in Efoulan 
Municipality 
 
 
French Version 
 
Preambule 
Le projet Alternatives to Slash and Burn Agriculture (ASB) « Alternatives à l’agriculture itinérante » est 
une plate-forme qui conduit des activités dans les domaines biophysiques et socio-économiques en 
partenariat avec des instituts de recherche nationaux et internationaux comme IRAD, IITA, ICRAF. La 
préoccupation actuelle est de développer des stratégies et mécanismes pour l’adaptation aux changements 
climatiques observés de nos jours sur le globe terrestre.  
Les informations collectées dans le cadre des initiatives REDD+ au cours de cette enquête sont strictement 
confidentielles au terme de la loi N° 91/023 du 16 décembre 1991 sur les Recensements et Enquêtes 
Statistiques qui stipule en son article 5 que "les renseignements individuels d'ordre économique ou 
financier figurant sur tout questionnaire d'enquête statistique ne peuvent en aucun cas être utilisés à des 
fins de contrôle ou de répression économique". 
 
Définition de l’unité d’observation (Le ménage): un ménage est constitué par un homme et/ou une femme 
marié(e) ou veuf (ve) + les enfants non mariée, et d’autres personnes de la famille économiquement 
dépendante, vivant dans un même habitat (maison + cuisines des femmes) 
 
RESOURCE AND LAND MANAGEMENT HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
CAMEROON 
Septembre 2011 
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 Numéro du questionnaire |__||__||__||__||__| 
 
PARTIE 1: INFORMATIONS GENERALES 
 
P1Q1 Heure de début de l’entretien : __________ Partie réservée 
Ne pas remplir 
P1Q2 Date de l’enquête .............................................................. |_||_| |_||_| |2||0||1||0| 
P1Q3 Nom de l’enquêteur ..........................................................  
P1Q4 Village ................................................................................ |__||__| 
P1Q5 Arrondissement ................................................................ |__||__| 
P1Q6 Département ............................... |__||__| 
P1Q7 Région.......................................... |__||__| 
P1Q8 Localisation du ménage : Latitude.............................. Longitude ……………. |__||__||__||__| 
 
PARTIE 2: IDENTIFICATION DU CHEF DE MENAGE 
 
P2Q1 Nom / Prénom du Chef de 
ménage…………............................................. 
|__||__| 
P2Q2 Sexe : (1=Masculin ……… ; 2=Féminin............) |__| 
P2Q3 Age.......................... |__||__| 
P2Q4 Contact téléphonique............................................................... |__||__||__||__||__||__||__||__| 
P2Q5 Statut matrimonial : 1= Marié*…...      2= célibataire….        
3=veuf (ve)……….. 
|__| 
P2Q6 Niveau d’instruction générale :  
1=pas été à l’école ………. ;  
2=école primaire …… ; 3=Secondaire ………… ;  
 
|__| 
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4= enseignement sup………… 
P2Q7 Religion :1=chrétienne ;....... 2=musulman ;................... 
3=autre ;......................... 
|__| 
P2Q8 Ethnie : ………… 
……………..................................................................... 
|__||__| 
P2Q9 Clan (Ayong)/ Famille (Mvog ou Nda bot): 
………………………………………………………/  
 
P2Q10 Les trois principales activités:                    Les ranger par 
ordre d’importance 
1=……………………..                   
2=………………………                              ……. 
...............                                   ……………… 
 
|__| 
* Mariage =  une vie conjugale qui est assurée soit par la dot, soit par un acte de mariage ou encore un 
durée de plusieurs années (5 ans et plus) 
 
PARTIE 3: CARACTERISATION GENERALE DU MENAGE 
 
A. COMPOSITION DU MENAGE ET FORCE DE TRAVAIL 
P3QA1 : Quelle est la composition de votre ménage et sa force de travail 
Groupe d’âge  Masculin Féminin 
Nombre 
total 
(A+B) 
Nombre total 
 
(A) 
Nombre 
d’actifs  
agricoles 
 
Nombre total 
 
(B) 
Nombre d’actifs  
agricoles 
Enfants 
mineurs 
(0 - 14ans) 
P3QAM P3QA1    
 
P3QA2       P3QA3         P3QA4        
Enfants 
majeurs 
P3QAE P3QA5     
 
P3QA6        P3QA7        P3QA8       
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(15 - 20 ans) 
Adultes 
(21 - 60ans) 
P3QAA P3QA9     
 
P3QA10     P3QA11        P3QA12       
Vieillards 
> 60ans 
P3QAV P3QA13    
 
P3QA14       P3QA15       P3QA16        
Total P3QAT P3QA17  
 
P3QA18      P3QA19      P3QA20       
 
P3QA2  Le nombre de personnes dans votre ménage a-t- il augmenté ou diminué 
depuis l’an 2000 ? 1=………….oui;          2=………non 
|__|   
P3QA3 Expliquez votre réponse : 1=naissances,  2= mortalité,  3=exode rural,       
4= autres (préciser : ……………………………………….) 
|__|  |__||__|
 
B. INVENTAIRE DES BIENS DU MENAGE 
 
P3QB0 : Pouvez-vous nous dire les quantités de biens et équipements que vous possédez dans le 
ménage ?(Cocher et inscrire le nombre) 
 Biens / équipement Nombre 
 Agriculture et élevage  
P3QB1 Chèvres  
P3QB2 Montons  
P3QB3 Poulets  
P3QB4 Canards  
P3QB5 Chiens  
P3QB6 Chats  
P3QB7 Porcs  
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 Machines et équipement  
P3QB8 Motopompe  
P3QB9 Tronçonneuse  
P3QB10 Pulvérisateur  
P3QB11 Bicyclette  
P3QB12 Motocyclette (marque : ………….)  
P3QB13 Groupe électrogène  
P3QB14 Téléviseur  
P3QB15 Radio  
P3QB16 Arme à feu (pour la chasse)  
P3QB17 Pousse-pousse  
P3QB18 Électricité  
P3QB19 Brouette  
P3QB20 Autres biens (préciser)  
 
P3QB21  Caractérisation de l’habitat 
1= …………..Maison principale séparée de la cuisine ;  
2= ………….. Maison principale mélangée avec la cuisine  
 
|__| 
 
P3QB22 Maison principale 
P3QB23a 
1=………..en dur;         
2=………en semi-dur 
(briques de terre)  
3=. ….....en terre 
battue ;   4=……..en 
planches  
5= …….autres 
Cuisine 
P3QB23b 
1=………..en dur;         
2=………en semi-dur 
(briques de terre)  
3=. ….....en terre 
battue ;   4=……..en 
planches  
5= …….autres 
Maison et cuisine 
mélangésP3QB23c 
1=………..en dur;         
2=………en semi-dur 
(briques de terre)  
3=. ….....en terre battue ;   
4=……..en planches  
5= …….autres (préciser) 
………..………….. 
 
|__| 
 
 
 
|__| 
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(préciser) 
………..………….. 
(préciser) 
………..………….. 
  
|__|   
C. LES SOURCES D’ENERGIE DU MENAGE 
 
P3QC0  Quelles sont vos principales sources d’énergie ? 
Source d’énergie Mode d’acquisition Quantité 
consommée /mois 
Utilisation 
Bois de chauffe P3QC1 P3QC2( …………) P3QC3 
Charbon  P3QC4 P3QC5(sacs) P3QC6 
Gaz  P3QC7 P3QC8(bouteilles) P3QC9 
Autres (préciser) P3QC10 P3QC11                 ( …………) P3QC12 
 
P3QC12 Pourquoi n’utilisez-vous pas d’autres sources en dehors de celles que vous 
avez citées ? ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
|__|  
|__||__| 
P3QC14  
Si on utilise le bois pour le chauffage ou le charbon, dites les lieux de prélèvement et la 
pratique :  
Lieu (par ordre de fréquence de 
prélèvement) 
1=jachère ; 2=cacaoyère ; 3=foret secondaire/très 
vielle jachère ,4=forêt primaire ; 5=champs vivriers 
Pratique :  
1=Ramassage 
2=récupération 
3=coupe 
Observations sur les 
espèces (prélèvement 
sélectif ou non, 
espèces préférées, 
espèces exclues) 
Bois de 
chauffage 
 
P3QC14a  P3QC14a1   
P3QC14b P3QC14b1 
P3QC14c P3QC14 c1 
P3QC14d P3QC14 d1 
P3QC14e P3QC14 e1 
Bois de 
charbon 
P3QC14f  P3QC14f1   
P3QC14g P3QC14g1 
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 P3QC14 h P3QC14 h1 
P3QC14 i P3QC14 i1 
P3QC14j P3QC14j1 
 
D. ACCES A LA RESSOURCE TERRE 
Classification des jachères 
P3QD1 A quel âge considérez-vous qu’une jachère est encore jeune  (………..) ans, 
Donnez le nom en langue locale 
…………………………………………………… 
|__|  |__|  
P3QD2 Combien de jeunes jachères de ce type avez-vous ? ………….. |__|  |__|  
P3QD3 A partir de quel âge considérez-vous qu’une jachère est d’âge moyen ? 
(………..) ans 
Donnez le nom en langue locale ……………………………………………… 
|__|  |__|  
P3QD4 Combien de jachères de ce type avez-vous ? ………….. |__|  |__|  
P3QD5 A partir de quel âge considérez-vous qu’une jachère est vieille ? 
(………………..)ans 
Donnez le nom en langue locale ………………………………………………… 
|__|  |__|   
P3QD6 Combien de vieilles jachères avez-vous ? ………….. |__|  |__|   
P3QD7 A partir de quel âge considérez-vous qu’une jachère est très vieille ? 
(………………..)ans 
Donnez le nom en langue locale …………………………………………… 
|__|  |__|   
P3QD8 Combien de très vieilles jachères  avez-vous ? ………….. |__|  |__|   
P3QD9 Comparez la taille de vos terres cultivables à celles des autres ménages du 
village. Est-ce qu’elle est ? 
1= ……….Petite taille ; 2= …….. Même taille ;  3= …….. Plus grande 
 
|__| 
P3QD10 Ces terres sont-elles familiales (clan ou Mvog - Nda bot), ou bien 
exclusivement pour votre ménage ? 
1= ………. Les terres appartiennent exclusivement au ménage ;  
 
|__| 
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2= ………. Les terres sont pour toute la grande  famille   
3= ….…..une partie est pour notre ménage et l’autre pour la famille. 
 
P3QD11 Dans le cas où les terres appartiennent à la famille (ou Mvog - Nda bot) est-ce 
qu’il vous faut l’accord de quelqu’un pour les cultiver ?    
1=………….oui;          2=………non 
 
|__| 
P3QD12 Si oui, qui donne cet accord? ………………………………………………….. |__|
P3QD13 Dans le cas où vous souhaitez augmenter le nombre de parcelles cultivées, 
auriez-vous assez de terres disponibles ?  
1=………….oui          2=………non 
 
|__| 
P3QD14 Sur quels types de formation végétale ? 
1)………jeune jachère,  2)………… jachère moyennement jeune,  
3)……….. vieille jachère  4)………… très vieilles jachères, 
 5) ………. Toutes ces formes 
 
|__| 
 
P3QD15 Quel type d’activités les membres de votre ménage ont le droit d’exercer dans les 
différentes forêts du village?(Cocher dans les cases correspondantes) 
Type de 
forêts 
Mise en 
place  des 
cultures 
vivrières 
Mise en 
place de 
cultures 
pérennes 
Cueillette / 
ramassage 
des PFNL 
Coupe 
des 
arbres 
Chasse 
au fusil 
Chasse 
par 
pièges 
Pêche 
Forêt 
primaire 
P3QD15a 
 
P3QD15b P3QD15c P3QD15d P3QD15e P3QD15f  
Très 
vieilles 
jachères 
P3QD15g P3QD15h P3QD15i P3QD15j P3QD15k P3QD15l  
Vieilles 
jachères 
P3QD15m P3QD15n P3QD15o P3QD15p P3QD15q P3QD15r  
Jeunes        
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jachères 
Rivières       P3QD15s
 
Fleuves       P3QD15t 
 
 
P3QD16 Y-a-t‘il des terres que vous avez  donnés à quelqu’un du village ou de 
l’extérieur pour travailler ?1=………….oui;          2=………non 
 
|__| 
P3QD17 Si oui, pour cultiver quoi ? ………………………………………………… |__||__||__|
P3QD18 Quelle était la forme de négociation ?  1=………..location ;  
2=………. prêt ; 3=………..achat/vente  ; 4=…………don 
 
|__| 
P3QD19 Avez-vous des terrains bornés ?1=………….oui;          2=………non |__|
P3QD20 Si oui, donner la superficie et l’utilisation? 
P3QD20A. Superficie du terrain 1 ………… ;  UT1.Utilisation  …………… 
P3QD20B. Superficie du terrain 2 ………… ;  UT2.Utilisation  …………… 
P3QD20C. Superficie du terrain 3 ………… ;  UT3.Utilisation  …………… 
 
|__||__| 
|__||__| 
 
|__||__| 
 
 P3QD21  Quels sont les types  de champs que vous avez cultivés en 2010 ? 
Type de champ Nombre Formation végétale 
d’origine 
Cultures dans chaque champ 
1. Champ de forêt 
(Essep) 
P3QD21a P3QD21a1 CULT1. 
2. Champ mixte 
vivrier 
P3QD21b P3QD21b2 CULT2. 
3. Champ de 
marécage 
P3QD21c P3QD213c CULT3. 
4. Champ P3QD21d P3QD21d4 CULT4. 
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maraîcher 
5. Champ 
d’ananas 
P3QD21e P3QD21e5 CULT5. 
Autres :    CULT6. 
6.  P3QD21f P3QD21f6 CULT7. 
7. P3QD21g P3QD21g7 CULT8. 
 
 
P3QD22 
 
Combien de plantations de cultures pérennes (cacaoyères, palmeraies, caféières, et 
autres) appartiennent à votre ménage, et quel est leur âge, la formation végétale 
d’origine ? 
Sont-elles en expansion récente? 
 Nombre Age 
(Ans) 
Formation 
végétale 
d’origine 
Expansion récente ? 
1= ….oui  2=……non 
Observations 
Cacaoyères 
traditionnelles 
 
 
 
P3QD22a P3QD22b 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………... 
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22c 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22d 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
 
Cacaoyères 
avec variété 
hybride 
P3QD22e P3QD22f 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………... 
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22g 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22h 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
 
Palmeraies  P3QD22i P3QD22j P3QD22k P3QD22l  
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1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………... 
4………….. 
5…………. 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
Caféières 
 
P3QD22m P3QD22n 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………... 
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22o 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
P3QD22p 
1…………… 
2………….. 
3…………...  
4………….. 
5…………. 
 
 
Diversification des cultures 
P3QD23 Est-ce que vous avez introduit de nouveaux systèmes de culture (types 
de champs) dans vos exploitations au cours des 10 dernières années ?  
(1= ….oui        2=……non) 
 
P3QD24 Si oui, lesquels ?  
1……………………………………………………………………………. 
2…………………………………………………………………………… 
3…………...................................................................... 
4………………………………………………………………………….. 
5………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Surface cultivée et changement au cours des 10 dernières années 
P3QD25 Est-ce que le nombre de champs que selon les types cités a augmenté au cours des 10 
dernières années? (considérer le total pour les deux saisons annuelles) 
(1= ….oui        2=……non) 
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Changement Diminution ………….. (P3QD25A) Augmentation ……….. (P3QD25B) 
 Quel type de champ a diminué Quel type de champ a augmenté? 
  
  
  
  
(P3QD25C)                                5= ……… Pas de changement 
P3QD26 Est-ce que la taille de vos champs a augmenté ou diminué au cours des 10 dernières 
années? (considérer le total pour les deux saisons annuelles) 
(1= ….oui        2=……non) 
P3QD27 Pouvez-vous dire pourquoi ce changement?  
1= ……………….technologie disponible, (préciser : …………………) 
2= ……………….plus d’argent,  
3= ……………….indisponibilité de la main d’œuvre 
4=  ……………..disponibilité de la main d’œuvre 
5= ……………….Autres (préciser : …………………………………………………) 
 
E. ESTIMATION DU REVENU ANNUEL DU MENAGE 
 
P3QE_  
Sources de revenus  
 
Production 
(année en 
2010) 
Qté 
(UML)** 
Proportion consommée et 
partagée 
 
(%)* 
Proportion 
vendue 
 
(%)* 
Prix de 
vente 
 
F CFA 
Vente des produits 
agricoles(P3QE1) 
(cocher d’abord 
(P3QE11) (P3QE12) (P3QE13) (P3QE14) 
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les produits puis 
estimer les 
proportions) 
1. Plantain     
2. Manioc     
3. arachide     
4. Concombre 
(Ngon) 
    
5. Macabo     
6. Ignames     
7. Patate douce      
8. Cacao     
9. Café     
10. Maïs     
11. Maraîchers 
(tomate, piment, 
gombo etc) 
    
12. Huile de palme     
13. Safou     
14. Mangues     
15. Agrumes     
16. Ananas     
17. Autres 
(.……………) 
    
Vente de produits 
forestiers non 
ligneux    (P3QE2) 
(Enregistrer d’abord 
les produits puis 
estimer la proportion 
générale) 
(P3QE21) (P3QE22) (P3QE23) (P3QE24) 
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1. Mangue sauvage 
(Irvingia « ndo’o ») 
    
2. Djansang     
3. Okok     
4. Bita cola     
5. Vin de palme     
6. Rotin     
7.      
8.     
9.      
10.     
Vente des produits 
de chasse et élevage 
traditionnel 
(P3QE3) 
(Enregistrer d’abord 
les produits puis 
estimer la proportion 
générale) 
(P3QE31) 
 
(P3QE32) 
 
(P3QE35) 
 
(P3QE34) 
 
1.     
2.     
3.     
4.     
5.     
6.     
Vente des produits 
de pêche et 
pisciculture 
(P3QE41) 
 
(P3QE42) 
 
(P3QE43) 
 
(P3QE44) 
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(P3QE4) 
(Enregistrer d’abord 
les produits puis 
estimer la proportion 
générale) 
1.     
2.     
3.     
   Revenu total  
     
NB : * Proportion : 0%  25%  50%  75%  100% ; **UML=Unité de mesure locale 
 
 
P3QE5 
Vente de bois au cours de l’année  2010 
Nombre 
d’arbres coupés 
Lieu de coupe Forme du bois 
vendu 
Prix de 
vente 
(spécifier 
unité) 
Total 
1. Vente de bois de feu P3QE5a P3QE5b 
 
P3QE5c 
 
P3QE5d P3QE5e 
2. Vente de bois scié P3QE5f P3QE5g 
 
P3QE5h 
 
P3QE5i P3QE5j 
3. Vente d’arbres sur 
pied 
P3QE5k P3QE5l P3QE5m 
 
P3QE5n P3QE5o 
4. Autres ( ……………) P3QE5p P3QE5q P3QE5r 
 
P3QE5s P3QE5t 
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P3QE6 Quels sont vos revenus des activités extra- agricoles 
pour l’année 2010 
(Enregistrer d’abord les produits puis estimer 
les proportions) 
Quantité Prix unitaire Prix 
total 
1. Petit commerce 
(biens vendus :………………………………) 
 
  P3QE61 
2. Pension de retraite, salaire, envois des 
enfants qui vivent en ville, etc.  
P3QE6 (12 mois) P3QE6 (Mensuelle) 
 
P3QE62
3. Moto taxi  P3QE6 (12 mois) P3QE6 (Mensuel) 
 
P3QE63
4. Autres (préciser : 
………………………………..) 
  P3QE64
 
F. ESTIMATION DES DEPENSES 
 
P3QF0 : Dépenses annuelles du ménage (2010) 
a. Dépenses en agriculture 
 
Quantité  
(préciser 
l’unité) 
Prix unitaire  
(F CFA) 
Coût total (F CFA) 
Achat des intrants agricoles (semences, 
engrais, pesticides, produits vétérinaires)    
  (P3QF1) 
    
    
    
Achat de matériel agricole (machette, lime, 
houe, pulvérisateur, essence, gasoil,  etc.) 
  (P3QF2) 
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Location de matériel agricole   (P3QF3) 
    
    
    
Transport des denrées récoltées   (P3QF4) 
   (P3QF5) 
   (P3QF6) 
  Total  
b. Dépenses de survie du ménage 
 
Quantité  
(préciser 
l’unité) 
Prix unitaire  
(F CFA) 
Coût total (F CFA) 
1. Achat de nourriture pour la famille   (P3QF7) 
2. Écolage des enfants   (P3QF8) 
3. Soins de santé   (P3QF9) 
4. Mariage   (P3QF10) 
5. Décès d’un membre de la famille   (P3QF11) 
Autres types de dépenses (spécifier)   (P3QF12) 
6.     
7.     
   
Total 
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c. Dépenses de main d’œuvre  
P3QFC1 Dans quel type de champ et pour quel type d’activité utilisez-vous la main d’œuvre 
payante ?  
1=Défrichage ;  2=Semis ;  3=Désherbage ;  4=Lutte phytosanitaire ;  
5=Récolte ;  6=Transport des denrées au champ ;  7=Transport pour le marché ; 
8=Transformation ;          9=Autres (préciser)………………………. 
Type de 
Champ 
Description de l’activité Coût de la main d’œuvre (en F CFA) 
et unité de travail 
1. Défrichage FCMOa 
Semis FCMOb 
Désherbage FCMOc 
Lutte phytosanitaire FCMOd 
Récolte FCMOe 
Transport des denrées au champ FCMOf 
Transport pour le marché FCMOg 
Transformation FCMOh 
2.  Défrichage FCMOi 
Semis FCMOj 
Désherbage FCMOk 
Lutte phytosanitaire FCMOl 
Récolte FCMOm 
Transport des denrées au champ FCMOn 
Transport pour le marché FCMOo 
Transformation FCMOp 
 
 
228 
 
 
d. Sécurité alimentaire 
P3QFD1 Quelles sont les denrées achetées, veuillez les ranger  par ordre 
d’importance (de la plus achetée à la moins achetée)? 
                          Denrée                                          Rang 
1= ………………………………………                ……………… 
2= ………………………………………                ……………… 
3= ………………………………………                ……………… 
4= ………………………………………                ……………… 
5= ………………………………………               ……………… 
6= ………………………………………               ……………… 
7= ………………………………………               ……………… 
 
 
 
|__| |__|  
 
|__|  |__| 
 
|__|  |__| 
 
|__|  |__| 
 
|__|  |__| 
 
|__|  |__| 
P3QFD2 Comparez les quantités de nourriture achetées à celles produites dans le 
ménage. 
1=……..les quantités produites sont plus grandes ;  
2=……..les quantités achetées sont plus grandes ;  
3=……..les quantités produites et celles achetées sont les mêmes. 
 
|__|   
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PARTIE 4.PRISE DE DECISION ET RESPONSABILITE 
 
P4Q0  Qui prend la décision pour les activités dans chaque type de champ et qui en est 
responsable du champ ?  
(1=l’homme seul ; 2=la femme seule ; 3=les deux H+F) ; 4=les enfants, 5=tout le 
monde) 
Type de champ  Choix du 
terrain 
 
(Choix) 
Préparatio
n 
du terrain 
 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
Semis
 
 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
Entretien
 
 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
Récolte
 
 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
Transport 
après 
récoltes 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
Vente
 
 
(décision/ 
gestion) 
a. Champ mixte 
vivrier(P4Qa) 
                         
b. Champ de forêt 
(Essep) (P4Qb) 
                         
c. Cacaoyère(P4Q
c) 
                         
d. Caféière(P4Qd)                           
e. Palmeraie(P4Q
e) 
                         
f. Champ 
maraîchers(P4
Qf) 
                         
g. Autres type de 
champs (à 
spécifier 
(P4Qg) 
                         
  Activités extra‐agricoles 
h. Cueillette et 
ramassage des 
PFNL (P4Qh) 
 
i. Chasse(P4Qi)   
j. Pêche(P4Qj)   
k. Coupe d’arbres 
pour la 
 
230 
 
vente(P4Qk) 
l. Autres :  
 
 
 
PARTIE 5. VIE ASSOCIATIVE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE 
 
P5Q1.  Êtes‐vous  membre  d’une  association agricole  ou  de  gestion  forestière?1=………….oui;          
2=………non 
P5Q2. Si oui, la (les) quelle (s) ? 
Association  Quels sont les 
objectifs ? 
Quelle place 
occupez‐vous? 
Quels sont les avantages que le 
ménage tire de l’association? 
1=revenus financiers, 2=Formation, 
3= Matériel, 4=Autre ………………….. 
P5QA  
 
P5QA1  
 
P5QA2  
 
P5QA3  
 
P5QB 
 
P5QB1 
 
P5QB2 
 
P5QB3 
 
P5QC 
 
P5QC1 
 
P5QC2 
 
P5QC3 
 
 
231 
 
 
PARTIE 6. LES FACTEURS DE DÉFORESTATION 
 
P6Q1  Est que vous avez défriché  la  forêt  /ou de  très vielles  jachères  l’année dernière pour 
faire l’essep, cacaoyère, ou palmeraie ? 
1=………….oui;          2=………non 
P6Q2  Qu’est‐ce qui vous motive à continuer de défricher les forêts ou vieilles jachères? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
|__|  |__|
P7Q3  Est‐ce que vous pensez que vous allez continuer à défricher les forêts au même rythme 
que maintenant ou encore vous aller augmenter ou diminuer le rythme/la surface? 
1= …………….même rythme que maintenant 
2= ……………augmenter le rythme  
3=…………… diminuer le rythme  
|__|
 
PARTIE 7. ANALYSE DES PERCEPTIONS ET ATTITUDES 
 
P7Q1  Pensez‐vous que les ménages du village peuvent réduire la quantité des terres 
cultivées dans les très vieilles jachères et forêts ? 
……………………………………………….. …………………… 
|__| |__|
P7Q2  Selon vous quelles seraient les conséquences d’une telle réduction pour votre 
ménage ? (réduction de la production, augmentation des dépenses pour les intrants 
agricoles, réduction de la durée de la jachère, etc.) 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
P7Q3  Si l’État vous demandait alors de réduire la quantité des terres cultivées dans les très 
vieilles jachères et forêts, quelles conditions  proposeriez‐vous? Cochez  tout ce qui   
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s'applique parmi les propositions suivantes 
1= ……….Compensation monétaire payée directement au ménage (si possible demander 
une estimation des attentes) 
2= ……… Subventions des engrais/et matériel agricole pour intensifier les rotations sur 
les terrains déjà cultivés 
3= ……….développement infrastructurelle du village (route, hôpital, école…) 
4= ……….Allocation de titres fonciers 
5= ………. A aucune condition 
5= ……….Autre (préciser : ……………………………………………………) 
 
 
 
|__| |__||__| |__| 
P7Q4  Dans le cas où vous l’acceptez à certaines conditions, est‐ce que vous pouvez mener 
d’autres activités économiquement rentables ici au village?  
1=………….oui;          2=………non 
Expliquer votre réponse : ……………………………………………………… 
 
 
|__| 
P7Q5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P7Q6 
Si on vous proposait une compensation après avoir préservé la forêt pendant 
plusieurs années (par exemple 20 ans), quelle institution selon vous serait mieux 
placée pour être votre intermédiaire avec les bailleurs de fonds ? Classez par ordre 
de préférence : 
(     )= ………..Chef du village 
(     )= ………..ONG (citer un exemple : ……………………………..) 
(     )= …………Ministère (en charge des forêts/des finances) 
(     )= …………Mairie 
(…Autre (préciser : ………………………………………………………) 
Si de  telles compensations étaient effectuées pour préserver  la  forêt, quelle  serait 
selon vous la régularité suivant laquelle les compensations devraient être versées ? 
1= ………..Tous les 5 ans ; 2= ………..Tous les 10 ans ; 
3= ………..Tous les 20 ans 
4= ………..Autre (préciser : ………………………………………………..) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|__||__||__| 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|__| 
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PARTIE 8. DOCUMENTATION DES DROITS ET PERCEPTIONS DES COMMUNAUTES DANS LE 
PROCESSUS REDD‐REALU DANS LES SITES ASB 
 
P8QA : ACTEURS DE LA  REDD ET REALU 
P8QA1  Est‐ce que vous avez dejà entendu parler du changement climatique  
1=………….oui;          2=………non 
 
|__| 
P8QA2  Si oui, depuis quand?1= ………….Moins de 6 moins               
                                          2= ………….  il ya 1 an.              
                                          3= ………….Depuis 2 ans             
                                          4= ………….plus de 2 ans  
 
|__| 
P8QA3  De qui avez vous reçu l’information? 
1= ……….un ami/famille 
2= ……….Réunion avec une ONG 
3= ……….Services étatiques 
4= ……….Forum International  
5= ……….Autres sources (spécifier : …………………………………..) 
 
 
 
|__| 
P8QA4  Est‐ce que le changement climatique a influencé vos activités agricoles au cours des 
dernières années ? 1=………….oui;          2=………non 
 
P8QA5  Si oui, quels aspects du climat les ont influencés ? 
1= ………….la chaleur 
                         2= ………….  Le froid 
                         3= ………….le bouleversement des saisons 
                         4= ………….autres (préciser : …………………………) 
 
P8QA6  Depuis quand constatez‐vous ces changements ? …………………..   
P8QA7  Comment est‐ce que ce changement climatique influence vos activités agricoles ? 
Expliquez. 
1= ……Période de semis : …………………………………… 
2= ……la production en baisse : ………………………… 
3= ……le risque de feu de brousse : ………………………… 
4= ……aspects phytosanitaires : …………………………… 
5= ……Autres………………………………… 
 
 
|__|  |__| |__|   
 
P8QA8  Quelles sont actions entreprises pour lutter contre le changement climatique ? 
1= ………….culture de contre saison 
 2= ………….  Augmentation des surfaces de culture 
 
UFA voisine : ________________________________________________________ 
Aire protégée : ______________________________________________________  
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 3= ………….diversification des activités agricoles 
4= …………. Culture intensives 
5= …………… Autres (préciser : ………………………………………………..) 
 
P8QA9  Êtes‐vous au courant des processus  de lutte contre le changement climatique au 
Cameroun ?                 1=………….oui;          2=………non 
 
 
|__| 
P8QA10  Quelles sont les structures d’appuis au monde rural que vous connaissez parmi les 
suivantes? (cocher la bonne réponse)  
Recherche (IRAD, IITA, CIFOR, ICRAF, CIRAD, ………..) 
Vulgarisation (MINADER, PVNRA, ………….) 
ONGs (SAILD, WWF, ……….) 
Bailleurs de fonds (USAID, FAO, FIDA, ……………) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
|__| 
 
|__| 
 
|__|  
 
|__|  
 
|__|  
P8QA11  Êtes‐vous en contact avec ces structures?            
1=…………. oui          2=………non 
 
|__| 
P8QA12  Si oui, lesquelles ? ………………………………………………………………………………   
P8QA13  Si oui, quels types de relations /appui existe‐ t‐ il entre vous et ces structures? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
|__|  |__| 
P8QA14  Si non, expliquer depuis quand et pourquoi ? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
|__|  |__| 
 
P8QB : TENURE FORESTIÈRE ET FONCIÈRE, DROITS AUX RESSOURCES  DANS LE PROCESSUS REDD 
/REALU 
 
P8QB1  A qui selon vous, appartiennent la forêt et ses ressources dans votre village? 
1) L’État             2) La communauté         3) Le chef du village            4) les Élites          5) 
Exploitants forestiers           6) Autres,  spécifier………………… 
 
|__|  |__| |__|   
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P8QB2
  
Avez‐vous des contraintes à l’accès et l’usage des produits forestiers 
ligneux (Arbres)?   
                1=…………. oui          2=………non 
 
|__| 
 
P8QB3  Si oui lesquelles ? ……………………………………………………………………………………………  |__|  |__| |__| 
P8QB4
  
Avez‐vous des contraintes à l’accès et l’usage des produits forestiers non  
ligneux (« Irgingia » mangue sauvage, Rotin, Ndjanssang, noisette, etc.)?  
                1=…………. oui          2=………non 
 
|__| 
 
P8QB5  Si oui, sur quel produit et quels types de contraintes ? 
1. PFNL : ………………………… Contraintes : ……………………… 
2. PFNL : ………………………… Contraintes : ……………………… 
3. PFNL :…………………………. Contraintes :……………………… 
|__|  |__|  
 
|__|  |__|  
 
|__|  |__| 
P8QB6  Connaissez‐vous la Loi  forestière au Cameroun  
           1=………….oui          2=………non 
 
|__|  
P8QB7  Selon vous, quels sont vos droits que vous aimeriez voir pris en compte dans la 
gestion des forêts de votre village ?  
1=Propriété des arbres plantés et des forêts communautaires ………… 
2=Accès aux ressources forestières ……………………………………… 
3=Commercialisation des produits forestiers ………………………… 
4=Autres : ………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
|__| 
 
P8QB8  Si oui, pouvez‐vous formuler quelques propositions utiles à la commission de révision 
de la loi forestière de 1994 ? 
1. ________________________________________________________ 
2. ________________________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________________________ 
 
|__| 
P8QB9  S’il y a une exploitation dans votre voisinage,  que pensez‐vous des bénéfices pour la 
communauté ?(les décrire et commenter) 
Bénéfice m :………………………Commentaire : ……. 
 
|__| 
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1=……Très équitable  2=……Équitable      3=……. Pas Équitable 
4=….  Je n’en sais rien  
Commentaire : ……………………………………………………..  
 
P8QB1
0 
Est‐ce que vous plantez les arbres de bois d’œuvre? 
1=………….oui          2=………non 
|__|  |__| |__|  
 
P8QB1
1 
Si oui, combien en avez‐vous planté au cours des cinq dernières années ? …………  |__| 
P8QB1
2 
Si non, expliquez pourquoi ? …………………………………………………………………………………  |__| 
P8QC CONFIANCE AUX ACTEURS INTERVENANTS 
 
Dans chaque communauté ou lieu de travail, certaine personnes ont confiance les uns des autres tandis 
que d’autres n’ont pas en matière de gestion des forêts et des arbres. Maintenant, je vais vous parler de 
la confiance que vous avez pour les autres producteurs, le gouvernement, et les ONG qui travaillent dans 
ce domaine.  
 
Pouvez‐vous s'il vous plaît me dire si en générale vous êtes en accord avec les énoncés suivants. 
1= Tout à fait d'accord ;   2= D'accord ;   3= Désaccord ;   4= Fortement en désaccord ;   5= Pas sur 
 
P8QC1  Je pense que je peux faire confiance à la plupart des habitants de ce village. 
(                      ) 
 
P8QC 2  Je pense que je peux faire confiance aux gens qui sont partie de la même GIC que 
moi.  
(                      ) 
 
P8QC 3  Je crois que je peux avoir confiance au Gouvernement Camerounais. 
 
(                      ) 
 
P8QC 4  Je crois que je peux avoir confiance aux officiels du ministère des forêts et la faune.  
(                      ) 
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P8QC 5  Je crois que je peux avoir confiance aux officiels du ministère de l'agriculture et du 
développement rural. 
(                      )  
 
P8QC 6  Je crois que je peux avoir confiance aux officiels du ministère de l'environnement et 
de la protection de la nature.  
(                      ) 
 
P8QC 7  Je crois que je peux avoir confiance a la plupart des Gouvernement internationale 
de l’Ouest. 
(                      ) 
 
P8QC 8  Je crois qu’on peut faire confiance à la plupart des ONG Internationale qui travaillent 
dans ce domaine (exemple : WWF, ICRAF, IUCN,  CARE) 
(                      ) 
 
P8QC9  Je crois qu’on peut faire confiance à la plupart des ONG nationale et locales qui 
travaillent dans ce domaine (CED, SAILD, etc.) 
(                      ) 
 
P8QC10  Je crois qu’on peut faire confiance à la plupart des entreprises privée qui travaillent 
dans ce domaine. 
(                      ) 
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PARTIE 9 : VOLONTE D’ACCEPTERLES FORMES DE PAYEMENT 
Supposons que vous êtes intéressés à participer dans ce programme  visant la conservation des forêts et 
des arbres dans les champs. L’accord que vous signez indique que _________ serait votre interlocuteur 
principal, _____________ veilleraient à ce que vos arbres sont encore debout sur vos terres et 
_____________ paierait pour la conservation des arbres. Cependant, nous pouvons encore négocier le 
prix et la forme de payement.  
 
Tout comme la dernière partie, vous serez payé pour entrer dans l’accord qui vous engageant à 
maintenir tous les arbres de vos vielle jachères, vos très vielle jachères, vos plantations de cultures 
pérennesand les forets que votre ménage à l’accès (nfos afan). Tu ne peux pas défricher ses champs pour 
les cultiver mais tu peux planter d’autres arbres ou augmenter a les plantations des cultures pérennes  
(agroforesterie).   
L’accord serait de 15 ans, alors vous recevrez 10 paiements (une par 1.5 année) durant cette période. 
 
P9 QA Sous quelles formes souhaiteriez‐vous recevoir les compensations afin de continuer la gestion 
durables des écosystèmes ? 
P9 QA1.  C [   ]= En cash 
P9 QA2. NC [   ]=Non cash (promotions innovations agro forestières et agricoles)  
P9 QA3. NCC [   ]=Les deux combinées 
 
Je vais passer des quantités différentes avec vous. S'il vous plaît veuillez me dire si vous voudriez ou non 
accepter l'accord pour chaque montant. 
(Pour chaque montant, demandez): Seriez‐vous d'accord pour _______CFA? 
 
(S’ils ont besoin des explications supplémentaires, dites quelque chose comme ceci: 
Vous devez me dire le montant que vous voulez être payé, tout comme cet accord qui se passait 
réellement. Si vous dites trop faible d'un montant, vous aurez alors besoin demain de maintenir les arbres 
et les laisser debout, même s’il ya d'autres choses que vous préférez faire avec votre terre. Si vous dites 
des montants trop élevés, alors vous ne serez pas demandé de faire partie de ce programme, et vous 
pourriez continuer comme vous le faites maintenant, et ne recevrez pas de paiement.) 
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Total des sommes versées par 
an (CFA par are =1omx10m) 
Oui, je suis d'accord avec ce 
montant 
Non,  je ne suis pas d’accord 
avec ce montant 
5000    
7500    
10000    
12500    
15000    
17500    
20000    
22500    
25000    
Plus (préciser)    
Ne sais pas    
MERCI POUR VOTRE BONNE COLLABORATION 
Pour tout détail que vous jugez nécessaire, veuillez contacter Serge Ngendakumana, ICRAF, Bureau 
régional au tel. : 79 53 28 19 
 
Heure de fin de l’entretien : _____________________ 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE TO INSTITUTIONS	
 
COUNTRY REDD+ & REALU READINESS ASSESSMENT 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE SEMI-STRUCTUREE (MINEP, MINFOF, MINADER, R&C.O., 
NGO)  
 
Préambule :  
L’ICRAF en partenariat avec d’autres membres de l’ASB entreprennent de mener des études 
dans les Régions de  l’Est, Centre et Sud en vue de documenter la gestion durable des ressources 
forestières par les communautés ainsi que d’appuyer les institutions dans leurs quête 
d’approfondir les connaissances sur l’opérationnalisation des processus REDD et REALU au 
Cameroun. Cette étude vise à analyser la politique de la  REDD+ et les prévisions légales ainsi 
que techniques y afférentes. Voudriez-vous, répondre aux questions ci-dessous. Soyez rassurés 
que les informations seront traités avec professionnalisme et discrétion.  
 
A. CONTEXTE ET INFORMATION TECHNIQUE 
1. Département / Organisation / Structure : 
2. Statut légal: a. service d’état ou public  b. ONG  c.’’CBO’’  d. Autres 
(spécifiez)………… 
3. Couverture géographique de vos interventions: Nationale, régionale ou locale  
4. Quelle région spécifique du Cameroun couvrez-vous?  
5. Avez-vous développé votre mission stratégique:   OUI      NON 
6. Si oui, précisez: …..………………………………………………… 
….……………………..…… ……………………………………… 
……………………………………………..……………….…..……… 
7. Quelle est votre vision stratégique institutionnelle ? 
………………………………………..……………………………………………………
………………………………..………………………..…..………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………................ 
8. Avez-vous déjà pensé à aligner votre mission et votre vision aux effets du changement 
climatique mondial?          OUI      NON 
9. Si oui, quels sont les éléments à intégrer  dans la nouvelle vision ou mission pour lutter 
contre le CC? 
a. …………………………………………………………………………………....…… 
b. ………………………………………………..………………………….……………. 
c. ………………………………………………………..……………...………………… 
d. …………………………………………….………..……...………………………..…. 
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10. Quels sont les éléments à prendre en compte dans la nouvelle vision ou mission pour 
s'adapter au CC? 
a. ………………….………………………………………………………………… 
b. ………………………………………………………………..…………………. 
c. …………………………………….………………………………………………. 
d. ……………………………….…….……………………………………………… 
11. Comment pouvez-vous qualifier vos principales actions au regard de ce qui concerne les 
affaires liées au carbone forestier depuis 2005 et combien de temps vous engagez sur les 
12 mois de l’année ? 
  (a)  Suivi et inventaire forestier?  
 (b) Renforcement de la législation forestière? 
 (c) Foresterie et la conservation des forêts? 
 (d) l’agroforesterie basée sur la plantation des arbres dans les paysages 
 (e) l’agriculture et développement rural 
 (f) la Politique et le plaidoyer 
 (g) Autres (préciser) 
 
12. S'il vous plaît indiquer où vos activités ont été ou sont mise en œuvre? 
1).................................................2)................................................3)....................................
4)..................................................5)................................................................................ 
13. Pourriez-vous donner la liste des institutions/organisations avec lesquelles vous 
collaborez dans le domaine du changement climatique? 
 
Organisations internationales ………………………………………………………………. 
ONG:……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Les bailleurs de fonds: …………………………………………………………...………..  
 
B. Les indices de niveau de préparation pour la REDD+ / REALU 
 
Les questions suivantes sont appréhendées afin que nous entamions l'évaluation en ce qui 
concerne les perspectives de fonctions REDD comme suit: 
 Planification: politiques (sur les droits, occupation de terre, CC,), règlements, stratégies, 
prise en compte des parties prenantes 
 Coordination: Rôles et responsabilités, les procédures, renforcement 
 MRV: mesure du carbone, des rapports, des bases de données  
 AUDIT: Niveau national et sous régional 
 Démonstration et pilotes 
 Facilitation et Gestion des systèmes de motivation, le partage des bénéfices, financement 
et négociation avec les partenaires. 
 
Fonction de la politique et processus  
(Planification, politiques, droits, domaine, prise en compte des parties prenantes) 
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14. Avez-vous été impliqués dans le processus national REDD? 
OUI ou NON 
 
15. Si oui, dans quelle étape ou niveau avez-vous été impliqué? Cochez la case appropriée 
A. Développement de la stratégie nationale REDD     
B. 1er Document de la Communication Nationale sur le CC 
C. R-PIN 
D. 2ème Document de la Communication Nationale sur le CC 
E. RPP 
F. Négociations pendant la Conférence des Parties (COP) 
 
16. A quel niveau de fonction ci-dessus avez-vous été très actif? 
A………………………..B……………….….. C……………………..D………………… 
E………………………...F……………………………………………………………… 
Décrirez votre participation 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
17. Si non, pourquoi vous n’avez pas été impliqués dans les différentes étapes du processus? 
Précisez s'il vous plaît: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
18. Quel mécanisme a été mis en place pour prendre en compte la participation des parties 
prenantes dans le processus REDD? Décrivez ci-dessous: 
a)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
b)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
c)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
d)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
19. ? Quel est votre niveau de satisfaction avec la politique actuelle de REDD? 
        0→                   1  →                     2  →              3  →            4  →               5  
 (Légende 0: pas du tout, 1: Pas sure 2: moyen 3: Satisfait 4: Très satisfait, 5: Très bien 
satisfait) 
20. Savez-vous si le Cameroun est membre du FCPF: Oui ou Non 
21. Savez-vous si le Cameroun a une stratégie nationale REDD? Oui ou Non 
22. Si oui, quelles sont les principales questions abordées par la stratégie nationale REDD? 
1)............................................................................................................................................................ 
2)............................................................................................................................................................ 
3).............................................................................................................................................................. 
23. Si non, donnez votre point de vue …………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
24. Quels sont les avantages et les inconvénients des options  politiques pour la REDD ? 
Avantages 
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1)……………………………………………………………………. …………………… 
2)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Inconvénients  
1)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Fonction de stratégie et de régulations 
 
25. Avons-nous les instruments politiques pertinents pour le suivi du REDD? 
a. Mode de tenure foncière et les droits sur le carbone 
b. Planification des utilisations de terre 
c. L'exploitation forestière illégale 
d. Biocarburants 
e. Conservation de la biodiversité 
f. Genre, conflits et changement climatique 
26. Quels sont les instruments politiques qui favorisent la réduction des émissions dues aux 
changements des utilisations des terres? 
a. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
b. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
c. ……………………………………………………………………………………………..……………… 
d. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
27. Selon vous, que devrait être les quatre principaux critères d'une bonne politique pour la question actuelle des 
changements climatiques? 
a. ………………………………………………………………………………………..………………… 
b. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
c. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
d. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 
 
28.  Quelles pourraient être les défis à relever par une telle politique? 
a. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
b. ……………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………... 
c. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
d. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 29. Quelles sont les opportunités dans la REDD/REALU  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
30. Selon vous, quelles pourraient être des indicateurs de niveau de préparation à la REDD-REALU au: 
 
a. Niveau politique: 
1………………………..………2………………………………..3…………………………….. 
b. Niveau technique: 
1………………………………2………………………………..3…………………………….. 
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c. Niveau social: 
1……………………………………2………………………………..3…………………………….. 
d. Autres 
(spécifiez)………………………………………….…………………………………………………….. 
Fonction de Coordination 
(Rôles et responsabilités, procédures, renforcement) 
 
31. Le pays a-t-il des dispositifs institutionnels/organisationnels approuvés pour prendre en 
compte la REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest degradation)? Oui 
ou Non 
32. Si oui, les quelles? 
i. ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
ii. …………………………………………………………………….………………… 
iii. ………………………………………………………………………………………. 
iv. ……………………………………………………………………..……………….. 
33. Quelles sont les autres dispositifs institutionnels/ organisationnels qui ont été mise sur 
pied pour appuyer l’adaptation au changement climatique ainsi que son atténuation?  
34. Précisez: 
i. …………………………………………………..…………………..……………… 
ii. ………………………………………………………………………….…………… 
iii. ………………………………………………………………….…………………… 
iv. ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
35. Au Cameroun, quelles sont les institutions/organisation responsables pour: 
a. Le suivi et inventaires forestiers?: 
………………………………………………..……… 
b. Le renforcement de la législation 
forestière:………………………………..…………… 
c. La foresterie et la conservation des 
forêts.............................................................................. 
d. L’agroforesterie basée sur la plantation des arbres dans les 
paysages?............................... 
36. Quels sont les principaux écosystèmes du Cameroun qui sont potentiellement ciblées pour 
la REDD? 
1)............................................2)………………………….3)……………………………… 
37. Quelles pourraient être vos suggestions visant à améliorer la coordination des activités 
REDD dans le pays? 
1)………………………………………………………………………..………………...... 
2)………………………………………………………………………….………………… 
3)…………………………………………………………………………………..……… 
 
Monitoring, Rapportage et Vérification (MRV) et AUDIT: Détermination du stock de 
carbone, rédaction de rapports, données 
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38. Où avez-vous observé le taux de déforestation le plus élevé à ce jour? 
a. Domaines forestiers nationaux, 
b. Forêts communautaires, 
c. Zones des forets privées 
39. Donnez la source et / ou des données pour appuyer votre réponse ci-dessus  
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
40. Quels types d'écosystèmes sont le plus souvent touchés par la déforestation et la 
dégradation des forêts au Cameroun? 
1).......................................................................................................................... 
2)………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3)………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
41. Votre institution/organisation avait-elle les facilités et équipements tells que les outils de 
suivi du climat, laboratoires, les outils d’évaluation de l’hydrologie, etc? OUI ou NON 
42. Si oui, commentez……………………………………………………………………… 
...................................................................................................................................………… 
43. Quelle est votre approche pour mesurer le taux de déforestation annuel? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
44. Quels sont les principaux facteurs qui favorisent la déforestation dans votre aire 
d’intervention? 
1)............................................2)………………………….3)……………………………… 
45. Avez-vous une base de données sur l'état des forêts dans votre zone d’intervention? Oui 
ou Non 
46. Décrivez brièvement le type de données que vous avez déjà  collectées: 
 Nationale Régionale Paysage 
Modes d'utilisation des terres/modifications:    
Causes de déforestation et dégradation des forêts 
dans les régions 
   
Données sur le carbone (mesure, des canevas de 
modélisation) 
   
Les instruments politique et institutions    
 
47. Quels outils et approches de travail utilisez vous dans les forêts? 
Précisez …………………………………….. 
48. Avez-vous des équations allométriques spécifiques pour estimer le stock de carbone? Oui  
/ Non 
49. Existent-ils des données sur les gaz à effet de serres ou CO2 dans votre pays? Oui  / Non 
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50. Où observe-t- on  la déforestation et dégradation des forêts dans votre pays? 
1)......................................2)………………….3)…………………… 
51. En considérant ce qui précède, quel est votre évaluation des moyens techniques, 
financiers et matériels dont dispose le Cameroun pour le suivi de changement climatique? 
0→  1                  →2                  →3                →4                      →5  
(Légende 0 : pas du tout, 1:Pas sure 2: Moyennes 3: Satisfait 4: Très satisfait, 5: Satisfaction 
excellente). 
Fonction de démonstration 
 
52. Avez-vous mené des études qui peuvent fournir les informations utiles pour la RPP en 
cours (or REDD-REALU) au Cameroun? Oui ou Non………………………………., 
donnez les détails sur ces études (c.-à-d. site web, rapports, bref politique, articles ou autre 
publication) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
53. Combiens de projets votre institution/organisation a-t-il exécuté concernant la 
conservation et la gouvernance forestières dans les 03 dernières années? Cochez une 
classe ci-dessous : 
A: Nul;          B: 1-3 ;          C: 4-6        D: Plus (spécifiez SVP)…………………..        
Listez les projets 
…………………………………………………………….……………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
54. Parmi ces projets, quel est le plus réussi?............................................................................... 
55. Combien d’arbres votre structure à t’il planté ou appuyer la plantation pour renforcer le 
couvert forestier dans vos paysages cibles depuis 2007 (Remplissez le tableau ci-
dessous)? 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 total Moyenne 
annuel 
Spécifiez 
la région  
Nombre total 
d’arbres plantés 
       
Nombre d’espèces        
Partenaires 
impliqués 
       
Montant total de 
financement 
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56. Ya t il eu des phases pilotes de démonstrations REDD au Cameroun? Oui ou Non  
Où sont-ils établis?   Pour quoi sont-ils 
établis? 
Quelles sont les 
leaders à ce 
moment? 
Quelles ont étaient les 
résultats ? 
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
57. Fournissez les sources d’information spécifiques sur le projet:  
a. Site web:  
b. Rapports de référence /publications: 
c. Personnes à contacté (Noms et email):  
58. Quels sont les obstacles qui empêchent les acteurs au Cameroun d’exécuter le REDD 
effectivement? 
a. Pas de prise en compte de la dimension livelihoods 
b. Focus sur les seules zones forestières 
c. Tracasseries dans le déboursement des fonds 
d. Insuffisance de la capacité et moyens de suivi 
e. Autres (spécifiez)………………………………………………………… 
 
Fonction de la capacité 
59. Selon vous, le Cameroun a t-il la capacité d’implémenter le REDD? 
Domaine ou fonction Oui le Cameroun peut Non ou pas encore 
Politique et institutions    
Réglementation et stratégie   
Coordination   
MRV et AUDIT   
Démonstration et Pilotage   
Gestion et  mesures de 
motivation (mesures 
incitatoires) 
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60. Selon vous quelles sont les organisations les plus aptes dans la gestion des paysages et 
dans les domaines qui concerne REDD-REALU? 
Domaine ou fonction Institutions nationales  Institutions internationales  
Politique et institutions   
 
 
Réglementation et stratégie   
Coordination  
 
 
MRV et AUDIT   
Démonstration et Pilotage  
 
 
Gestion et  mesures de 
motivation (mesures 
incitatoires) 
 
 
 
 
61. Votre institution/organisation a t-il un personnels qualifiés et compétents avec des 
responsabilités bien définit dans le cadre du REDD/REALU?   Oui    ou        Non 
Si oui, combien?....................................................................................... 
62. Ces personnels ont-ils une grande expérience dans le processus REDD?  
63. Si oui, indiquer les domaines d’expérience acquise par rapport aux fonctions REDD 
(question 59)  jusqu’à maintenant : 
1)…………………………………………………2)………………………………………
……………………3)…………………………………………………4)…………………
……………… 
64. Avez-vous utilisé les consultants venant d’ailleurs?  
Si oui, dans quel cas? Commentez 
…………………………………………………………..…………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
65. Votre institution était-il impliqué dans les formations liés au changement climatique? Oui  
ou   Non  
66. Si oui, citez les partenaires (parties prenantes) et sujets de formation 
Partenaire (s) 
organisateur(s) 
Thème de formation Commentaires 
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67. Quelles sont les autres exigences dont nous avons besoins pour être prêt pour le REDD? 
1)………………………..…………..…………..……………………………………..… 
2)……………………..………………………………………………………………….. 
3)………………………..………………..……………………………………………….. 
68. Quels peuvent être les 03 domaines prioritaires de renforcement de capacité to mieux 
implémenter le REDD+ et REALU?  
1)…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
2)…………………………………………………..………………….…………………. 
3)……………………………………………………………………………..…………….. 
Gestion et facilitation des finances et motivation 
69. Y’a-t-il des fonds disponible au Cameroun pour la lutte contre le changement climatique 
ainsi que l’adaptation au changement climatique? 
1) OUI     2) NON 
70. Citez autres challenges dont nous avons besoins de surmonter afin d’être prêt pour le 
REDD. Vos réponses peuvent portés sur les niveaux suivants. 
a. Niveau politique:  
b. Niveau technique 
c. Niveau social 
d. Autres (spécifiez le niveau)…………………………………. 
71. Quels sont les opportunités de financement disponible? 
1)............................................................................................................................................. 
2)............................................................................................................................................. 
3)............................................................................................................................................. 
4)............................................................................................................................................. 
72. Selon vous, quelles sont les politique optionnelles qui peuvent facilités la mobilisation des 
fonds à chaque niveau pour pays (local, régional, national) dans le contexte de 
changement climatique.  
1).......................................................................2)................................................................... 
3).......................................................................4)................................................................... 
 
 
e.  
f.  
 
Merci pour votre disponibilité et collaboration. 
Noms de répondant (facultatif) :   Adresse (Tel. & Email :  
Autres commentaires et suggestions : 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX E : GLOSSARY 
 
These definitions are provided solely for the purpose of this thesis. Web links are provided when 
applicable for additional information. 
Agroforestry: The simple definition of Agroforestry is planting trees on farm or tree based 
farming. The World Agroforestry centre defines Agroforestry as a collective name for 
land-use systems and practices where woody perennials are deliberately integrated with 
crops and/or animals on the same land management unit. 
Adaptive co-management: An emerging approach for governance of social-ecological systems. 
Novelty of adaptive co-management comes from combining the iterative learning 
dimension of adaptive management and the linkage dimension of collaborative 
management in which rights and responsibilities are jointly shared. Resilience alliance 
(http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/adaptive_comanagement)  
Baka: One of the indigenous ethnic groups in Cameroon. The group extends to many 
neigbouring countries on the Congo basin such as Central Africa Republic, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.  
Carbon dioxide equivalent: a measure used to compare different greenhouse gasses on their 
contribution to radiative forcing. The UNFCC (2005) currently uses global warming 
potentials as factors to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Carbon stocks: total carbon stored in terrestrial ecosystems as a specific time as living or dead 
plant biomass and in soil, along with usually negligible quantities of animal biomass. The 
unit is Mgha-1 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): A project-based mechanism defined in article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol which allows a country with an emission-reduction or emission-
limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol to implement emission-reduction 
projects in developing countries. Such project can earn saleable certified emission 
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tone of CO2, which can be counted 
towards meeting Kyoto targets. 
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Co-management: The process of management in which government shares power with resource 
users, with each specific rights and responsibilities relating to information and decision 
making (glossary of statistical terms-OECD, 2001: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=384)  
Ecoregion: an area defined by its environmental conditions, especially climate, landforms, and 
soil characteristics (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ecoregion ) 
Emissions: the release of greenhouse gases and or their precursors into the atmosphere over a 
specific area and period of time (UNFCCC, Article 1.4) 
Forest: In this document, a forest is according to FAO, a land area of more than 0.50ha, with a 
tree canopy cover of more than 105, which is not primarly under agricultural or other 
specific non-forest land use.  
Forest dynamics: describes the underlying physical and biological forces that shape and change 
a forest over time, or the continuous state of change that alters the composition and the 
structure of a forest. Two basic elements of forest dynamics are forest succession and 
forest disturbance. 
Forest ecosystem: A dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and 
their abiotic environment interacting as a functional unit, where trees are key component 
of the system. Human, with their cultural, economic and environmental needs are an 
integral part of many forest ecosystems. (http://www.cbd.int/forest/definitions.shtml. ) 
Kyoto Protocol: a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). It is an international environmental treaty negotiated in 1997 with the goal of 
stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Land use: Land use is the human use of land. Land use involves the management and 
modification of natural environment or wilderness into built environment such as 
settlement s and semi-natural habitats such as arable fields, pastures and managed woods. 
It has also been defined as “the arrangements, activities and inputs people undertake in a 
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certain land cover type to produce, change or maintain it”(FAO, 1997a, FAO/UNEP, 
1999). From Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/land_use  
Land use change: the shift from one land use of a land area to another, such as from forestry to 
agriculture. 
Local actors: Actors, such as communes, communities or individual households or farmers, 
directly or indirectly involved in, or affected by an intervention. 
Nested approach: A hybrid approach to REDD+ accounting that includes elements of both sub-
national and national approaches to REDD+. Under this approach, countries can adopt two 
unique features: first, the capacity to scale up from a sub-national to a national approach 
over time. Secondly, countries have the option to account for and receive international 
offsets at sub-national and national levels simultaneously.( 
http://rainforests.mongabay.com/carbon-lexicon/nested-Approach.html ) 
Non Timber forest Products (NTFPs): any commodity obtained from the forest that does not 
involve harvesting trees for wood products or pulp (paper products), such as game 
animals, nuts and seeds, berries, mushrooms, oils, foliage, medicinal plants or fuelwood. 
Ownership: The legal right of possessing something (legal and economical term). 
Paradigm: a set of normative factors, assumptions or ideas that serve as a pattern of model for 
social or political action. 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES), also known as payments for environmental services (or 
benefits), are incentives offered to farmers or landowners in exchange for managing their 
land to provide some sort of ecological service. They have been defined as "a transparent 
system for the additional provision of environmental services through conditional 
payments to voluntary providers. These programs promote the conservation of natural 
resources in the marketplace. Some PES programs involve contracts between consumers 
of ecosystem services and the suppliers of these services. 
Wetland: Land where an excess of water is the dominant factor determining the nature of soil 
development and the type of animals and plant communities living on the soil surface. It 
spans a continuum of environments where terrestrial and aquatic systems intergrade.   
